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Documents

June 2007

The Tanov Case. Folder 43. The Chekist Anthology.

In this entry Mitrokhin describes the essential role that the KGB agent Tanov played in repressing the dissident movement in the Soviet Union in the late 1960s. Mitrokhin states that Tanov had important connections and was a trusted person among Soviet dissidents which helped him to receive important information about their activities. Tanov’s primary target was Orlova who was friends with many dissidents in the U.S.S.R. and in the West. She introduced Tanov to many of her acquaintances, which helped him to broaden his connections. Mitrokhin partially focuses on describing how Tanov gained trust among anti-soviet activists. Mitrokhin also states that because of Tanov’s critical role, the KGB was able to establish a detailed list of dissidents, their activities, connections, places where they met as well as personal portraits

February 23, 1954

From the Journal of Ambassador Pavel Yudin: Record of Conversation with Mao Zedong, 4 January 1954

A memorandum of conversation between Mao Zedong and Pavel Yudin. Yudin informs Mao about the Soviet "uncovering" of Lavrentii Beria's espionage. Mao thanks for the information and notes that it will be highly useful for China. He hints that the political atmosphere in the CCP had been "unhealthy" as some people have tried to use others' mistakes to undermine their reputation. In this connection, Mao refers to Zhang Guotao as a Guomindang spy, and also speculates that Wang Ming may have been recruited by the Guomindang as early as 1930.

October 23, 1981

Cooperative Agreement between the Interior Ministry of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet KGB for the summer of 1981 - 1985

The two parties consent to assist each other in the surveillance of goods going between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, letters going between the two countries and from them to capitalist countries, correspondence sent from Czechoslovak or Soviet citizens to people who recently arrived from capitalist countries, the mailing of anti-socialist materials sent through the two nations and mail involving anti-socialist propaganda sent to either country from capitalist countries. Both parties also agree to exchange information on ways subversives use the post to their advantage and how each country’s officials monitor post suspected of containing ideologically injurious material.

1961

Intelligence Report on Counterintelligence Interactions with Great Britain and Israel

A report on the progress of agent recruitment.

April 1, 1982

Report from Gen. G. Anachkov on Counterintelligence Work Against US Intelligence Activity

July 25, 1983

Information from Gen. G. Anachkov on Albanian intelligence Officers’ Recruitment of Agents in Bulgaria

June 2007

Pseudonym. Folder 11. The Chekist Anthology.

Mitrokhin states that discipline was the main reason for assigning a pseudonym to a KGB agent. Some agents refused to choose a pseudonym, considering it to be humiliating. But as Mitrokhin points out, a refusal to use a pseudonym could diminish the psychological and operational effect of the recruitment process. The KGB Order No. 00430 stipulated that all recruits had to sign a non-disclosure agreement regarding their collaboration with the agency. The KGB Order No. 00235 specified that the most valuable agents had to be indexed solely by their respective pseudonyms. As a recruitment tactic, Mitrokhin notes, the use of a pseudonym enhanced agent’s awareness of the secretive nature of one’s work and accentuated the conspiratorial function of the KGB.

June 2007

Directorate K Memorandum No. 153/838, 21 January 1976. Folder 13. The Chekist Anthology

The Memorandum No. 153/838 considered problems associated with the dissident movement of the Peoples Workers’ Union (Narodno-trudovoy soyuz, NTS). Vasili Mitrokhin writes that among the primary concerns mentioned in the Memorandum was the execution of complex active measures to aggravate contradictions between the leadership of various NTS groups.

The Memorandum instructed operatives to observe relations of the NTS with the publishers of the journal “Continent.” In order to fuel up tensions between the NTS groups, operatives needed to, among other things, find out whether members of the “Continent” received higher payments than members of the NTS. In general, Mitrokhin suggests that the foremost purpose of the Memorandum was to gather disreputable information and undermine activities of the NTS.

June 2007

Tracking down writers of anonymous letters and leaflets, 1957-74. Folder 14. The Chekist Anthology.

Vasili Mitrokhin describes investigative methods used during anti-Soviet incidents in Sverdlovsk and Serov. On November 7, 1969 anti-Soviet leaflets were distributed in the city of Sverdlovsk. The KGB collected 60 copies. It was determined that the leaflets were made on a portable typewriter of a foreign make using a standard-format paper. It was also estimated based on the content of the leaflets that the author was approximately 17-20 years old. On April 26, 1970 the anonymous leaflets appeared in the city for the second time. They were printed on the same typewriter, but differed in content. The KGB operatives collected 14 copies. Similarly to the first group of leaflets, they feature a signature of the “Executive body of the party ‘Free Russia’.”

On May 1, 1970 identical leaflets were disseminated in the city of Serov. The KGB operatives narrowed down the circle of suspects to 176 students. From local testimonies, they discovered that Uzlov, a student at the Ural Institute of Engineers, had been a member of a youth organization called “Revolutionary Workers’ Party,” which was later renamed to “Free Russia.” Nikolay Shaburov (born 1945) and Victor Pestov (born 1946) were leaders of the “Free Russia.” They designed the text of the leaflets and recruited followers to help distribute the copies. Members of the “Free Russia” were arrested and convicted.

June 2007

The KGB of the Ukrainian SSR. Annual review by V.V. Fedorchuk of counter-intelligence operations in 1970. Folder 16. The Chekist Anthology.

Annual review presented by V.V. Fedorchuk, chairman of the KGB in the Ukrainian SSR, summarizes the main successes, failures, and future priorities of the KGB in 1971.

Pagination