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2022

Antonio Mariani, 'The 36th Strategic Interdiction Brigade: An Italian Contribution to the Cold War' (Excerpts)

These excerpts from the memoirs of a former member of Italy’s 36th Air Brigade, published by the Italian Air Force, provides fascinating perspective on the shock felt by officers when they received the dismantling instructions and then how they planned and carried out their tasks. The following sentences convey the emotional reactions: “The dismantling, for those who experienced it, was a real demolition. A frenetic destructive activity pervaded the military community which, almost with anger and a certain sadism, destroyed and reduced to useless remains everything on which it had studied, worked and operated.” As the excerpts makes clear, not everything was destroyed and junked. Consistent with the Joint Staff’s original proposals, sensitive components, such as the warheads were returned to the U.S., while other parts of the missiles were salvaged and made available to other organizations. Some equipment went to Italy’s “San Marco” space research program, just as Prime Minister Fanfani had proposed to President Kennedy during their meeting in January 1963.

To what extent the dismantling procedure in Turkey paralleled the one in Italy remains unclear, at least on the basis of available documentation.

March 19, 1963

Memorandum from Major General W. O. Senter, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems and Logistics, U.S. Air Force, with attachment 'A Plan for the Withdrawal and Disposition of the SM-78 (Jupiter) Weapon System from Italy and Turkey [:] Operation Pot Pie

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had appointed the Air Force as “Executive Agent” for taking charge of the Jupiter removal from Italy and Turkey, and Air Force General William Senter signed off on the plan of action. Under the plan, the Jupiter’s classified components, including the warheads and guidance systems, would be returned to the United States, while remaining portions of the missiles were to be rendered “unidentifiable,” the meaning of which was described in detail (PDF p. 7): removal of the missiles from launching areas, separating the engines from the missiles, dismantling “sub-systems,” and “orderly disposition of the remaining components.”  This was consistent with the Joint Staff’s recommendations for salvage procedures to ensure that both Italy and Turkey had access to useful non-sensitive equipment and parts.  Under the plan, various U.S. military organizations, including the Italian and Turkish Air Forces, would have specific responsibilities, which were described in detail as were procedures for the return of the warheads, re-entry vehicles and guidance systems to the United States.


The dismantling operation in Italy, nicknamed Pot Pie I, would begin on April 1, while the operation in Turkey, Pot Pie II, would begin on April 15, with a “minimum of publicity” in both countries.  The plan would be classified as “Confidential NOFORN,” although, as noted, elements of it were to be shared with Italian and Turkish officials.

February 1, 1963

OSD [Office of Secretary of Defense] Telegram 020123Z to Department of State

By late January, the negotiations with Turkey were bogged down, with Defense Minister Sancar asking for a Turkish military presence on the Polaris submarines as well as delivery of nuclear weapons for the F-100 Super Sabres before the Jupiters were replaced. Without a formal agreement on the Jupiters, the U.S. government held back from a decision on another matter: the delivery of F-104G fighter-bombers. Nevertheless, Defense Department officials approved a decision to “provide first available aircraft” in April 1963, which was necessary to authorize the Air Force’s “preliminary preparatory actions.” The U.S. would preserve its “bargaining position” by informing Turkey in writing that an “accelerated delivery date will become firm upon satisfactory conclusion of current US/Turkey negotiations.”

December 27, 1962

JCS Telegram 7947 to USCINCEUR [Commander-in-Chief European Command], CINCLANT [Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command] and DSTP [Director Strategic Target Planning Staff], Offutt Air Force Base, Info for CINCSAC [Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command]

This urgent message “of the highest sensitivity” from the Joint Chiefs to top commanders began with a misrepresentation of President Kennedy’s decision: “serious consideration [is] being given to withdrawal of JUPITERS from Italy and Turkey.” The recipients—General Lyman Lemnitzer [CINCEUR], Admiral Robert Dennison [CINCLANT], and General Thomas Power [DSTP]—were to assume that Italy and Turkey had agreed to the decision, that withdrawal of the Jupiters would occur by April 1, 1963, and that Polaris submarines would be in the Mediterranean by that date. Both USCINCEUR and DSTP, who directed work on the SIOP, were to consider retargeting requirements once the Jupiters went offline. CINCLANT was to consider the feasibility of deploying one, two, or three submarines.

December 27, 1990

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with the Turkish President Özal on Friday, 21 December 1990

Kohl and Özal debate the Gulf crisis and Turkey's request for the deployment of the air component of NATO's Allied Command Europe Mobile Force. In addition, they discuss the resignation of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

January 28, 1991

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany, January 28, 1991, 11:08-11:28 a.m.

On a phone call, Bush and Kohl discuss the Gulf War, including the evacuation of Iraqi planes to Iran, Saddam Hussein's state of mind, the role of Turkey, and German's financial contribution.

October 15, 2020

Interview with Eran Lerman

Eran Lerman is a former Israeli intelligence officer. He served as a member of the Israeli delegation to ACRS. 

November 4, 2020

Interview with Nabil Fahmy

Nabil Fahmy is a former Egyptian Foreign Minister and diplomat. He served as the head of the Egyptian delegation to ACRS as well as the head of Egypt’s delegation to most of the Steering committee meetings

November 4, 2020

Interview with Aly Erfan

Aly Erfan is a former Egyptian diplomat. He served as a member of the Egyptian delegation to ACRS. 

November 2, 2020

Interview with Ariel Levite

Dr. Ariel Levite is a former Israeli senior official. He served as a member of the Israeli delegation to ACRS and the inter-ministerial committee on arms control. 

Pagination