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August 21, 1970

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan, Park Chung Hee's August 15 Address

In a drastic change from previous policy, President Park Chung Hee called for the peaceful reunification of the peninsula. One of the prerequisites would be North Korea's uneqivocal acceptance of the competence and authority of the UN. Some believe that the strength of the ROK economy and SALT program may have prompted Park's change in attitude.

November 10, 1965

Cable 157 from the US Embassy in Gabon to the Department of State

During a visit to the Nounona uranium mines, Ambassador Bane learned that all processed ore went to France for metal extraction by the Atomic Energy Agency.

January 20, 1966

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

March 30, 1983

CIA Report, 'New Information on South Africa’s Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation' (redacted)

CIA report summaries new information on Israel-South African nuclear cooperation. According to the report, South Africa formerly launched its weapons program in 1973, and paused it in 1979 following the international discovery of the Kalahari nuclear test site. Military cooperation between South Africa and Israel is believed to be extensive, with continual contact between personnel and the large-scale sale of arms. Aside from the South African sale of depleted uranium to Israel in the mid-1970s, the CIA had no hard evidence of nuclear cooperation between the two.

December 18, 1980

Memorandum from Chairman, Non-Proliferation Coordinating Committee James Malone, 'Recommendations for the Reagan Administration Non-Proliferation Policy'

James Malone writes to US Secretary of Energy designate James Edwards with recommendations from the Non-Prolifreation Coordinating Committee for the Reagan administration representing the views of nuclear industry groups.

January 21, 1979

US Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 'The 22 September 1979 Event'

Forwarded to Ralph Earle, Director of US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on the 22 September 1979 explosion, or Vela Incident, concludes that it was a nuclear explosion.

December 11, 1995

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Memorandum by Robert S. Rochlin, 'Implications of an Indian Nuclear Weapons Test'

Memo from senior scientist at the ACDA, Robert S. Rochlin, discussing the possible serious political and diplomatic consequences of India launching a nuclear test. In the event that Rao had made a decision to test, the United States did not have enough “leverage” to encourage a policy reversal or to prevent a regional arms race; Washington would need to organize a “concerted intervention by all the major states.”

December 11, 1995

State Department Telegram 285472 to US Embassy in Tokyo, 'ACDA Director Hollum’s Meeting with Japanese Officials'

Talking points for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Hollum from the State Department. Hollum was instructed to “urge” the Japanese to convey their concern to the government of India and “strong opposition [to] any such tests.” The State Department did not want to make any public statements about the situation because that “would be counterproductive,” that is, it would tip the U.S.’s hand Japan to tell Tokyo to voice its concerns over the possible Indian Nuclear Test to New Delhi.

June 19, 1953

National Security Council Report, NSC 158, 'United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States'

Recommendations adopted by the National Security Council at the suggestion of the Psychological Strategy Board on covert actions to be undertaken in the Soviet Satellite States. Authorized by the National Security Council, NSC 158 envisaged aggressive psychological warfare to exploit and heighten the unrest behind the Iron Curtain. The policy was endorsed by President Eisenhower on June 26, 1953.

June 14, 1948

Central Intelligence Agency Report, "Effects of Soviet Restrictions on the US Position in Berlin"

Describes effect of Soviet restrictive measures in Berlin on US intelligence and propaganda activities and on operations of the joint military government.

Pagination