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Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Cuban Foreign Relations

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

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Central Africa

Angola

Cuba and Southern Africa

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South America

Brazil

President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

United States-Soviet Relations

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894- 1971

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Alekseyev, Alexander Ivanovich

1913- 1989

China and Latin America and the Caribbean

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Castro Ruz, Raul Modesto

1931-

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Risquet, Jorge

1930- 2015

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Kudryavtsev, Sergey Mikhailovich

1915- 1998

Sino-Soviet Relations

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October 21, 1991	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with President Patricio Aylwin, Santiago de Chile, 21 October 1991, 09:30 – 11:00 hours Kohl and Aylwin discuss Honecker's release from the Chilean embassy in Moscow. Kohl recollects his personal meetings with Honecker, in particular the latter's 1987 visit in Bonn. Moreover, Kohl reflects on his inner-German trade policy and its impact for the GDR's demise, especially the billion DM loan for the GDR in 1983.
1962	Report, S. Biryuzov to Marshal of the Soviet Union Cde. R. Ya. Malinovsky on Some Conclusions and Suggestions concerning the Operations of the Missile Troops in Operation 'Anadyr''
April 2, 1963	Report from General-Lieutenant of Aviation Lovkov to Marshal of the Soviet Union Cde. N.I. Krylov General-Lieutenant of Aviation Lovkov reflects on Operation Anadyr’, including what lessons the Soviet military can draw from the episode and how the personnel involved in the shipment of missiles to Cuba should now be treated.
August 23, 1963	Report from General-Lieutenant of Aviation Lovkov to the Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff General-Lieutenant of Aviation Lovkov writes that the "experience of the shipments of the Missile Forces by sea in the summer of 1962" to Cuba will be useful in completing a new manual on transporting missiles over water.
December 1962	Report of the Commander of the 51st Missile Division concerning the Operations of the Division during the Period from 12 July through 1 December 1962 Commander of the 51st Missile Division General-Major Igor Demyanovich Statsenko's detailed postmortem on the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba in mid-1962 and their removal later that year following the nuclear confrontation with the United States. The report includes an attachment titled: "Some Questions of Operational and Tactical Concealment during the Operation of the Division on the Island of Cuba."
December 18, 1962	Letter, General-Major Igor Demyanovich Statsenko, Commander of the 51st Missile Division, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Missile Forces, Moscow A cover letter from Statsenko indicating that he is submitting copies of his detailed reports on the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba in mid-1962 and their removal later that year.
January 25, 1963	U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, 'Briefing on Cuban Developments' [Excerpts] During a briefing on Cuban developments to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, Secretary of State Rusk denied that there was any connection between the removal of the Jupiters and the solution of the Caribbean crisis, presenting the withdrawal instead as part of the “entire program of modernization of NATO forces,” together, in the Italian case, with the substitution of Corporal missiles with Sergeants (see pages 23-26).
January 18, 1963	Department of State Telegram 1250 to the American Embassy Rome This message, intended “only” for Ambassador Reinhardt, included information for use in backgrounders for officials and journalists, but only with the Department’s consent. It included comparisons of the Jupiter and Polaris missiles, a brief discussion of possible targeting arrangements for Polaris, and the possible timing of the introduction of Polaris and the phase out of Jupiter missiles. One point concerned “Equating of Italy and Turkey with Cuba.” U.S. officials were advised to make no comment on the matter, but if raised, officials should observe that when the Soviets equated missiles in Cuba with Jupiters in Italy and Turkey “we absolutely refused accept any such comparison or deal.” A version of these points would soon go to Fanfani’s foreign policy adviser, Carlo Marchiori.
January 16, 1963	Memorandum to the Secretary of State [Dean Rusk] from McGeorge Bundy During the luncheon for Fanfani, Bundy sent Rusk this short memo about the Fanfani-Kennedy conversation, noting the former’s concern that removing the Jupiters could lead to attacks from the right about “softness toward left-wingers who want the missiles out.” When Kennedy spoke with McNamara after the meeting, he asked him to emphasize to Fanfani the military advantages of replacing the Jupiters with Polaris. McNamara wanted to emphasize that very point to offset any talk of a “nefarious Cuban bargain” with the Soviets. Bundy also highlighted the debate between George Ball and McNamara over whether Jupiters and Polaris should be mentioned in the communique on the Fanfani-Kennedy discussions.
November 9, 1962	Memorandum from William R. Tyler to the Secretary [Dean Rusk] through U. Alexis Johnson, 'Turkish and Italian IRBM's' Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.