This Foreign Ministry analysis was written for French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville. It spells out the obstacles facing an independent deterrent two weeks after France’s first nuclear test on February 13, 1960. The author cautions that a “minor deterrent” of a few dozen 100-kilton atom bombs loaded on vulnerable, short-range Mirage IV A fighter-bombers would cost hundreds of billions of francs. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles with which to threaten Moscow would require an additional 8-10 years and a further cost of 500 billion francs (around $100 billion in 1960). In order to match the superpowers’ thermonuclear level, that figure could rise as a high as “several trillion” over more than a decade, during which time the United States and the Soviet Union might well leapfrog the French force de dissuasion.

Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 29 July 1989 describes the latest developments in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Honduras, Cambodia, the Soviet Union, China, Chile, Sri Lanka, India, and Panama.

MAE DAP memo on prospective US-USSR INF and START negotiations, Soviet position and objectives, role of Europe in promoting an intermediate solution for INF. The paper addresses also the issue of the deployment in Western Europe of Pershing II and Cruise missiles, and discusses consultation in Atlantic Council with amb. E. Rowny on European role question in START talks.

MAE DAP memo on resumption of negotiations on INF. Observations on Allied negotiating position regarding an intermediate solution. Discussion of the Soviet position (press conference by Foreign Minister Gromyko, statements by Secretary-General PCUS Andropov): The paper also discusses the issue of French and British national nuclear deterrents, deployment of Euro-missiles and Soviet SS-20, comments Allied countries and perspectives on the negotiations.

Report by NATO Special Group to the Ministers on how to approach negotiations with the URSS on INF.

Report on NATO Washington meeting on INF negotiations. The report addresses the US position concerning phasing, the issues raised by the other delegations as well as problems related to burden sharing.

Note by ambassador to NATO Fulci on US request for secrecy concerning the intended use of euromissile bases after INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty. 

Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Analysis of the recent Chinese nuclear weapon test and it's strategic implications for China's diplomatic and military policies.