Cuban Intelligence, 'Report on subversive groups that the CIA sent to Cuba clandestinely in order to prepare conditions that would allow for a mercenary invasion'

Republic of Cuba – Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces – Rebel Army

5 May 1961 “Year of Education”

Report on subversive groups that the CIA sent to Cuba clandestinely in order to prepare conditions that would allow for a mercenary invasion

The Department of State of the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency, seeing the squandering of money by different counterrevolutionary groups in their country, devoted themselves to the task of directly organizing these groups, as well as the training of the mercenaries and saboteurs in the camps already set up in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and some marine bases in the states of Florida and North Carolina, and also in Puerto Rico. They recruited mercenaries in different parts of Florida and those which were chosen among war criminals displaced from political power, and also from the national bourgeoisie, and from some organizations that played a role against tyranny [i.e., Batista—ed.] like the Second Front of Escambray, the OA and elements of the right wing from 26 July and the Directorate. This recruitment led to the result that a so-called Government would be formed in exile, into which they integrated, among others, Miró Cardona as President and Tony Varona as Vice [President]. They did this with the goal of uniting all counterrevolutionary groups under one leadership, as well as for the effect of propaganda, preparing the way for when the invasion came and power was taken, according to them, over a piece of our land, a beachhead. They would be able to dedicate all necessary aid and possibly be recognized by some puppet governments in [Latin] America, and therefore gave themselves over to the work of preparing these personnel in the handling of weapons and armed struggle.

They chose different groups to accomplish their preparation in sabotage, clandestine work, assassination,^[1] communications, military information and uniting these groups into an organization which they call FUR, the United Revolutionary Front, for whom they chose as organizer the now-executed ex-Commander Sori Marín, one known by Rafael as someone named Francisquito, also shot, calling the mercenary army that would invade our land the “Liberation Army,” and putting as its leaders [Manuel] Artimes, [Pepe] San Román, and others, all known as thieves and elements of the worst caliber, the majority prisoners, after the failed invasion.

After the group that constituted the FUR was imprisoned and the majority shot, the CIA chose another Executive for the composition of the FUR, including Commander Gonzalo Miranda of the Marines of the Revolutionary War and others, almost all being detained.

Here is a diagram of how the FUR is organized in our country, following direct instructions from the CIA in Washington, its form of operation and current conditions, and measures that should be taken for its annihilation.

[See diagram following document translations and endnotes]

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Below CIA —two groups: Liaisons, Revolutionary United Front

Under Liaisons: Operational Groups: Armament, Sabotage, Radio^[2]

Under FUR: Military Coordinator, Supplies, Finances, Propaganda, Coordination, Action and Sabotage, Political Coordinator

CIA, intelligence and counterintelligence organization of the United States government, controlled directly by the President of that nation, charged with preparing any actions that can harm our Revolutionary Government, from an act of sabotage to an assassination.

FUR, Revolutionary United Front, encompassing at its core all counterrevolutionary groups that operate in our country, forming an Executive [committee], who is chosen by the leaders of counterrevolutionary organizations, and whose function is military and political coordination, supplies, finances, propaganda, action and sabotage, communications, etc.

3. These counterrevolutionary groups are formed by the following organizations. Some “nomes de guerre” appear among leaders, almost always highlighting them as a CIA Delegate, for example, Rafael, mentioned above, now shot, appeared as National Coordinator.

Liberation Movement – Justo

Radical Anticommunist Action – Pepe

Save Cuba Movement (SAC) – César

Independent Revolutionary Group (ARI) – Ramón

Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR) – Dr. Jorge

Democratic Revolutionary Marines (MRD) – Abel

Mazones^[3] Anticommunist Movement (MMA) – Benito

Anticommunist Civic Action – Nasario

Democratic Liberation Movement (MLD) – Felipe

Anticommunist Youth of America (JACA) – Raúl

Constitutional Democratic Legion (Nelson Granado)

November 30th - Alejandro

Anticommunist Organizations Block (Jibarito)

Cuban Action – Demetrio

Insurrectional Democratic Organization (OID) – Ludovies

Student Revolutionary Democratic Federation (FERD) – Raúl

National Democratic Union (May 20th) – Marcelino Toro

Christianity Against Communism (CCC) – Teté

Anticommunist Front (FAC) – Felipe

Naval Revolutionary Corps – Benito

Action 62

Anticommunist League

Insurrectional Movement for the Revival of the Revolution (MIRR)

Revolutionary Dissident Recuperation Movement (ADRA)

Union of Anticommunist Medical Professionals Revolutionary Group

National Anticommunist Union

Revolutionary Liberation Movement – Montenegro

Free National Anticommunist Organization

Cuban National Movement – Mazones

Work accomplished by the executive committee of FUR

Cm – Military commander, position once occupied by ex-Commander Sorí Marín, shot, and now occupied by Commander of the M.G.R. Gonzalo Miranda, presently detained; work consisted of coordinating military matters, attempting to capture members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, as well as all those who were discharged soldiers for whatever reason and still assisted active military personnel, and those who were prisoners or fugitives.

A – Supplies. Someone named Marcial, as a nom de guerre, was responsible for supplies: Tobarich, as well, was in charge of Action and Sabotage, and substituted for Engineer Ray, responsible for various bombs that produced an explosion in Havana, and the entrance of arms and explosives into the capital, including among their missions the occupation of Celimar and the lading near Eufemio Cay. This individual, now deceased, carried out two functions within the Executive of the FUR.

F – Finances. This position was occupied by Salvador García (nom de guerre Octavio) who found himself a fugitive, and substituting for one within the group who had been shot previously, as the CIA had foreseen that its leaders would be taken prisoner and stipulated that each Executive member would have a substitute. His work consisted of distributing money for operations and the counterrevolutionary elements’ needs.

P – Propaganda. This task fell to Bebo Borrón, prisoner, and Tony Díaz, fugitive; their obligation comprised the propaganda for said organization although they carried out an infinity of other work.

C – Communications. Executive office unknown to he who occupied it, his task being possibly, but never surely, that of communicating with the CIA and preparing places for the installation of a plant.

(E) Liaison Group. This group is formed by four CIA officials of Cuban nationality, serving as the linkage between operation groups and the FUR, as well as directly to the CIA, with the following nom de guerre: Mendoza, Ernesto, Bran, y Luis Acosta, who uses the abbreviation code 2637.

(GO)Operations Group Operation groups of infiltration for action and sabotage. These groups were organized by the CIA in cells of three: one responsible for weapons, one for sabotage, and another as radio operator, specialized in all classes of weapons, as well as sabotages, demolition, assassination and communications, which they carry out directly with the CIA. They also have the function of teaching counterrevolutionary elements that the political apparatus, FUR, positions them to accomplish sabotage, as well as armament and disarmament, which they learn through the Liaisons. The chief of these operations groups is Frank Bernardino, who received training outside the country, remaining within the country^[4] in the coastal zone lying between Matanzas and Havana, in the northern part, until the moment of his introduction; some were also brought in by parachute through the province of Camagüey. When they come by sea, they do so by boat, which upon nearing the coast, receives signals from land, as almost always the arrival is done by agreement with groups that operate within the country and, upon receiving the signal, launch a rubber boat that takes them to the shore; now 27 cells are operating within our territory.

These groups have the following characteristics:

They have been recruited from the youth of the petty bourgeoisie, industrial workers, members of the right wing of July 26th, Revolutionary Army ex-members, as well as the Army of the Dictatorship.

They have false documents: a fingerprint wallet and a card from the labor census (these cards have smaller numbers than the authentic ones.)

They travel with a lot of money, and use lighted watches that they had in the camps.

They frequent elegant clubs, bars, and cabarets.

They often use women as camouflage, who dress as militiawomen and travel on buses, just as all these elements go unarmed.

The CIA, after the failures to launch weapons from airplanes, adapted the system of launching said weapons in sets of 30 cavalries, and where they had trusted personnel, promised to launch no fewer than eight tons, between weapons and explosives, and according to the latest news, between Havana and Pinar del Río more than 120 tons have been launched, as one of their tactics was to introduce in cities vast quantities of arms around Havana as well as in the provinces, where surveillance is less effective. Just as all the cells that operate in Havana have their troops in surrounding areas, around 100 agents have entered the country.

In Matanzas, reports say that they have deposited weapons in all municipalities.

Measures that must be taken for the destruction and obliteration of these groups

a) Introduction of activists^[5] in the prisons.

b) Addition of VR in hotels, guest houses, clubs and cabarets, in order to infiltrate the greatest number of active personnel among the counterrevolutionary organizations.

c) Recruitment of troops among elements that have been marginalized by the Revolution, in one way or another: soldiers and clandestine fighters.

d) Increased vigilance on the part of the CDR.

[1] Trans. note: This seems extreme, but an atentado is an attempted killing, or more generally, an attempted crime. Here its meaning seems more specific and sinister.

[2] Trans. note:  Spanish “radista” is not commonly used and does not appear in major dictionaries but is my best educated guess based on context in this document.

[3] Trans. note: Original Spanish “Mazónico” looks very similar to “Masonic,” and may be a typo, but given mention of the name Mazones later and context, this interpretation seems correct.

[4] Trans. note: Illegible initials written above this word “país”, possibly “N.A.” or “N.D.”

[5] Trans. note: Spanish “activos” is difficult to translate well here, and I am not sure, given the limited context of the list, that my interpretation is fully correct. The gist seems to be that prisoners will be recruited into the counterrevolution unless the Cuban government and military introduce some kind of oversight or propaganda mechanism (via human presence) into these prisons.