Cable Nº 12703/12705 from Tehran

CABLE STRICTLY SECRET

Copy Nº 1 – DISTRIBUTION LIST

Nº 2 – to Stalin

Nº 3 – to Stalin

Nº 4 – to Molotov

Nº 5 – to Beria

Nº 6 – to Malenkov

Nº 7 – to Mikoyan

Nº 8 – to Zhdanov

Nº 9 – to Vyshinsky

Nº 10 – to Dekanozov

Nº 11 – to Lozovsky

Nº 12 – to Silin

Nº 13 – to the 10^th Department

Nº 14 – to file

[handwritten at the top: [[illegible letters]] N819/[[illegible word]]

from TEHRAN Nº 12703 received at 0125 27 April 1946 Copy Nº 2

   12705 Sp[ets] NºNº 591,592

During yesterday’s conversation at his own initiative Muzaffar Firuz gave extensive information about the activity of the opponents of the current government. He reported that all sorts of intrigues against Qavam’s government are being woven and covert sabotage is being waged with the goal of weakening the government and bringing it down. These intrigues are coming both from outside of as well as from within the government itself. The British, who are greatly alarmed at Qavam’s policy, are the foreign instigators. Up to now the British have recognized all the legal governments in Iran, for they have pursued a policy to their liking. But now the situation has changed. The current government has begun to conduct an independent policy and this is worrying the British. British leaders who have been in Iran have published a series of articles directed against the current government. From the spirit of these articles it is felt that the British are planning to follow the path of putting pressure on Iran. Firuz expressed the supposition that the British are developing some plan of action against Qavam’s government. If they are contemplating undertaking anything in this direction then they can count only on the Iranian army and some tribes; they will not encounter support among the Iranian people. According to Firuz’s assertion there is also a group of schemers in the government itself. They include Bayat, General [Akhmedi], and [Egbal’]. Firuz regards Bayat, who passes off himself as a friend of the USSR, and Qavam believes this, as the most dangerous intriguer. [Akhmedi], said Firuz, unfortunately enjoys the trust of Qavam. Firuz himself does not trust [Akhmedi], thinking he is pursuing a two-faced policy; verbally, he is kindly disposed toward Qavam, but in fact slanders Qavam to the Shah, setting the Shah against the premier. [Akhmedi], for example, resolutely refused to arrest Arfa and did this only after a categorical written order of Qavam. After the arrest [Akhmedi] fled to General Razmara and said, “This is an outrage, the government is arresting senior military officers without the Shah’s sanction; today they arrested Arfa, tomorrow they might arrest me, and the day after, you”.

In general, Firuz considers the situation in the army insecure. “If the Shah gives an order to arrest Qavam, me, and others right now”, declared Firuz, “we won’t be able to do anything”. As regards Minister of Health [Egbal’], in Firuz’s estimation he himself does not represent forces in his own right, but he punctually informs Mirza [Kerikhman] about everything that happens in the Council of Ministers. Outside the government subversive work is headed by Mirza [Kerikhman Reshti], former deputy [Dashti], Jamal [Emami], and [Sanandaji].

Firuz recommended that Qavam arrest these people and thereby thwart their plans and find out these plans in more detail. However, although Qavam agrees with Firuz in principle, he is delaying, and is deciding not to arrest these people right now. Qavam thinks that the arrest of these people would produce an unfavorable impression, for they might ask why the government is not touching the representatives of the other wing. Firuz declared, “to this I reasonably answer that the representatives of the other side are not working against the government, but the representatives of this side want to bring it down. And if we don’t arrest them right now, then they will arrest us as soon as a favorable occasion presents itself”. Firuz advised us to influence Qavam to act more boldly and decisively against his opponents.

From further information it was possible to understand that the center of the anti-government intrigues is the court. Firuz said that the second day after the government decision to remove the statement in the Security Council, the Shah had a conversation with General Razmara (General Razmara is quite close to [Muzaffar] Firuz. I. S.) and convinced him to halt the friendship with Firuz, promised to forget previous offenses, to compensate [for] damages caused him by General Arfa, to give him a high post, etc. The Shah declared that the government had committed treason, removing the question from the Security Council and the main person responsible for this was [Muzaffar] Firuz. The government decided to appoint Razmara Governor-General of Kermanshah in order to halt the actions of [Kobadian] and his company there. The agreement of the Shah was needed inasmuch as Razmara is a military person. The Shah refused this, declaring that he intended to appoint Razmara to another post. Right now Colonel Hashemi, appointed by General Arfa, commands the division in Kermanshah and is a member of the Nehzat-e Melli Party. But not only Hashemi, but other officers appointed by Arfa continue to remain in their posts. How is it possible in such a situation, Firuz declared, to arrest Kobadian and change the situation in this province [?].

26 April 1946 CONCLUSION FOLLOWS

14 copies ls

Sent on 27 April [at] 1145

vyp [issued by] Yezhov

Authenticated [by] [illegible signature]