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April 15, 1967	Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.134, TOP SECRET, April 15, 1967 An analysis of the causes of the incidents on the 38th parallel by delegates to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Comission.
April 14, 1967	Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.73.130, TOP SECRET, April 14, 1967 A report on the tensions provoked resulting from incidents near the 38th parallel.
April 8, 1967	Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.121, TOP SECRET, April 8, 1967 Telegram informing requests from North Korea asking for technical and scientific cooperation in the field of atomic energy.
April 7, 1967	Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.14.213, TOP SECRET, April 7, 1967 Ionescu Teofil and the Chinese counselor in Pyongyang discuss the "great revolutionary event" in North Korea and the state of play in Sino-North Korean relations.
March 28, 1967	Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.108, TOP SECRET, March 28, 1967 Ionescu Teofil and the Soviet Minister-Counselor in Pyongyang discuss the reasoning behind the "forthcoming revolutionary event" in North Korea, commenting that the event is likely to be way of distracting the public from economic problems and failures.
March 19, 1967	Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.098, TOP SECRET, March 19, 1967 A Romanian Embassy report on the state of an economic cooperation agreement between North Korea and the Soviet Union.
March 15, 1967	Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.093, TOP SECRET, March 15, 1967 Ionescu Teofil and Huang Mîoi discuss a forthcoming ‘great revolutionary event’ in North Korea.
December 30, 1966	Excerpts from a 30 December 1966 Memo of the Soviet Embassy to the DPRK (A. Borunkov) about Embassy Measures against Chinese Anti-Soviet Propaganda in the DPRK A short note on the anti-Chinese propaganda in North Korea, which is done in a restricted manner.
March 14, 1967	Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.091, TOP SECRET, March 14, 1967 A record of conversation with the head of the External Relations Section of the 'Rodong Sinmun' discussing North Korea's reunification policy.
October 14, 1983	Telex from the East German Embassy in Romania to Bucharest, 14 October 1983 Summary of Romanian position on the Euromissiles Crisis presented at October 1983 summit and also shared with the United States via a letter from Nicolae Ceauşescu to President Ronald Reagan.The Ceauşescu – Reagan letter underscored that: (1) Romania did not approve of the Soviet missile deployments; (2) noted that Romania would only participate in defense operations, and specified that it would carefully consider the nature of the call for assistance by fellow alliance members before sending its troops outside of Romanian territory; (3) stressed that the Romanian Armed Forces were fully under national control, giving several specific details on how this was guaranteed; and (4) explicitly noted that Romania did not and would not ever host nuclear missiles on its territory, whether from the Soviet Union or the United States.