September 3, 1992
Cable from Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Foreign Ministry, 'Brazil-USA. Access to advanced technology. MTCR. Interview at the Department of State.'
This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)
From: Embassy in Washington To: Exteriores
CONFIDENTIAL
DCIA/DMAE/DNU/DCS
XIEX LOO G14
No. 1900
Date: 03/09/92
Brazil-USA. Access to advanced
technology. MTCR. Interview at
the Department of State.
1900 41915 - With views to take up again the dialogue about the Brazil-USA cooperation in issues linked to the “Missile Technology Control Regime” (MTCR), I had an interview today, September 2nd,, with Robert Einhorn, who replaced Elizabeth Verville as “Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-military Affairs” at the Department of State, and with Vahn H. Van Diepen, “Director of the Office of Weapons Proliferation Policy.” Secretary Carmen Lidia Richter also participated in the interview.
2. At the outset I recalled the Brazilian initiatives on nuclear non-proliferation, the Declaration of chemical and biological weapons and the measures related to the space program and to export controls of sensitive technologies.
3. Einhorn said that the measures adopted by Brazil are “important and impressive” and that they have been duly acknowledged by the American government, including by President Bush, who follows the issue directly. He added that as a result of the new Brazilian posture on this matter, new areas of cooperation between Brazil and the United States should open up. He recalled, in this context, that the American non-proliferation policy responds to security concerns and does not intend to affect commercial operation or technological programs of third countries. Nevertheless, some programs are still a source of concern, such as, for example, in the area of space, the capacitation for the launching of satellites, since the launching technology is no different from that related to the launching of ballistic missiles. For this reason, the United States would not contemplate bilateral cooperation in fields such as launching, or others that are equally included in category 1 of the list of products controlled by MTCR, even with regard to members of the IAEA.
4. Einhorn made clear that while MTCR is basically aimed at controlling the export of goods and technologies related to ballistic missiles, its provisions are also applied to “joint-ventures” or other forms of collaboration that might help in the development of technologies covered by the regime. He added that even among the members of the mechanism, the transfer of goods included in category 1 is not meant to occur. The only exception, he went on, were transfers made by the United States to the United Kingdom, in the field of ballistic missiles within the scope of cooperation agreements prior to the MTCR itself. The guidelines related to the MTCR do not deal, however, to the autonomous development of sensitive technologies. Nevertheless, the American legislation provides for the obligation to apply sanctions to the importer and the exporter of such technologies, regardless of membership in the MTCR, as happened both regarding India and Russia as a result of the recent operation of transfer of rocket engines. The restrictions imposed by the American legislation refer to the objective conditions of the project – construction of missiles that may have military use, for example – and not to the evaluation by the executive about the intentions of the country.
5. With reference to a recent article published by the New York Times (see my cable 1821 dated 8/19/92), about possible concern of the American authorities abut the lack of evidence of the stoppage of the project Condor II, Van Diepen remarked that this is a special case, since it does not regard a transfer but rather technology stolen from the United States. Einhorn recalled the commitment of the Argentine president and of Minister Tella to shut down the project, a commitment that the United States does not doubt, since they understand possible delays, due to internal resistance to the definitive termination of the project.
6. With regard to the visit of the quadrilateral group to Brazil and Argentina last April, Einhorn highlighted the positive character of the contacts and reiterated the interest of the United States to continue the dialogue. Van Diepen, who participated in the plenary meeting in Oslo, from June 29 to July 2 last, recalled that the report on the visits to Brazil and Argentina was presented during that meeting and that the members of MTCR stated their interest in pursuing the dialogue with both countries. Einhorn left open the hypothesis of Brazilian adherence or of a request for full participation in the regime, which would be examined by the members, in the light of the provisions of Brazilian legislation on export controls and the track record of Brazil in this field.
SERGIO AMARAL
This cable reports the meeting between Brazilian diplomat Sergio Amaral, Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant for Politico-Military Affairs, and Vahn H. Van Diepen, Director of the Office of Weapons Proliferation. Eihorn made clear during the meeting that space programs such as Brazil’s are a source of concern for the US administration because it could use the same technology developed for the SLV to build ballistic missiles.
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