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Documents

August 10, 1957

Memorandum from George W. Wood for Lt. Col Lee, 'Visit of Vietnamese Officers to Korea to Observe the Korean Service Corps'

George W. Wood of the US Eighth Army agrees with the proposal for South Vietnamese officers to come to South Korea for study and training.

May 14, 1957

Letter from Syngman Rhee to Ngo Dinh Diem

A cordial invitation letter from Syngman Rhee to Ngo Dinh Diem to visit South Korea.

December 1979

The Capability of the Puppet Regime to Launch an Attack on the South: A Comprehensive Analysis

South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Cultural Bureau reports on the current situation and information regarding the risk of a North Korea attack, North Korea's military capabilities, and the definiteness of a possible of a North Korean invasion.

November 22, 1979

Cable, South Korean Ambassador in the UK to South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs

Details from a conversation between the South Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom with Julian Ridsdale, Member of Parliament, on US troops stationed in Korea, the Soviet Union and China's viewpoints on Korea's reunification, and other matters.

February 10, 1951

Telegram from Yumashev to Stalin

Intelligence reports from the Fifth Navy Radio Network from 7 and 9 February reporting that there have been increased amounts of radio transmissions between naval commanders of the US forces in the Far East, and that evidence suggests that the US command is preparing a landing operation on the west coast of Korea.

August 7, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (Third Session)

President Rhee and Secretary Dulles have concluded the final negotiations for the US-ROK defense pact and now both believe it is time to inform the American and Korean public. Rhee emphasizes that he will not accept Korean neutralization and it is imperative to remove the Chinese from the north. Dulles states that the US will do its best to unify Korea under one peaceful government and will try to remove the Chinese aggressors in the north.

August 6, 1953

Proposed Joint Statement by President Rhee and Secretary Dulles

In this proposed joint statement, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles discuss the terms for the joint security pact between the ROK and the US.

August 3, 1953

Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

August 6, 1953

Summary Memorandum, US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (August 6)

In 1953, Secretary Dulles met President Rhee to discuss the US-ROK mutual defense treaty. This summary memorandum notes twelve of Rhee’s requests and/or points he will like this treaty to incorporate. These include the number of ROKA divisions, which economic model the US should use to help Korea’s economy, and the request for moral and material support for the ROK to resume war with the north. This summary also notes whether the US granted, wanted to further discuss, or rejected each point.

August 5, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (First Session)

In early August of 1950, delegates from the United States and the Republic of Korea met to discuss the logistics for the forthcoming conferences centered on the creation of a strong US-ROK mutual defense treaty. The delegates also propose who can and should be present. While both sides agree that North Korea and China should be included, President Rhee advocates that due to India’s Prime Minister’s “pro-communist views,” India should not be invited.

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