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January 16, 1973

H. Daniel Brewster to Herman Pollack, 'Indian Nuclear Developments'

The interagency group prepared a response to NSSM 156 on 1 September 1972 and it was sent to Kissinger. The summary of the study reproduced here includes the conclusion that an Indian test would be “a set-back to nonproliferation efforts” and that Washington should “do what [it] can to avert or delay” one. Thus, recommendations included a number of unilateral and multilateral actions that the United States government could take, noting that “given the poor state” of Indo-American relations, an “overly visible” U.S. effort would more likely speed up an Indian decision to test a device, Even non-US efforts were likely not to “be per se effective.”

September 21, 1972

Memorandum of Conversation, 'Indian Nuclear Developments'

A meeting between British Foreign Office and State Department officials on the Indian nuclear problem occurred the same month that Indian Prime Minister Gandhi approved the “final preparations for a PNE.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christopher T. Van Hollen (the father of the future Maryland Congressman) and his colleagues followed the approach taken by the Special National Intelligence Estimate, which was close to that taken by the British Joint Intelligence Committee. According to country director David Schneider, the “odds were about even” that India would make a decision, but once it was made, India could test very quickly. There was “no firm intelligence” that a “go-ahead signal” to prepare for a test had been made. Schneider reviewed bilateral and multilateral steps, proposed in the NSSM 156 study, that the U.S. and others could take to try to discourage an Indian test and the range of reactions that would be available if India went ahead. A “weak” U.S. reaction, Schneider observed, would suggest that Washington would “acquiesce” if other countries followed India’s example.

August 3, 1972

Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 31-72, 'Indian Nuclear Developments and their Likely Implications'

Prepared as part of the NSSM 156 policy review, this Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) concluded that the chances of India making a decision to test were “roughly even,” but the post-mortem analysis [see "Why now?," 18 May 1974] argued that based on its own findings, the conclusion ought to have been 60-40 in favor of a decision to test. In its analysis of the pros and cons of testing, the SNIE found that the “strongest factors impelling India to set off a test are: the belief that it would build up [its] international prestige; demonstrate India's importance as an Asian power; overawe its immediate South Asian neighbors; and bring enhanced popularity and public support to the regime which achieved it.” The drafters further noted that a test would be “extremely popular at home, where national pride is riding high” and that supporters of a test believed that it would make the world see India as “one of the world’s principal powers.” The arguments against a test included adverse reactions from foreign governments that provided economic assistance, but the estimate noted that foreign reactions were “becoming less important” to India.

July 26, 1972

US Embassy India Cable 9293 to State Department, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

The Embassy acknowledged that India had the “technical know-how and possibly materials to develop [a] simple nuclear device within period of months after GOI decision to do so.” Nevertheless, it saw no evidence that a decision had been made to test a device. Moreover, capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons were limited, with no plans in sight to “develop [a] missile launch system.”

July 4, 1972

Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Proposed NSSM on the Implications of an Indian Nuclear Test,' with cover memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy

National security assistant Henry Kissinger asks President Nixon to approve a proposal for a national security study memorandum [NSSM] on the implications of an Indian nuclear test for U.S. interests.

June 27, 1972

US Embassy Tokyo Cable 67912 to State Department, 'Japanese View Regarding Indian Nuclear Plans'

Cable on a discussion with Japanese Disarmament Division Chief Tanaka, who was uncertain whether India would conduct the nuclear test or not.

June 26, 1972

US Mission Geneva Cable 2755 to State Department, 'Japanese-Pakistani Conversations Regarding Indian Nuclear Plans'

Report on conversations between Japanese officials and a Pakistani source who indicated the location of the upcoming Indian nuclear test. The cable expressed doubts about the information, suggesting that the "stir" "may have been created largely on personal basis" by the Pakistani source.

June 23, 1972

State Department Cable 113523 to US Embassy India, 'Japanese Views Regarding Indian Nuclear Plans'

In response to a request from the State Department, Ryohei Murata, an official at the Japanese embassy, reported that the Japanese government believed that for prestige reasons and as a “warning” to others, the “Indians have decided to go ahead with a nuclear test” which could occur at “any time.” The Thar Desert in Rajasthan would be the test site.

April 22, 1972

State Department Cable 69551 to US Embassy United Kingdom, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

The Canadian embassy had asked the State Department for information on the intelligence reports from earlier in the year that an Indian nuclear test was “imminent.” The State Department denied the request, but informed the Canadians that the reports were so numerous and their “congruity, apparent reliability, and seeming credibility” so striking that it had become necessary to update official thinking about Indian intentions.

April 7, 1972

State Department cable 59655 to US Embassy United Kingdom, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

The British Government took the same view as the Canadians, seeing no evidence that the Indians had made a decision to do a nuclear test, although they had the “capability.”

Pagination