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October 27, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 27 October 1962 Jelen discusses the Cuban Missile Crisis: military and missile bases in Cuba and Turkey, UN inspections of Cuba and U-2 planes.
October 27, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Paszkowski), 27 October 1962 [First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasili Vasilyevich] Kuznetsov assessed the [UN] resolution of Ghana and the United Arab Republic [Egypt] as kind of a band-aid, but a one that nevertheless is significant. On the other hand, he considers the statement of the Afro-Asian nations as both good and strong.
October 26, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962 According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.
October 26, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962 Drozniak makes an assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, based on his conversations with foreign diplomats and respected journalists. Among other topics, he includes his opinion that "The operation of installing the [Soviet] missiles in Cuba was carried out in great hurry, without special adherence to secrecy, and perhaps even with the awareness that the missiles would be discovered relatively quickly. This [fact] has been interpreted [by the Americans] as [a possible] attempt by the USSR to test Kennedy’s “the will and readiness to fight.” [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev chose Cuba, because he considered Berlin to be too dangerous."
October 25, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 25 October 1962 Drozniak discusses the ongoing Cuban Missile Crisis situation, including the rumors of a possible US military invasion of Cuba.
October 24, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Paszkowski), 24 October 1962 Paszkowski discusses changes in the tensions of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, including his opinion that the US's recent actions and rhetoric were a pre-election bluff.
October 24, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 24 October 1962 On the Cuban Crisis situation, Jelen says that Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseyev is optimistic but Brazilian Ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto is concerned. Jelen also gives his own impressions of the crisis, saying that "There’s a relative run on the stores, but without any signs of panic and fears of the threat of military operations."
October 23, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 23 October 1962 In a conversation with Charles Bartlett (a journalist who had befriended President Kennedy), Drozniak learns more of the Cuban Crisis situation and of US-USSR relations, including that the steps taken to address the crisis (the quarentine of Cuba) were implemented by Kennedy in the atmosphere of great pressure from the public opinion.
October 20, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak) Drozniak compiles information he has collected from US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler and US Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson on the rising Cuban situation and US-USSR relations.
October 18, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962 Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.