August 7, 1970
Untitled report on the candidacy of Suleiman Franjieh
This document was made possible with support from Youmna and Tony Asseily
266/13
17/8/1970
The candidacy of Suleiman Franjieh by centrists and his adoption by Chamoun and Edde is, for the Edde-Chamoun axis, a brilliant manoeuvre designed to lead to one of these two outcomes:
The first: He is rejected due to pressure by leaders of the group comprising Rachid Karami, Rene Mou'awad, Kabalan Issa al-Khoury, and Bachir al-Othman, because they cannot accept that the presidency go to someone from Zghorta and because his relations with Rachid Karami are very bad and tense. This would also mean that Karami will not be given the premiership on account of Franjieh's close ties with Salam. Franjieh’s candidacy will thus fail due to this group's opposition, as well as opposition from Jumblatt and the Kata'eb who would only support him if there is near unanimity in his favour; the ball will thus go back into Chamoun's court. Franjieh will then withdraw in deference to Chamoun and Edde who supported him, the Kata'eb and some elements from the two groups will also withdraw, a number from al-Nahj (Chehab's group) will filter out, and Chamoun will be the winner.
The second: Karami's haste today to agree on a compromise candidate that the Alliance would impose and that person would be either Pierre or Raymond Edde.
Franjieh’s candidacy is therefore the subject of brilliant manoeuvring which will keep the group busy searching for a way to respond to and deal with it, and will keep Jumblatt also busy making contacts without reaching any worthwhile result. Therefore, when the group rejects Franjieh, the centre will openly join the alliance whose candidate would then be assured of victory.
It is certain that the al-Nahj’s candidate is Elias Sarkis, and the civilian and military apparatus have volunteered to serve and support him; he is, however, too weak to pose a real threat to the opposition’s candidate.
There are around ten deputies from the group who will never vote for him, such as ‘Adel and Samih Osseiran; Rafiq Chahine; Ali 'Arab; Michel al-Mur; Bachir al-Othman and two of his companions, Jean 'Aziz and Pierre Pharaon; and Abdel-Latif and Majid al-Zein.
Thus, and in spite of all the gossip surrounding Franjieh's candidacy, the initiative is still in the hands of the opposition.
As for the session, it will be held on time except if the parties agree to postpone it until next Friday to have more time to reach an understanding. Among Sabri Hamadeh's pretexts for impeding the session, if ever, would be that it is in the general interest; he is referring here to his agreement with a number of deputies to create squabbles and disagreements in order to thwart the session, which would then allow Hamadeh to postpone it, all in one go, until 13 September. The Americans are also playing an important role in the battle for the presidency; they support a candidate from the right and prefer Pierre or Raymond Edde, though they prefer the latter because of his popular base, which his brother lacks.
As for the rousing pamphlets and statements by both parties, they are for local consumption and designed to create a war of nerves. Jumblatt's statement to leftist communist and Baathist parties provoked an adverse reaction vis-a-vis the group by making the West, and in particular America, extremely eager to win the battle.
Suleiman Franjieh's centrist candidacy may buy time for Chamoun while Jumblatt attempts to arrange new contacts, among other political developments.
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