Intelligence Message on the Chernobyl Accident

COPY

Secret

Copy No. [number is indistinct]

[Letterhead] Committee of State Security (KGB) of the Ukr. SSR

KGB Administration for Kiev and Kiev Oblast

Second Department

Intelligence Message

Agent Pseudonym: “Garsia”

Case No: 11046

Taken by: Sr. Operative Plenipotentiary of the Second Department Major V.I. Kocherga

Place taken: [blank]

February 3, 1987

Source [obscured]: Fully reliable, reliable, insufficiently reliable, reliability is indeterminate (underline the appropriate one)

Information verification: Verified, partially verified, doubtful, unverified, verification is indeterminate (underline the appropriate one)

Level of permissible information distribution: [Blank] (indicate according to chapter 2 of section “E” of the classification table)

Contents of Message:

Chernobyl: Accident.

Above a panoramic photo of the Chernobyl atomic energy station text: The accident at the Chernobyl atomic energy station in the USSR will go down in the history of atomic energy. About 30 people who were workers at the station or fire fighters died soon after the accident. 200 people were injured, and more than 100,000 people were evacuated from the zone of 30 kilometers around the station.

So what happened?

On April 25, 1986 the operators of the Chernobyl atomic energy station decided to perform the following experiment: to lower the power, shut off the steam input to the turbine and use the alternating current generator’s kinetic energy to provide electrical power for several tenths of a second to the reactor’s cooling pumps.

This experiment was performed in violation of the protocols in place. When the turbine was stopped, control was lost over the reactor. It did not stop automatically, because the safety catches were turned off by the operators.

At 1:23 on April 26, 1986, a sudden increase in power from the reactor in the 4th block led to a collapse of combustible uranium oxide. Superheated uranium came into contact with water from the cooling system and caused a steam explosion. This explosion destroyed a steam pipe and blew away a concrete slab above the reactor. A second explosion occurred several seconds later, for which there could have been any number of causes.

The red-hot reactor shield was blown away by the explosion onto the roofs of surrounding structures, which caused about 30 fires. They were all put out in 3.5 hours, which is the reason that firefighters were killed because of this accident. The reactor’s graphite moderator burned after coming into contact with air.

At the same time, some of the radioactive content from the reactor was ejected to a height of 1,000 m. A radioactive cloud crossed the northern hemisphere and caused contamination in other countries. This contamination was insignificant and not very dangerous. It was of varying levels in different countries depending on their distance from the source, the direction of the wind, and degree of vegetation.

Causes of the Accident

The Soviet side acknowledged six serious mistakes made by personnel:

-Two violations of operation instructions;

-Failure to follow the requirements for conducting an experiment; and

-Three cases of willful deactivation of the reactor’s automatic protective systems.

Soviet specialists have said that if even just one of these mistakes had not been committed, the accident would not have happened. However, the accident would not have happened if there had not been deeper causes related to the design itself of this reactor type.

Under a photograph of the MAGATE conference in Vienna text:

At a conference in Vienna from August 25th-29th, 1986, Soviet specialists presented to the experts of MAGATE the exact reasons for the catastrophe in Chernobyl. The head of the Soviet delegation, Valerii Legasov, laid out in precise detail the causes, sequences of events, and consequences of the accident, except for the RBMK reactor’s principal characteristics.

Under the design plan for the RBMK reactor text: Lightly enriched /2%/ uranium oxide is used in RBMK reactors as combustible fuel; graphite is used as a moderator; and boiling water is used as a thermal conductor. The core is made of a graphite cell, in which 1,700 field tubes containing a fuel mixture are placed. Water, circulating through the tubes, is heated from contact with the fuel. It becomes steam and goes directly into the turbine.

Under a map of atomic energy stations in the USSR text: Soviet atomic park. At the beginning of 1986 the USSR possessed 51 atomic reactors with a overall power of 28,600 MW. The USSR is the third in the world in terms of production of atomic energy after the USA and France. The RBMK network represents more than half of existing atomic power. This type of reactor was never exported. The Armenia, Shevchenko, and Bilibino stations are not shown on the map.

Analysis of the Accident

Chernobyl demonstrated the inconsistency of the technology used in the USSR and, in particular, the organization of the use of atomic energy stations, where attention is not being paid to the human factor.

The lack of an engineer specialist for safety at the moment the experiment was conducted, the triple violation of operating instructions by the brigade of operators, and the ability to “play” with the reactor’s safety visibly demonstrate the low quality of the station’s operation and insufficient preparedness of its operators. The Soviet side has said that “the personnel of the Chernobyl atomic energy station lost all sense of risk.”

In contrast with all Western countries, particularly France, it appears that the USSR has not drawn a lesson from the accident at Three Mile Island / USA 1979 /, where the human factor played a decisive role.

Unstable Reactor

In Western reactors, a change in the reactor’s power is automatically adjusted for and creates conditions that limit these changes. In the Chernobyl type of reactor, when the power increases, the quantity of steam, “vacuum,” also increases and further increases the power. One could say that these reactors have a positive “power coefficient.” RBMK reactors are unstable, and the less stable, the less power.

Insufficient Protective Systems

In French reactors, the control rods fall due to their own weight at an immediate shutdown signal and cause a maximally effective stop in the course of a single second.

In RBMK reactors, protective systems are imperfect: the control rods are lowered at a maximum speed of 40 cm/sec and take 20 seconds to achieve a shutdown.

Lack of a Protective Shield

The analysis of this type of reactor is incomplete. The safety criteria are significantly lower than those [measures] taken in Western countries. There is only partial protection around the reactor. A durable protective shield around the working core of the reactor is lacking.

At Chernobyl the lack of a shield led to the ejection of a significant portion of fallout materials into the atmosphere.

Notice: Agent “Garcia” presented this message which sets forth a translation of a brochure published in France in relation to the accident at the Chernobyl atomic energy station. This brochure is illustrated with color photos of the Chernobyl atomic energy station.

Send a copy of the message to the Comrade A.K. Borisov at the 6th department of the KGB Administration.

Sr. Operative Plenipotentiary of the 2nd Department of the 2nd Division of the Ukr. SSR KGB Administration for the city of Kiev and Kiev Oblast

Major

[Signature]

V.M. Kocherga