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July 27, 1953

Notes on Visit of General Clark with President Rhee (8:30-8:55, 27 July 1953)

General Clark tries to convince President Rhee to attend the armistice signing, emphasizing that Kim Il Sung will not be present. Ambassador Briggs then reports that President Eisenhower has approved $200 million in aid for Korean rehabilitation.

August 6, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (Second Session)

During the second Dulles-Rhee conference, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles led the discussion with the subject of Korean rehabilitation. Rhee makes a few suggestions that both sides should consider if Korean reconstruction should take place. These suggestions include: 1) rehabilitating Korean productive industry, 2) directly allocating money for Korea’s rehabilitation instead of doing so through the reconstruction of the Japanese economy and, 3) prevent the importation of Japanese technicians to Korea. Dulles answers he will consider Rhee suggestions, however, the US will continue to aid Japan to prevent losing her to communism.

February 10, 1955

Letter, General Taylor to President Syngman Rhee

General Taylor emphasizes the important contributions the Korean National Railway has made toward the military effort and rehabilitation of the Korean civil economy. He informs Rhee that the US will soon reduce its rail supervisory personnel and the Korean government will now have to support and secure the future of the railway-including the new repair and replace program- to help maintain operation after the war.

July 17, 1955

Letter, Lieutenant General Collier to President Rhee

For the 7th anniversary of Korea’s Constitution Day, General Collier congratulates and praises South’s Korea’s determination to fight communism and remain an independent nation.

March 4, 1954

Letter, President Syngman Rhee to General Van Fleet

President Rhee once again suggests that the US government should increase the ROK defense forces. It will not only be cheaper to fund Korean (over American) divisions, it also means that Americans do not need to fight in Korea. Rhee then negotiates that if the US government implements the necessary military buildup aid, he too will not take any “unilateral action” for or against the future Geneva Conference until after it has been in session. Finally, Rhee advocates his disapproval of US interest to build up Japan.