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June 17, 1982	Terry Jones, Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, Dept of State, to J. Devine et al., enclosing summaries of State Dept cable traffic during 1981-1982 relating to demarches on attempted purchase of sensitive nuclear-related products A summary of U.S. State Department cable traffic regarding Pakistan’s nuclear efforts in 1981-1982. While the Reagan administration was inclined to give Pakistan some leeway in light of their support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology from abroad was still something that the administration was against. Evidence that Pakistan had made efforts, some successful, to acquire specific technology that suggested a nuclear test was being prepared raised a red flag in the U.S. government
June 4, 1982	Note for [name excised] from [name excised], 'State/INR Request for Update of Pak SNIE, and Assessment of Argentine Nuclear Program' A planned update of the Special National Intelligence Estimate 31-32/81 concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear program was continuing and new evidence suggested a “significant” Chinese role in the design of the weapons. Despite this new evidence, CIA estimates suggest that the required amount of fissile material for weapons production would not be available as early as had been predicted, and that a Pakistani nuclear test was not imminent.
November 21, 1981	Secretary of State Alexander Haig to Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or) Secretary of State Haig writes to Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) to explain possible U.S. courses of action with regards to military and economic aid should Pakistan test a nuclear weapon. A test, Haig said, would “in all probability” lead to an end of economic and military support.
September 21, 1981	John N. McMahon, Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, to Ambassador Richard T. Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management, 'Special National Intelligence Estimate on Indian Reactions to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan,' 31-32/81 Special National Security Estimate 31-32/81 outlines possible Indian preventative action that could be taken against Pakistan’s nuclear program, and possible responses should Pakistan develop a weapon.
August 20, 1981	Acting Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence, National Foreign Assessment Center, to Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 'Warning Report-Nuclear Proliferation' In response to an IAEA report that Pakistan diverted plutonium from the Karachi nuclear power plant, a CIA analysis suggests that the Pakistanis “were not overly concerned” about these events. Of greater concern to regional security and stability was the discussions of the sale of F-16 fighter-bombers as part of a U.S. aid package to ensure Pakistan’s cooperation in the covert efforts against Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
December 16, 1950	Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua Zhou Enlai advises the Chinese UN representatives on how to explain and respond to representatives from other countries regarding the Korea issue and the proposed armistice.
December 13, 1950	Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua Zhou Enlai expresses that China is the most interested in the opinion of the U.S. and the UN regarding the conditions for an armistice on the Korean peninsula, and makes clear that the 38th parallel is no longer in existence.
December 12, 1950	Report from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong Zhou Enlai sends detailed reports to Mao Zedong on new recruits from the Northeast; the replenishment of military supplies; the distribution of Soviet infantry weapons; the repair of railways and transportation; the condition of airports in North Korea; the use of artillery and tank units; and the stationing of command posts.
June 25, 1981	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'India-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential Repercussions' A U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research report offers an overview of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, and speculates how the development of a weapon in one country could strain relations with Washington and lead to a regional nuclear arms race. India is less likely to take preventive action against Pakistan because of the risk of “antagonizing China,” the report suggests.
December 9, 1950	Letter, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong Zhou Enlai asks for Mao Zedong's instructions on whether to attack Seoul in January or postpone the attack until March, and gives details on the benefits of postponing the attack.