Mitrokhin notes that beginning in December 1970 and during the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the KGB had the following objective: to enhance intelligence and counter-intelligence activities of the Cheka. To achieve this purpose, the KGB established a strategic unit consisting of heads of directorates, deputy secretaries, and other leading committee members chaired by Lieutenant General S.K. Tsvigun. Particular attention was given to signs of terrorist intentions.

The unit counteracted eight anti-Soviet groups and organizations, including the Revolutionary Party of Intellectuals (Sverdlovsk), Russian Workers’ Party (Rostov-na-Donu), Struggle for Personal Freedom Union (Temirtau), Struggle for Liberation of Armenia Union (Yerevan), a group of Zionists, and others. Security level was elevated for entry into Moscow, monitoring of important targets, and conducting street patrols. On Red Square, 67 people harboring anti-Soviet views were detained, and four attempted suicides by burning were prevented.

In 1976, Leningrad KGB Directorate initiated active measures against “Plushkin,” laboratory director, and “Monarkhist,” employee of a suburban forestry, both of whom were intending to establish an anti-Soviet organization.

The parties agree to assist one another in the collection of intelligence information on political, economic, scientific and technical matters and exchange information on suspicious contacts of Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens suspected to be spies or subversive. Both agree to the exchange of counter-intelligence regarding Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens working in scientific organizations and international exhibitions, fairs and congresses. Steps are outlined to protect railroad cargo using troops from Warsaw Pact states, prevent eavesdropping of telecommunications and detect and prevent foreign terrorist attacks on Czechoslovak and Soviet airplanes and anti-socialist interruption of international trucking lines. Special mention is made of multiple international transportation organizations that need to be monitored. Information-sharing procedures are agreed to for commercial and industrial firms, banks, scientific centers and international scientific organizations.

The two parties agree to worker, including Interior Ministry officials and university students, exchanges in the field of academia, law, politics, criminal investigation, fire-fighting, engineering, external relations, science and public safety. Provisions are made of the exchange of documents relating to criminology, public safety, the Soviet military, politics and fire-fighting techniques. Both parties agree to exchange information on thefts of shipments, detection and prevention of anti-state activity in border regions and the protection of public order.

This 25 April 1974 directive from the Centre is attributed to an author identified as “Sviridov.” It was sent to KGB Line A residencies in Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Aden, Samaa, and others, and contains instructions for planning “active measures.”

“Sviridov” identified a variety of channels through which the KGB could influence Middle Eastern governments, militaries, and political groups, while suppressing anti-Soviet groups. Additionally, the residencies were instructed to plan active measures in advance to prepare for future contingencies.

In an explanatory note, Mitrokhin explains that “Sviridov” is a pseudonym for then KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, and that Line A is the arm of the KGB concerned with active measures intended to influence foreign countries.

This folder consists of a detailed operational plan for cooperation between the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB for the years 1975-1978. Specific objectives include penetrating the military, political, and economic establishments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and NATO, impeding the activities of the Czech Congress of National Development (KNR), collecting information on “Zionist intrigues,” gathering scientific/technical information on Western achievements in the fields of biological, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, and using active measures to curtail the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany.

In this entry Vasili Mitrokhin expresses the KGB concerns regarding the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists’ (NTS) anti-socialist activities held in the Soviet Union and in the West. Mitrokhin states that the KGB had the task of taking control of NTS’ activities as well as destroing their reputation and connections with other anti-Soviet organizations. In order to paralyze the NTS, the KGB’s fundamental goal was to establish strong connections with the organization by sending undercover agents. Toward the end of 1963, the NTS became familiar with the presence of KGB agents among their members. KGB’s main goal was to create an illusion that the NTS was ruled by the KGB, which would help to make America and the West to distrust the organization. According to Mitrokhin, taking over the NTS’s publication “The Posev” was important as well. Mitrokhin provides a KGB plan to overturn the publication and he also attaches the list of all KGB agents who were involved in this undertaking, including their short biographies and codenames.

In this entry Mitrokhin provides a history of the Cheka’s creation and its missions in Europe between 1918 and 1925.

Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.

Mitrokhin reports on KGB investigation of the Troyistsky couple. Troyitskaya Lidiya Petrovna was a legal consultant at the Central Bureau of Technical Assistance, Glavzapaduralstroy. Her husband Troyitsky Zinovy Anatoliyevich was a member of the CPSU, senior instructor of law at the Perm State University. In order to distract the Troyitsky couple and wiretap their apartment, A. G. Korolkov, a member of the CPSU, reserve colonel, and the deputy director of the Central Bureau of Technical Assistance at Glavzapaduralstroy, was encouraged to establish friendly relations with them.

From the audio record of the couple’s conversation, it was clear they were intending to go on vacation on September 2, 1964 and travel on a cruise ship to Astrakhan, stopping over in the town of Volsk, Saratov Oblast, on the way back to see Troyitskaya’s sister—L. P. Kazakova. The KGB launched the operation “Artists.” listening equipment was installed in their cabin on the ship. The couple slandered the USSR and expressed concerned for their safety in their conversations. At Kazakova’s apartment, the Troyitsky couple listened to the Voice of America, BBC and other radio stations. On September 17, the KGB conducted a covert search of the premises and photographed a notebook with addresses of their Soviet and foreign contacts On March 23, 1965 the KGB searched Troyitskys’ apartment, discovering a copy of the NTS (Narodno-trudovoy Soyuz) brochure in a Christmas ornament, and other items. In the aftermath of the search, the Troyitsky couple was arrested. Zinovy Troyitsky was sentenced to six years in various strict-regime facilities and was stripped of his license to teach. Lidiya Troyitska was sentenced to three years in a strict-regime colony.