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October 27, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 27 October 1962

Van Roijen relates that the U.S. State Department has great interest in learning about the mood in Cuba, particularly Havana. Van Roijen asks the Minister of Foreign Affairs to forward all of Boissevain's correspondences including his personal letters to him.

October 26, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 26 October 1962

Van Roijen relates the current situation in Washington and the American view on the crisis. The removal of the missiles was a non-negotiable issue for the Americans, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared their removal was absolutely essential. In the mind of American statesmen, the missiles in Cuba was directly connected to the 1961 Berlin crisis, as it was a new Soviet technique. The hurried construction of the bases was reported to go on, meaning time is of the utmost essence. The Americans were not above considering force to resolve the crisis, although this was relegated to a worst-case scenario.

October 26, 1962

Cable from Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, The Hague, to Dutch Embassy, London, 26 October 1962

This cable from Foreign Minister Luns refers to a personal letter received from British Foreign Minister Lord Home, regarding the stance of the United Kingdom in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The letter is one encouraging support to the United States at the UN Security Council, and that such a crisis would have repurcussions not only for the Caribbean but for Europe as well. Luns later sent a reply of thanks, indicating continuing solidarity with the Western World and promises to keep in closer touch with the British.

October 25, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 25 October 1962

Van Roijen relates in this cable the details of a meeting with the US State Department's Bureau of Western European Affairs. With regards to Cuba, the Soviets assured the United States that they would not supply Cuba with offensive military weapons and even detailed the ranges of the missiles shipped. The construction of the bases was done in such haste that no attempt to conceal them was made, indicating the construction was on a time limit. These along with several other factors (the 1961 Berlin crisis, internal pressure within the Soviet Union) had convinced the administration that the Soviets had the fixed determination to confront the US.

October 25, 1962

Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 25 October 1962

Boissevain relates the Cuban response to the crisis. In a speech, Castro does not deny the placement of nuclear weapons, and claims this kind of denial has been heard more from Khrushchev. The impression is one of building missile silos which look like "ground-to-ground" launch sites from the air. The Cuban government is satisfied with the developments from the UN Security Council regarding the issue, as evidenced by the Havana airport being reopened for international flights.

October 25, 1962

Minutes of the Council of Ministers, The Hague, 25 October 1962

A record of the meeting of the Dutch Council of Ministers at The Hague. The Prime Minister talks of the need to give a Dutch standpoint to the crisis, which has yet to be delivered. Minister of Home Affairs suggests that whatever action the United States adopts, the Dutch should comply for the sake of Western solidarity. The question of NATO is brought up, specifically if it should be included in an official Dutch position on Cuba.

October 24, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 24 October 1962

This cable comes from Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen, regarding the subject of Cuba and the discovered Soviet missiles. Van Roijen reports on the current status of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, noting that the Soviets are willing to dismantle the missiles in Cuba if the Americans would do for "obscolescent bases near Soviet territory." The State Department fervently denied that any such tradeoff would happen or was even being considered.

1955

Report from the Romanian Embassy to Pyongyang to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Political, Economic, and Social Situation in North Korea and on the Activity of the Embassy, undated [1955]

The Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang reports on political developments, post-war reconstruction, foreign aid, and culture in North Korea in1955.

September 29, 1954

Report from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Activity of the Embassy, September 29, 1954, written by comrade Victor Florescu, Second Secretary of the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

A report from the Romanian Embassy in North Korea to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs details the current states of affairs in North Korea in autumn 1954, mostly discussing the question of Korean unification, as well as prisoner exchange, North Korean economic conditions, inter-Korean relations, and North Korea's relations with China and Japan.

November 25, 1955

Report from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Political and Economic Situation in South Korea, November 25th 1955, 4236/1955

A report to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes the growing sense of tension and division regarding Syngman Rhee's leadership while Rhee carries out "agrarian reform" by using rice needed by the workers to pay off debt and increases the size of the South Korean army.

Pagination