Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note, No. 01/010124/73, Secret

The Issue of the Unification of Korea and the Evolution of the Dialogue between North and South

The Position of the Socialist Republic of Romania

1. The restoration of national unity represents one of the main preoccupations of the party and state leadership of the DPRK. In this respect, over the past 25 years, the DPRK made proposals on more than 130 occasions. Amongst the permanent, constant elements of the DPRK position, the following stand out: unification of the country is a strictly internal problem which should be solved peacefully, by the Koreans themselves, without any interference from outside, through negotiations between the North and the South.

Over the past few years, and especially at the April sessions of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly in 1971 and 1973, numerous proposals for unification have been made, which entail the following:

• Withdrawing all foreign troops from South Korea and dismantling the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;
• Ceasing the arms race between the North and the South and the mutual renouncement to the import of weapons and combat technology;
• Reducing the armed forces in the North and the South to 100,000 people or even less. In the event of the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea, the DPRK declared it takes upon itself the obligation to unilaterally reduce the ranks of its armed forces to 200,000 people;
• Creating a single, central government, following free general elections in the North and the South. In order to organize free elections, it was required to guarantee full freedom and [the freedom of] political activity for all parties and progressive organizations and the release of all political prisoners in South Korea. As a transitory measure to suffice until the complete unification of the country, a proposal to create a Confederation which maintains the current social systems in place was made;
• Organizing meetings and holding political talks at various levels so as to discuss the unification of the country;
• Pursuing economic, cultural, technical-scientific exchanges, as well as exchanges of sports teams. On certain occasions, the DPRK offered the ROK material aid at no cost, so that the South can rebuild its economy; the DPRK offered to provide a job for unemployed workers from the South; the DPRK offered the ROK raw materials; the North also offered to build irrigation systems in the South;
• Signing a peace agreement between the North and the South.

2. Starting on 6 August 1971 the DPRK no longer conditions the unification of the country on the abolishment of the existing treaties between the ROK and the US, and between the ROK and Japan, and it no longer requests the removal from power of Park Chung Hee.

Even more, on this occasion, Kim Il Sung said that the DPRK is willing to meet and to hold talks with any representatives and delegates from the ROK, including representatives of the ruling party. Afterwards, various Korean and foreign interlocutors unofficially declared that in the future the possibility of a meeting between Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee is not to be excluded.

After this change of attitude on 20 August 1971, direct talks between the representatives of the Red Cross from DPRK and those from the ROK began at Panmunjeom. After 51 meetings, on 11 August 1972 it was decided that substantive talks between the delegations of the Red Cross from the DPRK and those from the ROK to begin on 30 August 1972 are to take place alternatively in Pyongyang and Seoul and cover the following issues:

• Identifying the family members and relatives separated between North and South;
• Facilitating visits and correspondence exchanges between separated family members and relatives;
• The reunion of separated family members;
• Other humanitarian matters.

Up until now, several meetings and negotiations took place but to no avail.

3. On 4 July 1972, after the visit of Lee Hu-rak, Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, to Pyongyang, and following his discussions with president Kim Il Sung, as well as following Pak Seong-cheol [Pak Song Chol]’s visit to Seoul and his subsequent discussions with Park Chung Hee, the North-South Joint Communiqué was released in which the two parties agreed to:

1. Act with a view to the unification of the country on the basis of the principles of independence and non-interference from outside; as well as through peaceful means and by pursuing national unity above any ideological and social system differences;
2. Mutually refrain themselves from denigrating and libeling the other party and take measures to avoid conflicts;
3. Promote bilateral exchanges;
4. Support negotiations carried out through Red Cross societies;
5. Establish telephone lines between Pyongyang and Seoul;
6. Create a South-North Coordinating Committee, steered by Kim Yeong-ju [Kim Yong Ju] (member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party, the brother of Comrade Kim Il Sung), the head of the Organizational Section of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party and Lee Hu-rak. Subsequently, such an Executive Committee and a Secretariat of this Committee were formed.

Throughout the 5 sessions of the Coordinating Committee that took place until now, the following issues were discussed: organizational matters; the manner in which the provisions of the 4 July 1972 Joint Communiqué are fulfilled; starting with 10 October 1972 it was decided to stop any radio broadcasting hostile to the other party and to stop the dissemination of leaflets.

At the March 1973 session, in order to bring the confrontation between North and South to an end, the DPRK co-president of the Committee put the following matters on the agenda:

• Ending of the arms race on both sides;
• Reducing the number of armed forces in the North and the South to 100,000;
• Terminating the import of weapons and combat technology;
• Withdrawing foreign troops from South Korea;
• Signing a peace treaty.

In order to turn these proposals into reality, the DPRK suggested to co-opt the chiefs of staff from the North and from the South into the Coordinating Committee or to create a military sub-committee. At the same time, the DPRK proposed the creation of other subcommittees, on political, economic, social and cultural matters. Up until now, South Korea agreed to holding talks only on economic and cultural matters.

4. The April 1973 session of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly discussed the matter of “Ceasing foreign interference into the internal affairs of Korea and accelerating the peaceful and independent unification of the country.” The session adopted a letter addressed to all parliaments and governments as well as a letter addressed to the US House of Representatives and the US Senate in which it is requested to withdraw American troops from South Korea, to dismantle the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and to cease military aid to South Korea.

On 23 June 1973, President Kim Il Sung proposed a 5-point unification plan which contains the following provisions: ending the state of tension; starting to collaborate on multiple plans; allowing all layers of society to take part in the unification of the country; creating the Confederal Republic of Goryeo; the two parts of the country joining the UN as a sole state, under the name of Goryeo.

On the same day, South Korean President Park Chung Hee launched a unification plan which entails the following: mutual non-interference in internal affairs; refraining from the use of force; expanding the dialogue; respecting the responsibilities assumed through the July 1972 Declaration; cooperation at the international level; simultaneously entering various international bodies; both states establishing diplomatic relations with all countries.

Each party deemed the proposals of the other party as unacceptable.

5. Conclusions

The dialogue [between North and South] is progressing incredibly slowly because the terms on which the two parties agreed are not respected, each party trying to influence the other so as to gain as many advantages for itself as possible.

The results of the North-South dialogue are taking the following forms:

• Establishing and continuing contacts and negotiations at various levels, with the possibility to launch a meeting at the highest level;
• Establishing telephone lines between Pyongyang and Seoul;
• Ending hostile propaganda towards one another at the same time;
• Reducing the number of incidents at the 38th parallel;
• Forming the economic and cultural cooperation subcommittee;
• The gradual disappearance of the declarations according to which only the North or the South represent Korea and the interests of the Korean people.

With the exception of the UN, the DPRK is not against the simultaneous entry of the two parts of Korea into various international bodies.

6. Romania’s Position

The Socialist Republic of Romania is constantly and thoroughly supporting the position and the actions of the DPRK to unify the country.

Amongst the recent actions undertaken by Romania to support the position and actions of the DPRK the following are to be mentioned:

• Congratulatory and supportive messages addressed by comrade Nicolae Ceausescu to comrade Kim Il Sung on the occasion of the release of the 4 July 1972 Joint Communiqué and of the 23 June 1973 5-Point Plan;
• Solidarity and supportive messages and the declaration of the Great National Assembly Foreign Policy Commission, adopted in 1971, 1972, and 1973 to support DPRK’s unification proposals;
• Supporting the Korean problem in the working papers and documentation of the National Gathering of the Romanian Communist Party from 1972.
• Including the [Korean] matter in several declarations and communiqués signed on the occasion of high-level visits which took place between 1972 and 1973;
• Supporting the matter of Korea’s unification at the UN and various other international organizations;
• Relaying the letter of the Supreme People’s Assembly from 6 April 1973 to the presidents of the US Senate and House of Representatives.

August 1973

Signature – illegible