Skip to content

Results:

31 - 40 of 74

Documents

June 11, 1963

A.A. Wells, Director of Office of International Affairs, AEC, to Dr. Ragnar Rollefson, Director, Office of International Scientific Affairs, 'Reported Franco-German Cooperation in Development of the French Gaseous Diffusion Efforts'

In this memorandum, Wells reported on comments that West German Minister for Scientific Research Hans Lenz made during a meeting at the Atomic Energy Convention. Noting that West Germany had been holding talks with the French and EURATOM about building a reprocessing plant at Karlsruhe, Lenz “implied that this proposal quite likely had resulted in reports that Germany might be undertaking a cooperative program with France in the development of their gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte.” Lenz then reaffirmed West Germany's commitment to the 1955 Brussels Treaty pledge, declaring that West Germany would not initiate action to develop military applications of atomic energy.

May 30, 1963

Memorandum of Conversation between Georgi M. Kornienko, Chargé d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy, and Ronald I. Spiers, 'MLF, Disarmament'

In this conversation, Soviet diplomat Georgi Kornienko and State Department official Ronald Spiers discussed the Soviet objections to MLF. Kornienko argued that it would expose West Germany to “the nuclear disease” on the "road to disaster", but Spiers maintained that it would forestall the Germans from pursuing new nuclear programs.

May 29, 1963

State Department Telegram 6389 to US Embassy United Kingdom

In this telegram, President Kennedy encourages Prime Minister Macmillan to take a positive interest in the MLF project, in which the British had little interest because of financial reasons and their doubts about the German role. Kennedy also expressed concern about the future of German nuclear efforts.

May 25, 1963

Under Secretary of State George Ball to President Kennedy, 'Policy Recommendations: NSAM 241 - French Gaseous Diffusion Plant'

In this memorandum, Under Secretary Ball recommended making a greater effort to find more information about German or Italian interest in financial and other kinds of support for the Pierrelatte plant. Ball also suggested that Washington minimize German interest in acquiring nuclear fuel from non-US sources by making “assurances of a long-term supply of cheap nuclear fuel for peaceful uses."

May 21, 1963

Atomic Energy Commission, 'German Participation in Pierrelatte Gaseous Diffusion Plant,' with Cover Memo from Myron B. Kratzer, Division of International Affairs, to Mr. Thomas and Mr. Kaufman, Department of State

This AEC report looked at the Pierrelatte plant’s prospective capabilities, possible West German motives for seeking an independent supply of enriched uranium (possibly in cooperation with the French), the “adverse” implications of a French-German project, and policy alternatives available to Washington. If the West Germans were determined to contribute to the French enrichment project, the AEC saw serious risks including the “the prospects of a Franco-German military alliance that could constitute a European third force capable of dominating Western Europe."

May 13, 1963

Director of Central Intelligence John McCone and AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg to President Kennedy, with Attachment 'Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Project'

In this report, the CIA and the AEC found that because the French underestimated the cost of the Pierrelatte plant, they had a reason to consider West German financial aid.They conclude that the West Germans had relevant technical skill and the French may have regarded cooperation as a tactic to dodge Adenauer’s 1954 commitment and also as a “way for German industry to improve its position in the nuclear technological race.”

May 7, 1963

National Security Action Memorandum 241, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy to Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Plant' with Attachment 'France'

A report about an alleged French request to West Germany for financial support for their Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant raised White House hackles, despite German and French disavowals. In this memorandum, McGeorge Bundy asked the CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] to investigate the report and the State Department to develop policy recommendations in light of the findings.

February 27, 1963

President Kennedy to Honorable William Tyler [Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs] and Honorable Paul Nitze [Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs]

In a memorandum to senior officials at the Departments of Defense and State, President Kennedy expressed doubts over whether West Germany would abide by the non-nuclear weapons commitment that West German Chancellor Adenauer had made in 1954. Also mentioned in the memorandum is Kennedy's description of a meeting with West German defense minister Kai-Uwe von Hassell to discuss these concerns; von Hassell assured the President that West Germany would not go on any "nuclear adventures."

November 27, 1962

Secretary of State to the President, 'Agreement on Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons,' with Enclosures and Cover Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy

In this proposed agreement, Secretary of State Rusk asked the White House for authorization to approach the Soviets. Rusk had two central goals in mind: to determine if the Soviets would state whether its allies, such as China, would agree to a nonproliferation agreement and to give Moscow a “somewhat more precise indication of what we have in mind concerning the obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons.”

December 10, 1962

US Embassy West Germany Telegram 1538 to State Department

Following a similar telegram from 25 July 1962, this telegram noted French denials of any such discussion on French-German nuclear cooperation, but the Bonn Embassy agreed with the U.S. Embassy in France that the subject was “reserved for possible consideration in future.”

Pagination