Vidaković reports to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry on the diplomatic efforts of many Cuban officials (Roa, Dorticos, etc.). Vidakovic is worried they might not be approaching the situation (the Cuban Missile Crisis) with the appropriate fervor, which might, he believes, lead to a hysterical over-reaction at some point.

Foreign Minister Raúl Roa said to the Yugoslavian official that Fidel’s last declaration (his 5 point statement on 28 October) was directed more at Khrushchev than to Kennedy.

Barišić is forwarding a message from Brazilian President João Goulart to Yugoslavian President Tito. The body of the message contains his thoughts on both Brazil and Yugoslavia's involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis and also his hopes that negotiations can reach a settlement that will both retain Cuba's right to self-determination and also proceed with the denuclearization efforts of Latin America.

Vidaković describes the positions of both Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos, with whom he met, and U Thant, who sent him a message. Both men relay the difficulties in dealing with the Cuban situation, especially concerning the resolution to the UN on inspections in Cuba and the imminent danger of a possible American attack.

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about a meeting with Brazilian President João Goulart. Barišić says Goulart considers that everything must be done to prevent the beginning of war, because war would bring unpredictable catastrophe and it would be hard to extinguish it if war operations start. Goulart also shares his opinion that negotiations are necessary, and that Cuba must be prevented from becoming an atomic base for it could be the constant cause of war dangers.

Ambassador Vidaković describes a meeting with Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos. Dorticos is convinced that the American attack and invasion will happen later that night.

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović talks with Brazilian Foreign Ministry official Carlos A. Bernardes about the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. They are afraid that euphoria could make the US intensify a conflict that could lead to invasion, because the US ambassador [Lincoln Gordon] claims constantly that the solution to this crisis is not only disarmament of Cuba, but also liquidation of Fidel’s regime.

A telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry describing Vidaković's meeting with Brazilian Ambassador Pinto. They mostly discussed the Cuban crisis in relation to decisions made in the Organization of American States (OAS) councils.

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about meeting with Brazilian officials to discuss the US preparing a military invasion of Cuba.

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-USSR-Cuban relations. It says, the "American arguments in favor of the military blockade of Cuba are: firstly, they have solid proof that Cuba will get atomic weapons; secondly, Kennedy must take more severe measures because of the internal pressure, that’s why his option is blockade, although he is trying to transfer this issue to the UNO [United Nations Organization] in order to alleviate the pressure on himself; thirdly, transferring Cuba’s issue to the UNO he is creating a precedent against unilateral USSR actions in Berlin."