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October 26, 1962

American Embassy Ankara Telegram 587 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

In an “eyes only” response to a State Department query about the Jupiters, U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare observed that “if proper means could be found, good case could be made for removal of Jupiters from Turkey as counter for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.” Yet, withdrawing the missiles as part of a Cuban Missile Crisis arrangement would pose a problem that was “partly psycho-political” and “partly substantive.” With reference to the “psycho-political” problem, Hare’s explanation was framed ethnocentrically: The Turks “are proud, courageous people who do not understand concept or process of compromise.” In that context, the U.S. would lose much “if in process of Jupiter removal [the] Turks should get the impression that their interests as an ally were being traded off in order to appease an enemy.” He recommended several alternative solutions to the problem; for example, if the missiles are phased out, the U.S. could provide Turkey with a backup, such as the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) or Polaris missiles. If Italy gave up its Jupiters, he suggests, that could help with an approach to Turkey. 

October 26, 1962

American Embassy Rome Telegram 436 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC

On October 26, 1962, as the Cuban Missile Crisis is unfolding, U.S. Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt replied to a State Department inquiry about possible Italian reactions to withdrawal of the Jupiters, stating that they “would probably be manageable,” but also recommending early consultations with the Italian government if they were to “form part of negotiated settlement.” In particular, Reinhardt suggested offsetting the withdrawal with gestures to appeal to the Italian government’s craving for status, such as (a) presenting the removal as an Italian contribution to the relaxation of East-West tensions, (b) some kind of “big power consultation” between the U.S. and Italy, coupled with assurances on “the presence of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean,” (c) “public emphasis on Italy’s role in NATO in order to counter-balance loss of value which missiles have for Italy in calling attention to its role and position in alliance,” and (d) a promise to halt further reductions of U.S. military commitments in Italy. In short, Reinhardt saw a phase-out as a possibility but something to be “be very carefully handled.”

March 27, 1952

National Intelligence Estimate Number 27/1, 'Chinese Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Taiwan through 1952'

The CIA predicts that, as long as US support to Taiwan remains constant, the PRC cannot stage a successful attack on the island.

March 16, 1955

National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4-55, 'Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan'

The CIA on whether the PRC has the ability to seize Taiwan and/or the offshore islands.

Date unknown

Questions and Answers about Space Weapons

This CND pamphlet sets out the case against the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative which was being pursued by the Reagan Administration.

July 3, 1985

Letter, Joan Ruddock and Bruce Kent to Vice-President of the United States George Bush

This letter to then Vice-President Bush sets out CND's opposition to the British Government's involvement in the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (popularly known as Star Wars).

Date unknown

Russian Roulette: Don't Let CND Gamble with Peace

This poster produced by the Coalition for Peace through Security suggests that peace groups such as the CND paradoxically endanger peace. The image also associates the CND with the Soviet Union.

Date unknown

CND: Communists, Neutralists, Defeatists

This leaflet produced by the Coalition for Peace through Security attacks the CND specifically as being 'Communists, neutralists, defeatists'. It likens the CND to 'the Appeasers during the 1930s'.

Date unknown

The Soviet Union Needs You! Support Unilateral Disarmament!

This leaflet produced by Youth for Multilateral Disarmament suggests that the policy of the UK divesting itself of nuclear weapons - called 'one-sided disarmament' in the leaflet - would serve Soviet interests and weaken Britain. 

April 1983

Welcome to the Greenham Common Blockade, A Non-Violent Direct Action, Easter 1983

This pamphlet provides participants with information on taking part in a blockade of RAF Greenham Common, where Cruise missiles would be deployed from the end of 1983. Readers are encouraged to engage in direct action, and extensive legal advice is given to clarify what forms of action are legal.

Pagination