Skip to content

Results:

1 - 10 of 12

Documents

December 19, 1992

Directive of the President of Ukraine, 'On Measures to Ensure the Implementation of the Nuclear Policy of Ukraine and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Located on its Territory'

The directive discusses the procedures through which Ukraine will implement its nuclear policy and eliminate nuclear weapons within its boarders.

September 10, 1982

Report of KGB’s Governance about the Emergency Stop of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Unit No.1 on 9 September 1982

The document describes the accident which took place at Chernobyl nuclear power plant prior to 1986 disaster. The information on the accident which took place on 9 September 1982 was classified. The document demonstrates that before the Chernobyl disaster the Soviet government knew about the deficiences of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

August 28, 1986

KGB’s Report Operational Disorder in Organizing Activities Aimed at Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster Elimination

This document describes the deficiencies which were made in activities aimed at overlapping of Chernobyl disaster’s consequences. These deficiencies could lead to new victims because the security rules of handling with dangerous radioactive materials were broken.

May 16, 1986

Report on Radiation Situation. Secret. Signed by Experts A.V. Produnov and G.V. Yeremin

Radiation levels in Pripyat and the surrounding area following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.

May 4, 1986

KGB’s Report on Options of Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster Elimination

Physicists at the Academy of Sciences give advice for containing the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.

April 17, 1940

Conclusion of Radium Institute of Academy of Sciences on Invention of UIPhT Fellows Sent to Agency of Military Chemical Defense

In this letter two nuclear scientists from UIPhT described the construction of the nuclear bomb and proposed to start activities in producing of the nuclear arsenal and make these activities secret. Two Ukrainian physicists were first Soviet scientists who revealed the way of producing the nuclear weapon (of course they did not know about the similar inventions of the western scientists which were made at the same time because of secrecy regime).

January 1941

Claim for an Invention from F. Lange and V. Maslov, 'Thermocirculation centrifuge'

This document’s proposal about centrifuge received positive assessments from the leading Soviet academicians in Moscow.

October 1940

Technical Proposal of F. Lange, V. Maslov, and V. Shpinel, 'Fission of Uranium Isotopes by Using Method of Coriolis Acceleration'

Kharkov Institute scientists proposed in this document the concrete steps to build a nuclear weapon. The document demonstrates that Ukrainian physicists understood how to receive weapons grade uranium and elaborated concrete technical proposals to achieve this goal through uranium enrichment in centrifuge.

October 17, 1940

Claim for an Invention from V. Maslov and V. Shpinel, 'About Using of Uranium as an Explosive and Toxic Agent'

In this letter two nuclear scientists from UIPhT described the construction of the nuclear bomb and proposed to start activities in producing of the nuclear arsenal and make these activities secret. Two Ukrainian physicists were first Soviet scientists who revealed the method of producing a nuclear weapon (of course they did not know about the similar inventions of western scientists which were made at the same time under great secrecy).

February 28, 1940

Letter from Director of the Institute of Physical Problems Petr Kapitsa to State Plan of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 'About Cyclotron of Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology'

This document is an answer to the letter from State Plan of Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic to Academy of Sciences of USSR “About Rationality to Construct Cyclotron in UIPhT” (22 Feb 1940). The answer of academician Petr Kapitsa to this letter was very critical. Kapitsa wrote that UIPhT “during the last several years built a number of research installation but did not finish them. However it started to build new installations. Such activities of UIPhT can’t be considered as normal”. So Petr Kapitsa discouraged building a cyclotron in UIPhT, and this was one of the reasons why this institute did not become the leading nuclear center in USSR.

Pagination