Milovan Djilas relates his first meeting with Stalin and the discussion about the Yugoslav military and other general conversation.

This memorandum, signed by Yurii Andropov, the chairman of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB); Nikolai Shchelokov, the Minister of Public Order (whose ministry was renamed the Ministry of Internal Affairs in late November 1968); and Mikhail Molyarov, the Procurator of the USSR, was sent to the ruling Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) eleven days after the demonstration in Red Square against the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. The document lays out the basic facts of the case as viewed by the KGB and the CPSU. The document mentions the names of the eight activists who were in Red Square as well as two who helped with planning but were not actually in Red Square, Inna Korkhova and Maiya Rusakovskaya. Natal’ya Gorbanevskaya, one of the eight, was detained but released because she had recently given birth. However, a year later she was arrested in connection with her involvement and sentenced to a harsh term in a psychiatric prison.

Jimmy Carter explains his call for a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics in reponse to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

During his visit in Poland, Castro relates Cuba's position on a conversation taken place in Moscow and why it may be of interest to the Cubans. Gomulka raises the issue of the missiles. In Gomulka's opinion two factors were decisive: contradictions which arose within the socialist camp and the policy which was conducted by Khrushchev. Gomulka is assured that US is capable of conducting a war with Cuba by way of conventional weapons, it does not have to use nuclear weapons. It is clear that the socialist camp and the USSR cannot defend Cuba in any other way but by using nuclear weapons. If a conflict is meant to be, then it will be a nuclear conflict, there is no other way. Gomulka further raises a question whether to go into a nuclear war or not. Castro disagrees with a manner nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Cuba by Soviets. Khruchshev explained that he did not have time. Per Gomulka, Khrushchev conducted a policy which was not thought-out and which was all-out. Gomulka further discusses his talks with Chinese and Vietnamese comrades re: nuclear weapons issue.

In this entry, Mitrokhin draws upon KGB sources to describe Yuri Velichkov Bagomil Stanimerov (b.1941), a Bulgarian citizen who graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 1968. Stanimerov was recruited by the Bulgarian branch of the KGB in 1970, and became a resident of Sweden in 1972. Mitrokhin’s summary of KGB documents indicates that in April 1974, CIA officer Huey Walter “Hearst” made Stanimerov an offer in the name of the National Security Council. While Stanimerov refused the offer, he told Hearst that he would continue collaborating with him. Stanimerov subsequently traveled to many foreign countries, but the Americans no longer expressed interest in him.

In 1975, Stanimerov was sent to work in the Bulgarian embassy in the United States. The Americans began to train Stanimerov as a spy and tried to ideologically convert him. The Mitrokhin account posits that the KGB gave Stanimerov instructions in case the latter succeeded in infiltrating the CIA. In 1978, the KGB received information regarding the fact that Stanimerov was being investigated by the FBI for his ties with the Bulgarian intelligence services

A portion of an interview with Fidel Castro by Mervyn Dymally, an American politician, where Castro discusses his view that the 1988 Summer Olympic games in Seoul should be a joint effort between North and South Korea.

Memorandum of a discussion between IOC President Samaranch and Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shevardnadze. The two discuss other issues for a while before turning to the "Korea question," as Shevardnadze puts it. Samaranch explains the series of discussions and compromises that have already occurred, as well as expresses some doubt that North Korea is serious about making cooperation happen and that he'd need assurance about the "Olympic family" being able to cross the border. Shevardnadze expresses confidence that that wouldn't be a problem.

A letter from Willi Daume, a member of West Germany's Olympic Committee, discussing intelligence that suggested North Korea would attempt to disrupt the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul.

Letter from U.S. Senator Ted Stevens to the President of the IOC, Juan Antonio Samaranch, containing Stevens' correspondences with the U.S. Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, on the 1988 Olympic Games.