Consistent with the concerns about target coverage, the plan for Polaris patrols required the presence of at least one submarine in the Mediterranean. The overlapping patrols would begin when the U.S.S. Sam Houston entered the Mediterranean on March 28, followed by the U.S.S. John Marshall on April 10, and the U.S.S. Ethan Allen on 1 June. The Sam Houston could make a port call in Turkey, but the stopover had to occur when another submarine was in the Mediterranean. Taylor recommended the port of Glock as the site of a two-day visit, one day for a visit by officials and the second for a “daylight indoctrination cruise by designated observers.” The latter would be barred from sensitive “spaces” used for communications and nuclear propulsion.

Taylor forwarded to McNamara the views of USCINCEUR, CINCLANT, and the DSTP on targeting and submarine deployment issues. According to CINCLANT Admiral Dennison, it was feasible to deploy up to three Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean. They could regain the same “operating efficiency” that they had achieved in their previous Norwegian Sea deployment. In Lemnitzer’s absence, General Lauris Norstad, who was departing as CINCEUR, opposed the withdrawal of the Jupiters as “weakening our nuclear capability” by reducing target coverage and by “destroying” the Jupiter’s “psychological” impact. DSTP General Power was also concerned about target coverage but did not foresee “basic problems as long as Free World missiles are targeted as an integrated package.”

JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor was aware of Kennedy’s Jupiter decision, but it is not clear when the other Chiefs learned of the “closely held decisions.” This paper, approved by General Paul S. Emrick, director of Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, gave an overall look at the “planning requirements” necessitated by the Jupiter decision and the recent Nassau conference between President Kennedy and UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Among the issues presented by the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles were retargeting requirements, Sergeant missiles for Italy, the number of Polaris submarines patrolling the Mediterranean and their basing, and the speeding up of F-104G deliveries to Turkey.

General Maxwell D. Taylor informs Rhee he will arrange for Korean MPs to observe verification of prisoner of war rosters.

General Maxwell D. Taylor thanks Mrs. Rhee for a gift.

General Maxwell D. Taylor reports a successful meeting on the return of non-repatriated prisoners of war.

General Taylor requests housing and office space for C. Tyler Wood, Economic Coordinator for Korea.

General Maxwell D. Taylor attaches a copy of his letter sent November 11 informing the Prime Minister about the need to retain use of the Chosun Hotel.

General Maxwell D.Taylor writes that he has forwarded Pyun [Byeon]'s letter regarding the application of Korean law to the soldiers of the Eighth United States Army to the Commander in chief of the United Nations Command.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, on behalf of General Hull, reports that the United Nations Command has no jurisdictions over North Korean ex- prisoners of war who choose to proceed to a neutral country.