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Documents

September 6, 1964

Note by MD Cabinet on Von Hassel Declaration

Note on declaration by FRG Defense Minister Von Hassel on Italy's position vis-à-vis MLF. Annexes missing.

April 17, 1963

MAE Cable Report on French Position on MLF

Report by italian representative to the Atlantic Council A. Alessandrini on objections by French representativ to NATO MLF.

April 7, 1967

US Embassy Paris Telegram 15735 to State Department, 'Vice President’s Visit: Meeting with General de Gaulle on April 7 – Nonproliferation Treaty'

During his meeting with French president de Gaulle, Vice President Humphrey said that Washington knew the “French position” of opposition to the NPT, but wanted to know what de Gaulle thought the “German attitude” should be.

May 22, 1964

State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin H. Read to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, 'NSAM 241 on Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Plant'

Noting that the situation that gave rise to NSAM 41 had improved, Read informed Bundy that intelligence reporting would continue but he wanted permission to stop work responsive to the NSAM. There had been “no indication of any attempts by the French to enlist German or Italian cooperation in the Pierrrelatte project.”

May 12, 1964

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk, UK Foreign Secretary Butler, and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, 'Tripartite Discussion of Non-Dissemination'

In this discussion between Rusk and the British and French Foreign Ministers, the three discuss a proposed British nonproliferation declaration. Rusk had no objection but Couve de Murville found the declaration “patronizing” because it said “in effect that we [nuclear weapons states] are sinners and don’t want others to join us in sin.”

July 5, 1963

Secretary of State Rusk to the President, 'Interim Reply to Your Memorandum of May 30, 1963, for Holders of NSAM 241'

In this memorandum, Secretary of State Rusk noted Minister Lenz’s denials of any German connection with Pierrelatte or any interest in supporting the French weapons program. He declared that the agencies would continue “reviewing allied attitudes toward the Pierrelatte project and possible measures for inhibiting bilateral cooperation.”

June 6, 1963

Thomas L. Hughes, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Secretary of State, Research Memorandum, 'Franco-German Military Nuclear Cooperation,' REU-43

In this report, INR noted that the French had walked back statements by Charles de Gaulle in January 1963 that he would not object to the development of a West German nuclear capability. This report also includes notes on why the French opposed an MLF, claiming Washington might be "whetting the German appetite" for a national nuclear capability.

May 29, 1963

State Department Telegram 6389 to US Embassy United Kingdom

In this telegram, President Kennedy encourages Prime Minister Macmillan to take a positive interest in the MLF project, in which the British had little interest because of financial reasons and their doubts about the German role. Kennedy also expressed concern about the future of German nuclear efforts.

May 29, 1963

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William Tyler to Secretary of State Rusk, 'Rumored Secret Military Annex to Franco-German Treaty' with Attachment on Same Subject

In this document, Assistant Secretary to European Affairs, William Tyler, discussed the State Department's request to the US Embassy to ask the West German government whether there was an arrangement in the French-German Friendship Treaty that included a secret annex on military and nuclear cooperation.

May 21, 1963

Atomic Energy Commission, 'German Participation in Pierrelatte Gaseous Diffusion Plant,' with Cover Memo from Myron B. Kratzer, Division of International Affairs, to Mr. Thomas and Mr. Kaufman, Department of State

This AEC report looked at the Pierrelatte plant’s prospective capabilities, possible West German motives for seeking an independent supply of enriched uranium (possibly in cooperation with the French), the “adverse” implications of a French-German project, and policy alternatives available to Washington. If the West Germans were determined to contribute to the French enrichment project, the AEC saw serious risks including the “the prospects of a Franco-German military alliance that could constitute a European third force capable of dominating Western Europe."

Pagination