Fanfani covered the events of the day in this journal entry, noting that he told Kennedy he would make no commitment on the Jupiter-Polaris replacement until he spoke with McNamara. With McNamara, Fanfani emphasized the point about using the Jupiter base for space launches. Both Kennedy and McNamara denied that there was a trade with the USSR, with McNamara emphasizing the risks posed by the Jupiters during the Missile Crisis.

Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

That some officials in the State Department’s European Affairs bureau were convinced that Kennedy had approved a trade of the Jupiters in Turkey puzzled State Department official Seymour Weiss, who was convinced that the higher-ups has rejected a trade. In this memo, Weiss asked a colleague, Jeffrey Kitchen, to get an “accurate reading” on the matter.

In an “eyes only” response to a State Department query about the Jupiters, U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare observed that “if proper means could be found, good case could be made for removal of Jupiters from Turkey as counter for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.” Yet, withdrawing the missiles as part of a Cuban Missile Crisis arrangement would pose a problem that was “partly psycho-political” and “partly substantive.” With reference to the “psycho-political” problem, Hare’s explanation was framed ethnocentrically: The Turks “are proud, courageous people who do not understand concept or process of compromise.” In that context, the U.S. would lose much “if in process of Jupiter removal [the] Turks should get the impression that their interests as an ally were being traded off in order to appease an enemy.” He recommended several alternative solutions to the problem; for example, if the missiles are phased out, the U.S. could provide Turkey with a backup, such as the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) or Polaris missiles. If Italy gave up its Jupiters, he suggests, that could help with an approach to Turkey. 

An undated memorandum, produced most likely in the late spring of 1963 (most likely in May) that outlines Soviet thinking on the most recent discussions with US representatives on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The memorandum is crystal clear that the key goal for Soviet negotiators was to avoid West German control over nuclear weapons. This is why Moscow opposed the idea of a Multilateral Nuclear Force. However, Soviet officials also admitted that it was better to agree to a treaty that did not explicitly prohibit a multilateral nuclear force as long as their US counterparts committed not to let West German authorities have an authoritative role in authorizing nuclear-weapon use

This document includes accounts of several conversations between Soviet officials and US diplomats, including Andrei Gromyko for the Soviets, and Dean Rusk and Arthur Goldberg for the Americans. The most pressing topic discussed during these meetings was figuring out mutually acceptable language to mollify Soviet demands that the NPT contain explicit prohibitions on the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries not just directly but through a military alliance, namely, NATO, remembering previous US attempts to nuclearize NATO through the Multilateral Force (MLF). Some attention is paid to fears not just of the Soviet Union but the US and other NATO allies as well about the FRG acquiring nuclear weapons. In addition to the focus on the semantic differences in the Soviet and American drafts of the NPT, the document emphasizes that one key area of common ground between the Soviets and Americans is the importance that an agreement be reached sooner rather than later before more countries acquire nuclear capabilities.

This correspondence between Davis Boster and Georgy Kornienko recounts Boster's impressions of where US-Soviet negotiations on the NPT stand after reading Kornienko's report of a conversation with the US chargé. Boster summarizes areas of common ground between the US and the Soviets while also expressing the hope that what he describes as semantic differences over whether to explicitly prohibit transfers of nuclear weapons to a group of countries do not impede the achievement of a nuclear non-proliferation agreement. Boster closes by expressing the hope and willingness to continue negotiations in New York and reach an agreement.

A note from D.E. Boster translated into Russian from the English. This correspondence references a previous conversation with the temporary Charge d'Affaires, John Gatry, about the NPT.

This note to be distributed to the Central Committee of the USSR describes a conversation between Andrei Gromyko and US Chargé d'Affaires regarding the Americans' proposed language in Article I of the NPT. Gromyko shared the concern of the Soviet government that the American draft as it stands says nothing about prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons under joint control to an alliance or group of countries, and that the Soviet government wants to close off all means through which to proliferate nuclear weapons. Gromyko raised other concerns with the American draft and requests that Gatry notifies the US government and Dean Rusk of their conversation with the hope that Soviet concerns can be addressed appropriately.

This note summarizes a conversation between Alexei Roshchin and William Foster concerning Foster's views on individual provisions of the Soviet draft of the NPT, with Foster's primary concerns pertaining to Article I. The main issue of contention between the Soviet and American drafts is whether to explicitly prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons on a group basis or within an alliance, as the Soviets desire, but to which the Americans do not want explicitly stated in the Treaty. Roshchin conveyed the readiness of the Soviets to continue discussions on Article I, to which Foster's response that he would need to coordinate with the White House on the official posture of the US government toward the new Soviet language on the issue.