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October 30, 1962

Cable no. 336 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Cable 336 reinforces the notion by Pavlicek that the press is inadequately reporting on the Soviet Union's side of the crisis. The newspaper Revolucion in particular has poor coverage, which has sparked outrage among the Cuban population. The purported reason is preoccupation with other stories and a lack of adequate understanding of the entire crisis.

October 30, 1962

Minutes of Conversation between the Delegations of the CPCz and the CPSU, The Kremlin (excerpt)

In this conversation between Khrushchev and Novotny, Khrushchev used exceptionally candid language to defend his handling of the superpower confrontation, what he described as “six days which shook the world.” While well aware that many fellow communists (including the Chinese and Cubans) regarded his agreement under pressure from US President John F. Kennedy to remove the missiles as a surrender to the imperialists, Khrushchev stoutly defended his action as not only a necessary measure to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war, but actually a victory. Khrushchev bluntly criticized Fidel Castro for failing to comprehend the true nature of war in the thermonuclear age and, that at the height of the crisis, he had suggested in a letter to Khrushchev that the Soviets should be the first to use nuclear weapons, striking the United States should it attack Cuba, even though this would lead promptly to a global war.

October 30, 1962

Cable no. 335 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek reports there is an apparent rift between Cuban Foreign Ambassador Roa and Soviet Premier Khrushchev on the orders to dismantle the missile sites. Roa believes the people will not understand and misinterpret this step by the Soviets, as well as the Soviet Union losing international prestige. Fidel Castro plans to make a speech on public television to clarify the whole situation. Castro also made clear his paranoia about the United States not holding up to their promises and was convinced an invasion was still imminent.

October 29, 1962

Cable no. 333 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek informs Prague that negotiations have proceeded with some progress, while there is still a tense aura in the air. An invasion of Cuba by the United States is now an unlikely prospect, given American failures to penetrate Cuban airspace, the quick organized response of the Cuban armed forces, and the widespread support Cuba receives from the socialist countries of the world. Pavlicek promises the Czechoslovak government that the embassy will make all necessary provisions to providing information on the ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

October 28, 1962

Cable no. 332 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek writes of a breakthrough with the UN Secretary General and Cuba with regards to ending the crisis; Castro is willing to enter into settlements to resolve the crisis peacefully, on the condition that Cuba's sovereignty and security not be infringed by the United States. Preparations are being made for Cuban foreign minister Raul Roa to fly to the UN Security Council meeting.

October 28, 1962

Cable no. 330 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek writes of the negotiations between Khrushchev and Kennedy and of the Cuban people's reaction to them, which is mixed. Among the higher ranking intelligentsia, there is a suspicion that Cuba's defenses will be weakened. Among the lower-level staff, Khrushchev is met with trust and understanding. The Czechoslovak Press Agency is to publish the events in favor of the Soviet Union, portraying it as forcing the United States to negotiate.

October 28, 1962

Cable no. 328 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek informs Prague that Cuban anti-aircraft forces fended off and shot down a group of U.S. jet bombers, which were assumed to be on a mission to examine the missile bases in Cuba. He also intercepted a message from Washington that if Cuba does not leave a free zone for American personnel to land and inspect the bases, there will be "further action." The bases are not to be dismantled, and an invasion by the United States is to be anticipated.

October 28, 1962

Report to CPCz General Secretary Antonin Novotný

Further reports from Pavlicek indicate despite soft rhetoric from the United States indicating a willing to negotiate, aggressive preparations against Cuba continued. In particular, there was a large reinforcement of air force bases in Florida and Key West, as well as an announcement of increased intensity of air reconnaissance over Cuba. By the time of this message, there already have been exchanges between Cuban anti-aircraft guns and U-2 recon planes. However, there are no significant measures observed among military installations in Europe, with Czechoslovak troops maintaining maximum combat readiness. Very few instances of insubordination and dissent are found.

April 9, 1963

Resignation Letter of Jose Miro Cardona to the Revolutionary Council of Cuba

A resignation letter of Chairman Jose Miro Cardona to the Revolutionary Council of Cuba in which he outlines his role in the historical activities of the Council, as well as his concluding thoughts on the actions the Council should take.

April 9, 1963

Memorandum from Mexican Federal Director of Security re Cuban Revolutionary Council in Exile

A memorandum from Mexican Federal Director of Security regarding the recently exiled Cuban Counter-Revolutionary Council's meeting with U.S. President Kennedy in Florida to ask him for greater support of the anti-Castro forces.

Pagination