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September 14, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on Monday, 14 September 1992

Kohl and Rabin discuss the situation in the Near and Middle East and the changed in Syria's position toward Israel after the demise of the Soviet Union. Rabin expresses concern about the continued arms race in the region and Syria's purchases of Scud missiles from Russia and Slovakia. He also reiterates Iraq's continued capability to go nuclear within 5 to 6 years despite international arms control inspections. Last but not least, Kohl and Rabin discuss the situation in Iran and Kohl's contacts with President Rafsandjani.

July 13, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with French President Mitterrand on 7 July 1992 in Munich

Kohl and Mitterrand look into issues of nuclear power plant safety in the former Soviet Union as a key theme on the agenda of the World Economis Summit in Munich. Both complain about American and Japanese reluctance to agree on the establishment of a joint G-7 fund in this field.

July 6, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with U.S. President Bush over Breakfast at the Hotel Four Seasons in Munich on Monday, 6 July 1992

Bush reports about his recent conversation with Mitterrand on the establishmet of the Eurocorps and NATO's European pillar. Kohl thinks that U.S. concerns over the Eurocorps  were exaggarated reiterating that the Federal Repubic wanted a continued U.S. military presence in Germany and Europe. Bush complains about French reluctance to expand NATO's functions including out-of-area missions.

June 30, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with French President Mitterrand over Breakfast on Saturday, 27 June 1992

Mitterrand emphasizes that Yugoslavia could turn into "a second Vietnam” in case of a Western military intervention.  He questions the rational of U.S. and British policy in the Balkans and rejects France's military involvement. Kohl rules out Germany's participation in military operations.

June 20, 1989

China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'The Chinese Student Movement (After Armed Suppression by the Military)'

Report from the China Division, Asian Affairs Bureau of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the subsequent actions of the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada.

November 20, 1973

A Note of a Conversation Comrade President had Privately with the President of the Libyan Arab Republic Qaddafi on November 20, 1973, in the White Palace

June 1, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Portuguese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva on 1 June 1992

Kohl and Silva examine preparations for the forthcoming European Council in Lisbon as well as reforms in the nomination of appointees for the European Commission. They  talk about the re-nomination of Delors as President of the Commision. In addition, they discuss the seat of the European Central Bank and the European Monetary Institute.

February 28, 1967

Note from Mr. Francis Perrin, High Commissioner for Atomic Energy, 'French foreign policy in terms of atomic armaments, particularly with regard to the proliferation of this armaments'

Nonproliferation talks entered their decisive phase after the submission of a joint U.S.-Soviet draft to the ENDC on February 21, 1967. One week later, High-Commissioner of the French Commissariat à l’énergie atomique, Francis Perrin, assessed France’s options. It was not “by accident,” he noted, the original five UN Security Council permanent members—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China—were in line for nuclear-club membership: “…they are the same profound reasons, of a geographical, demographic or other nature, which led to the choice [in 1945] … of the countries with special responsibilities in the maintenance of world peace.” After noting how advances in “India, Israel, Japan, Sweden, and also West Germany” portended the further spread of nuclear weapons—and acknowledging France had itself sought help with its weapon program—Perrin pondered whether proliferation might hasten nuclear disarmament by convincing the superpowers of its merits. In the end, however, fear of a “large and hostile” nuclear-armed PRC made him pessimistic. While he did not advise signing the NPT, it would be “very important” for France to affirm publicly, if unilaterally, “its constant policy since 1958 … not to cede any atomic weapon or any atomic explosive device to a country which does not possess it, and not to help any such country to manufacture them.” He dismissed internal opposition toward the NPT as defensive—"an a posteriori justification of the French decision to constitute an atomic armament." More significant was the likelihood West Germany would gain its own atomic arsenal, jeopardizing France’s “dominant political position among the Europe of the Six” members of the European Communities and reviving Cold War tensions in Europe. He finished with an eye-opening analysis of how the Kosygin proposal for nuclear-weapon states to extend negative security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon states’ signatory to the NPT would not impede the use of French nuclear armaments against a West German blitzkrieg backed by the United States.

March 18, 1968

Note for the Directorate of Political Affairs, Disarmament, 'Non-proliferation treaty: Draft resolution on non-nuclear countries guarantees'

The finalization of a completed draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which the ENDC transmitted to by the United Nations without endorsement on March 18, 1968, launched a French review of the NPT’s implications for international law. The draft NPT was accompanied by a proposed United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC), whose soft guarantees against nuclear-weapon use or threats had been a compromise workd out between Washington and Moscow. An initial study by Foreign Ministry lawyers identified numerous “juridical reasons… to fight against a project that, in its letter if not its spirit, constitutes a revision of the [UN] Charter." The report elaborated on how the hierarchization of “forms of aggression” would “downgrade” non-nuclear (i.e. conventional) violence. Non-nuclear-weapon states treaty signatories would receive non-binding security guarantees. The “Anglo-Saxons and Soviets” would maintain “freedom of action as far as what measures they choose to adopt.” Although the French government’s foremost legal experts opted not to advise vetoing the UNSC resolution, they warned the NPT package could serve as a warrant for nuclear-armed permanent members of the UN Security Council to wage “preventive war” in the name of worldwide nonproliferation.

March 15, 1960

Maurice Couve de Murville to Prime Minister Michel Debré, 'Revision of the EURATOM Treaty,'

The French decision to join EURATOM was conditioned on the regional agency not impinging on national nuclear programs. As early as 1955, French Prime Minister Guy Mollet had instructed French negotiators that “Euratom will not be an obstacle toward the possible decision of France … to build nuclear weapons.”  While EURATOM’s jurisdiction would be limited to negotiating purchases of fissile materials, promoting trade with the United States and the United Kingdom, and exchanging reactors designs and civilian technology among members of the Atlantic community, Couve de Murville credited EURATOM with a fringe benefit: monitoring West Germany. In this spring 1960 letter to Prime Minister Michel Debré about revising the treaty, he warned against the removal of EURATOM controls over raw uranium and thorium or enriched uranium. Their removal, he cautioned, would create a dilemma: “either abandon the idea that German’s renunciation of atomic armaments could be enforced or support the enforcement of equivalent controls under the West European Union, which … would interfere in the direction of our programs and the development of our nuclear weapons.”

Pagination