Unofficial translation of correspondence between PM Craxi and President Reagan regarding strategic arms limitations and deterrence. Reagan outlines the planned US measures given lack of effort and willingness by the USSR to arrive to a binding agreement.

Some reflections on the outcome of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Ottawa. The Italian government praised the NATO resolution to keep the INF at a minimum level of deterrence, while critiquing the Soviet refusal to compromise.

This memo to Prime Minister Bettino Craxi argues against the merging of the INF and START negotiations proposed by the Finnish government and backed by Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau. The memo suggests that the proposal could jeopardize the Geneva talks and harm European interests.

These are the minutes of the meeting of the National Directorate of the Socialist Party. During this meeting the decision was made to accept the deployment and vote for it in the Parliamentary debate, even if the PSI was not part of the government yet. The minutes contain a long presentation by the future Defense Minister, Lelio Lagorio, which explains the strategic rationale behind the deployment. A lively debate follows, during which Craxi and Lagorio steer the Central Committee towards accepting the deployment.

A comparison between the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the Anglo – French system capable of reaching the Soviet Union. The memo uses data to demonstrate that the Soviet INF outnumbered by far NATO nuclear forces.

A memo about the relationship between Italy and the Soviet Union during the Geneva negotiations. It suggests some steps that Italy should undertake to keep alive the East-West dialogue and to preserve Italian economic interests.

During a meeting of the Central Committee of the Socialist Party, Bettino Craxi presents his point of view on the tense international situation.

A memo to Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi from his foreign policy advisor Antonio Badini about the domestic constraints on Dutch foreign policy.

A letter from Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu to Helmut Kohl. Ceausescu makes some suggestions to ease the Geneva negotiations: the Warsaw Pact could accept “not taking into account the UK and French missiles”: the German government could “postpone the deployment [of the Intermediate missiles] to the end of 1984 or the beginning of 1985”; or the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries should organize a conference “to discuss the issue of the Intermediate Range Missiles”.

A memo to Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi from his Diplomatic Counselor Antonio Badini. Badini warns against the latest Soviet proposals. He suggests that agreeing to them without making any concessions regarding the deployment of American missiles would be tantamount to the realization of a long term goal of the Soviet Union, i.e. the decoupling between the Western European and the American defense system. […] He writes that the Soviet proposals “can be taken as a possible basis for an agreement is surprising. We can
only hope that this fact does not imply that, from a political and psychological standpoint, the process of Finlandization of Europe is far more advanced than we believed thus far.”