Gorbachev et al prepare for their upcoming UN visit, and discuss presenting their reformed policies, arms reductions, the implementation of perestroika, withdrawal of troops from Hungary, and overall Soviet-American relations.

Reaction to V.G. Kulikov's report at the Conference of the Political Consultation Committee of the Warsaw Treaty regarding arms sales and military armaments in socialist countries, compared to NATO military policies.

Extensive account of Cheab's visit to Budapest, Kiev, Moscow, Leningrad, Georgia, Bucharest, Sofia, and Plovdiv.

A purported speech by Stalin to a special session of the Politburo. He argues that because of differing ideologies between the USSR and the United States, hostilities are inevitable and, for that reason, the country's military should be enlarged. He praises the example set by the Chinese communist movement, and notes that India should be where the Soviet Union directs its attention to next.

Brian Murray questions the validity of the document in CWIHP Working Paper No. 12, where the document was first published.

Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Gheorghiu Dej, informing the Romanian leadership of the decision taken by the Soviet leadership to withdraw the Soviet Red Army troops from the territory of Romania. Military and security services advisors will however remain in place until 1963.

This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”

This document outlines the politico-military situation in advance of a 17-25 March 1975 operational command staff exercise. The exercise scenario begins with a conventional offensive initiated by the 'Westerners' at 0600 on 17 March which escalated to a theater nuclear war by 19 March. This briefing document for exercise participants describes the military situation as of the morning of 19 March, including the tactical information on the geographic disposition, activities, and status of Warsaw Pact and 'Western' forces, air defense, communications, electronic warfare, and the situation in the rear. Appendices (included as a .pdf) contain detailed information on: The order of battle of the troops of the 4th Army, The availability of nuclear warheads and surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] in the 4th Army, Information about the nuclear strikes of the "Westerners," Information about the nuclear strikes by the "Easterners" on troops and objectives in the "Westerners" rear, Information about the engineer troops of the 4th Army, Information about the chemical troops of the 4th Army, Information about the signal troops of the 4th Army, Information about the rear of the 4th Army, The order of battle and the identified numbering of the formations and units of the "Westerners."