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Documents

February 21, 1979

Letter, Andrew Young to Abdalla Yaccoub Bishara containing "Report on the Activities of the United Nations Command (UNC) (December 17, 1977 - December 17, 1978)"

Andrew Young a report of the United Nations Command concerning the maintenance of the Korean Armistice Agreement, North Korean naval intrusions, and North Korean tunnel in DMZ.

November 23, 1971

Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

Ozbudun updates Narasimhan on domestic and international affairs in ROK. The 9th preliminary Red Cross talks made no progress. The ROK government worries that PRC's entry in the UN will affect the UN Korean question discussion. A Russian reporter may visit Seoul to sound out potential trade relations. Japan decides to forgo trade and banking relations with North Korea.

November 11, 1971

Letter, Ozbudun to Narasimhan, "PRC's Entry into the United Nations: Repercussions"

ROK doubts are rising due to the PRC's entry into the UN. Many debate ROK's position in connection with UNCURK and UNC.

July 9, 1971

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

A UN Command officer suggests future ROK and DPRK talks should be conducted directly. The ROK government, anxious to maintain US and UN military presence in ROK, criticizes the statement.

June 18, 1971

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

Kuzbari updates Narasimhan on the UN Command's proposal to clear the DMZ for civilian use, the need to validate ROK's accusations against North Korean seaborne attacks, Japan's view that ROK should adapt to communist China's entry into the UN, and the changing liberal attitude of the Korean people in regards to unification.

June 4, 1971

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

During a MAC meeting between the UN Command and DPRK, UN Command announces its disassociation with the Major Pak crash-landing incident and ROK's sole involvement on the non-return of Major Pak. The DPRK states that, in the future, they will not return any US military personnel.

May 28, 1971

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

The UN Command and MAC meetings over the return of North Korean pilot Major Pak are heated. The ROK government will not return Pak to North Korea, claiming that he desires to stay in South Korea. UNCURK will no longer play a role in the return or remain of Pak.

May 21, 1971

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

ROK claims of North Korean sea infiltration are challenged by UN Command and UNCURK. Additionally, student protests are growing, but DRP's reaction is cautious because they fear that the students may align with NDP and pose a threat to the DRP.

May 5, 1971

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

The ROK government decision to only return North Korean pilot Major Pak in exchange for the remaining elevent passengers of the 1969 KAL plane causes dissatisfaction with UNCURK and UN Command.

April 9, 1971

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan, 'Report on the Case of the North Korean Pilot, Major Pak Song Guk'

After the UN Command's failed attempt to exchange Major Pak with the remaining KAL passengers, determining and handling the repatriation of Major Pak is said to be in UNCURK's hands.

Pagination