Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to Wang Bingnan, 'Talking Points for the Fifth Meeting'

Top Secret

[To] Comrade [Wang] Bingnan:

[…]

[We] agree to your telegram of 3:00 p.m., 8 August, regarding the US willingness to reach an agreement and resolve some concrete issues.

Western journalists have published many speculative reports about the Sino-American talks. The US Army fabricated stories about how we mistreated eleven US fliers and the US and [South Korean President Syngman] Rhee intentionally created tension over the Korean issue. But people all over the world, including American people, demanded results from the Sino-American talks. This puts pressure on the US, who has been forced to reach some agreements [with us] during the talk. The US has consented that India may investigate and aid in the return of Chinese nationals. This is a sign that the US is preparing to sign an agreement with us. If the US walks one step further, agreeing to provide a complete list of Chinese nationals in the US and agrees that India looks after Chinese nationals in the US, it is equal to the recognition of the People’s Republic of China. This is unlikely at present. In addition to offering an explanation to our proposal IV, as to proposal II, the US side also repeatedly claims to have lifted restrictions on the return of Chinese nationals, which applies to Qian Xuesen. Regarding proposal III, the US side also re-supplied a list of seventy-six Chinese students. Thus, we have nearly achieved our goals regarding our four proposals. Yesterday, we proposed to delay the fifth meeting for a day. This is because we need sufficient time in order to telegraph to you the text of the speech. [We hope] that an agreement will be reached on Agenda I on 11 August.

The following items should be included in a possible agreement of 11 August.

1. Both sides declare that nationals residing in the other’s countries, who desire to return, are entitled to depart [for their respective country] unless they have unfinished civil or criminal cases.

2. To implement the aforementioned agreement, China entrusts India and the US entrusts the UK to aid their nationals in the other country on the issue of returning to their respective countries. The countries thus entrusted shall perform the following duties:

(a) Upon the request of a civilian of one side residing in the other’s country who desires to return or upon the request of his government made on his behalf, the entrusted country shall make representations with the government of the country in which the civilian is residing with a view to settling his difficulty in departure;

(b) In the event of a civilian of one side residing in the other who desires to return and who is being prevented from doing so, the entrusted country shall, upon his personal request or the request on his behalf by his government, conduct investigations and make representations with the government of the country in which the civilian concerned is residing, in accordance with the findings of the investigation with a view of arriving at a settlement;

(c) In the event that a civilian of one side residing in the other desires to return and finds difficulty in paying for the return journey, the entrusted country shall render him assistance on behalf of his government.

3. Upon the acceptance of the trusteeship described above by India and the UK in response to the requests of China and the US respectively, both sides shall give wide publicity to the details of this agreement by means of all available news media. India and the UK may also give similar publicity which they consider appropriate on the US and China respectively (This doesn’t exclude the publication of the complete text after today’s meeting).

We’ll send to you the formal text of this agreement in another telegram.

Before proposing this draft agreement on 11 August, [you should] make a speech, pointing out that the US has repeatedly promised the elimination of restrictions in accordance with our second proposal. The US also re-supplied a list of seventy-six Chinese students in accordance with our third proposal. We are satisfied with the arrangements. We have provided a complete list of all US nationals in China. But the US has not provided a list of all Chinese nationals in accordance with our first proposal. We express regret over that matter and declare to reserve our right to put forward this demand in the future (we would raise this matter again if the US bothers us on Agenda II issues).

We should also point out that we are not satisfied with the US excuse of prolonged deliberation of our fourth proposal. But for the purpose of reaching an agreement on Agenda I, on the whole, we agree to US arrangements. We propose this draft agreement based on the positions of both sides presented in previous talks. At the end of your speech, you may say that once the draft agreement is reached, we should notify the US side of our decision on those US nationals who have applied to leave China.

We will send to you the text of the speech in another telegram.

Should the other party agree basically to our proposed draft agreement (You can make a decision without further instructions from the FM if the other party only asks for cosmetic revisions). At that point, you can notify the other party that you have received orders to notify the US side that nine US nationals who applied for departure have been approved to leave. If the other party delays in responding to our draft agreement, then don’t notify them of the granting of departure for nine US nationals (Don’t announce the three convicted US nationals mentioned in the previous plan and the one expelled from China for now).

It is likely that the US side might propose a name list of about 470 American POWs and ask us to find out their whereabouts. We should reject such a name list. You may propose that if the other party agrees to transmit our demand to the US government and provide us with a complete list of Chinese nationals in the United States, we will accept a list of American POWs and transmit it to the Korean Military Ceasefire Commission. Otherwise, [you should] decline to accept it.

  Foreign Ministry

10 August 1955