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March 1, 1965

Statement of Raul Castro Ruz Pertaining to Cuba’s Minister of Industry, Ernesto "Che" Guevara

In a conversation between Kliszko and Raul Castro, a referral was made to the position assumed by the Minister of Industry in Cuba, Ernesto Guevara, at the economic seminar of Afro-Asian countries in Algeria in February 1965. Castro stated that he was not prepared to discuss the essence of the issue, e.g. the extent of aid from socialist countries to developing countries, but he felt Guevara's comments were extreme and out-of-place at the seminar.

March 20, 1965

Minutes of Conversation between Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro and Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka, Warsaw, 20 March 1965

During his visit in Poland, Castro relates Cuba's position on a conversation taken place in Moscow and why it may be of interest to the Cubans. Gomulka raises the issue of the missiles. In Gomulka's opinion two factors were decisive: contradictions which arose within the socialist camp and the policy which was conducted by Khrushchev. Gomulka is assured that US is capable of conducting a war with Cuba by way of conventional weapons, it does not have to use nuclear weapons. It is clear that the socialist camp and the USSR cannot defend Cuba in any other way but by using nuclear weapons. If a conflict is meant to be, then it will be a nuclear conflict, there is no other way. Gomulka further raises a question whether to go into a nuclear war or not. Castro disagrees with a manner nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Cuba by Soviets. Khruchshev explained that he did not have time. Per Gomulka, Khrushchev conducted a policy which was not thought-out and which was all-out. Gomulka further discusses his talks with Chinese and Vietnamese comrades re: nuclear weapons issue.

January 31, 1962

Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee (SED CC) Department of International Relations, 'Position on the publications about the Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba [CPC]'

On 29 and 30 January 1968 the central organ of the Cuban CP, “Granma,” published the speech given by Comrade Raoul [Raúl] Castro, second secretary of the CC of the CPC, at the 3rd meeting of the CC (24-26 January 1968). In this speech, comrades from the CPSU, the SED, and the CPCz were directly attacked in connection with the measures of the CC against a “micro faction” and openly accused of conspiracy against the Cuban party leadership and of collaboration with the penalized Cuban comrades.

August 23, 1962

Soviet Report on American Attempts at Disseminating Fabricated News on Cuba

Report on the American effort to spread false rumors about the arrival of Soviet military equipments and personnel in Cuba. To counter this subversive attempt, the Cuban security organs has established full control of foreign correspondence and captured maps and intelligence reports.

April 4, 1962

Soviet Report on Cuban Proposal to Establish a Soviet Intelligence Center in Cuba

Report on a conversation between the Cuban Minister of Internal Affairs Ramiro Valdez Menendez and the KGB representative in Havana regarding the former's trip to the Soviet Union. The discussion concerns a Cuban proposal to set up a Soviet intelligence center in the country, which the Soviets turned down.

January 11, 1967

Cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Cuban Intelligence Services

The report introduces Czechoslovak's assistance in the Operation MANUEL after the isolation of socialist Castro regime. Cuba looked for alternative routes in Europe in order to promote and influence the revolutionary movement in Latin America. Czechoslovakia assistance in the operation is of a strictly technical nature and its intelligence service is doing its utmost to protect the interests of the country by securing all technical matters. The report says that terminating the assistance was not possible for both practical and political reasons-- all direct flights between Czechoslovakia and Cuba would be suspended and a drastic cooling off of relations between two governments. Czechoslovak's refusal in assisting the operation would be interpreted as a political decision to suspend assistance to the national liberation movement in Latin America countries. However, the reports says that the assistance of Czechoslovak intelligence service to the operation is in no way amounts to agreeing with its political content and constitutes a minor aspect of intelligence work. The Soviet intelligence was also involved in organizing the operation in Moscow and offered assistance to its Cuban counterpart.

August 15, 1968

Report from the Bulgarian Ambassador in Havana, Stefan Petrov to Todor Zhivkov on the Domestic and Foreign Policy of Cuba

The ambassador gives an assessment of the Cuban domestic and foreign policy. He characterizes Fidel Castro as an adventurer and points to certain communist party decisions that are incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

1979

Agreement for Collaboration between Bulgarian and Cuban Ministries of the Interior

The agreement specifies the bilateral cooperation in the intelligence field.

March 11, 1976

Minutes of the Meeting between Todor Zhivkov and Fidel Castro in Sofia

Conversation for the record between Zhivkov and Castro during a four-day-long state visit of the Cuban leader to Bulgaria. Among the main issues discussed was the state of economic development in both countries, their relations with Albania, China, Romania and Yugoslavia; the Cuban foreign policy in Africa and the Caribbean; the civil war in Angola; the battle for the Third World.

November 7, 1967

Complaint by [Government of] Brazil Regarding Czechoslovak Transport of Guerrilla Fighters from Cuba to Latin America

Head of the 1st Administration of the Ministry of the Interior Josef Houska reports a complaint by the Brazilian government regarding to Czechoslovak assistance of transporting guerrilla fighters from Cuba to Latin America. Brazilian government issued an official warning that relations between Brazil and Czechoslovak could be deteriorated in connection with the support for Cuba. Houska says Brazilian officials' argument could be proof that Czechoslovak specially selected officials making technical arrangement for the transits belong to some section of the Czechoslovak civil service. However, the Czechoslovak authorities cannot be blamed that they go along with the activities of the Cuban Embassy in Prague, which controls the transport of the guerrillas since an embassy is entitled to engage in full diplomatic activities in a friendly country. Houska argues that the Brazilian government does not have conceret evidence for the direct accusation of Czechoslovakia. The position of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have been the result of pressure by ultra-reactionary forces in domestic policy which are concerned by the opposition activities in Brazil and abroad.

Pagination