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Documents

January 14, 1972

State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note, 'India to Go Nuclear?'

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) evaluates the available intelligence on India’s nuclear intentions. There were varying reports that India would test a device that month, sometime in 1972, or that the government was undertaking a program to test a “peaceful nuclear explosive.” According to INR, India had the capability to produce some 20-30 weapons, and it could easily test a device in an underground site, such as an abandoned mine, that would be hard to discover. Because the U.S. government had given a “relatively modest priority to... relevant intelligence collection activities” a “concerted effort by India to conceal such preparations... may well succeed.” What would motivate India to test, the analysts opined, were domestic political pressures and concerns about China and Pakistan.

January 6, 1972

State Department cable 3088 to Embassy New Delhi

The State Department asks the U.S. Embassy in India for its assessment of the likelihood that India is planning a nuclear test explosion.

June 19, 1962

Fifth Official Meeting Between the Delegation of the Albanian Labor Party and the Delegation of the Chinese Communist Party

Albanian leaders Hysni Kapo and Ramiz Alia meet with a Chinese delegation to discuss industrialization in Communist countries, specificallyAlbania's five-year plan. The Albanians complain about being excluded from international meetings of the socialist countries. The Chinese update the Albanians on their position of supporting Jiang Jieshi over the "Two Chinas" objective of the United States and their relations with other countries throughout Asia, while encouraging the Albanians to reach out to the Muslim nations of Africa.

August 3, 1955

Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to Wang Bingnan, 'Instructions for the Third Meeting of the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks'

The Chinese Foreign Ministry suspected that China’s release of 11 American spies had put pressure on the US side, making the US open to the idea of having a higher level meeting. The Foreign Ministry instructed the Chinese representatives to urge the US to promise to release Chinese students in the US in the next meeting, and also urge the US to accept the suggestion of bringing in third country (India) to help the release process, including financial support.

August 7, 1955

Instructions from the PRC Foreign Ministry On the Issue of Chinese Students in the US at the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks

The Chinese Foreign Ministry instructed Wang Bingnan how to counter-argue when Americans objected China’s suggestions regarding release of Chinese students in the US.

August 10, 1955

Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to Wang Bingnan, 'Talking Points for the Fifth Meeting'

The Chinese Foreign Ministry instructed Chinese Representative Wang Bingnan to have the following major agreements in writing on the fifth meeting:
(1) Any nationals who were willing to return to their countries should be granted permission;
(2) China designated India and the US designated the UK to facilitate the repatriation of each other’s nationals.

July 5, 1950

Ciphered Telegram No. 3172, Stalin to Zhou Enlai via Roshchin

A telegram from Stalin to Zhou Enlai with regards to India's mediation in the PRC's entry into the UN, Chinese troop movements in preparation for a possible Southern/Allied counterattack, and Soviet planes flying over Manchuria.

July 13, 1950

Ciphered telegram, Filippov [Stalin] to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin)

Telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou Enlai detailing his response to the English protest concerning "the Korean question." Also, a request for confirmation of Chinese troop movements to the Sino-Korea border, in case of a repulse of North Korean forces. Finally, a confirmation of the plans to train Chinese pilots on Soviet jets, to be followed by the transfer of the jets to Chinese possession.

December 28, 1956

Third World Reaction to Hungary and Suez, 1956: A Soviet Foreign Ministry Analysis

Tugarinov wrote this overview of reactions to the events in Hungary and Suez by third world nations. Tugarinov reports that the events in Hungary and the Near East increased the prestige of the United States.

June 12, 1967

Minutes of meeting between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and top Yugoslav officials about the situation in the Middle East

Minutes of a meeting between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and top Yugoslav officials about the crisis in the Middle East. Yugoslav Vice President Koca Popovic recounts his meeting with UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser in which Nasser told of his actions leading up to and immediately following the Israeli attack. The leaders then discuss the actions of Algerian leaders and brainstorm how best to react, especially how to work with India to develop a common stance for the non-aligned movement.

Pagination