The Embassy reported on the Council of Ministers decisions and the related communique. The latter made only general references to “modernization of arms of alliance” without mentioning Jupiters or Polaris, which was probably Fanfani’s preference. According to Reinhardt, Fanfani told him that the Council had “unanimously approved” the agreement that he and Kennedy had reached.

That the Commander of U.S. European Command (CINCEUR), Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, was a critic of the Jupiter removals may have informed a Joint Chiefs of Staff decision to send him a background paper explaining U.S. decisions that could also be used for discussions within NATO.   The backgrounder provided information comparing the reliability, vulnerability, and survivability, among other features, of the Jupiter and Polaris missiles. While the withdrawal of Thor and Jupiter missiles reduced Western “nuclear potential,” those reductions would be offset by an increase from 350 to about 800 U.S. strategic ballistic missiles, “some of which will be assigned to NATO targets.” Further, it “may be assumed that there will be no reduction in the present expectation of timely damage to the ACE [Allied Command Europe] targets presently covered by the Jupiters.”

This message, intended “only” for Ambassador Reinhardt, included information for use in backgrounders for officials and journalists, but only with the Department’s consent. It included comparisons of the Jupiter and Polaris missiles, a brief discussion of possible targeting arrangements for Polaris, and the possible timing of the introduction of Polaris and the phase out of Jupiter missiles.  One point concerned “Equating of Italy and Turkey with Cuba.” U.S. officials were advised to make no comment on the matter, but if raised, officials should observe that when the Soviets equated missiles in Cuba with Jupiters in Italy and Turkey “we absolutely refused accept any such comparison or deal.” A version of these points would soon go to Fanfani’s foreign policy adviser, Carlo Marchiori.

Compared with the negotiations with Italy, the talks with Turkish officials were complicated and slow moving.  One problem was Foreign Minister Erkin’s “mistaken impression” that Turkey would have a role in “manning” Polaris submarines. As desk officer John Bowling observed in this memo, Ambassador Hare saw that as a “grotesque” misunderstanding of the U.S. negotiating position, and the State Department’s reply rejected proposals for any Turkish role in commanding and staffing the submarines. All the same, Bowling saw the need for some Turkish involvement, including Turkish observers on the Polaris submarines “from time to time” and a “carefully phased” program of instruction in the U.S. beginning with “familiarization training” in the Polaris weapon system.

Other complications involved the provision of F-104Gs, including Turkey’s request to increase the number of fighter-bombers in the first squadron, which Bowling wrote was “literally impossible,” and the U.S. inability to provide a delivery date for the second squadron.  He suggested that the U.S. encourage more progress with Ankara by providing information on the state of the negotiations with Italy. Optimistically, Bowling thought it “possible” to reach a “satisfactory solution in ten days or so.”

In light of the Fanfani visit to the U.S., and the likelihood that the Jupiter-Polaris arrangement would be publicized, the State Department asked Hare for his estimate of Turkish reactions. Hare reported that Erkin was “perturbed” that an “impression” was being created that Turkey was “trailing behind Italians” on the Jupiter replacement issue. With a  Senate debate forthcoming on the matter, Erkin did not want it to look like he was “sleeping at [the] switch” but also did not “want [to] get out in front.” Not knowing what would be said in Washington, he was not sure what “line” to take. Erkin and Hare agreed that Erkin could say in Parliament that the government was “fully informed” and would take a position that was consistent with “Turkish best interests.” Turkish officials would continue to be concerned by the appearance that they had “been outdistanced by the Italians.”

Ambassador Hare met with Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin about moving ahead on substituting Jupiter missiles with Polaris, emphasizing the “importance in Turkey’s getting in on ground floor of this significant move toward a stronger NATO.” Erkin implied that he was “impressed by the reasonableness of our proposals,” but believed that the public would have to be persuaded “that Polaris would be as effective as Jupiters in assuring security of Turkey.” Hare observed that visits to Turkish ports by Polaris submarines armed with ballistic missiles could help maintain Turkey’s “confidence” in the U.S. deterrent and in NATO.

Following his instructions to begin reaching a deal, Reinhardt met with Andreotti. The latter raised the date of April 1 as sort of a deadline and asked Reinhardt how important it was, noting that it would better to remove the missiles after April 1 so it would not be an election issue, where the right could “condemn a great defeat,” while the left could claim a “great victory.” Reinhardt declared that Washington wanted the action on Jupiters taken “as soon as possible,” which Andreotti accepted, observing that an “optimum solution” would be a “two key” arrangement for Polaris, which he realized was not practical in the short term.

When Andreotti noted that the decommissioning of the Jupiter sites would be a “graphic step backward” for Italy in terms of direct Italian participation in nuclear defense, Reinhardt mentioned the replacement of Corporals with Sergeant missiles, which Andreotti acknowledged would be “helpful” for demonstrating a U.S. “presence” in Italy.

At the conclusion of this memorandum, Kitchen noted that President Kennedy approved the “plan of action” on the Jupiters on January 5, 1963. This was a reference to Kennedy’s Palm Beach meeting with Rusk and Finletter. As Kitchen observed, the letters to Andreotti and Sancar went out on January 5, and messages to Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt were sent a few days later. The instructions to Hare are in the FRUS, and the ones to Reinhard precede this document.

In this “limited distribution” message, George Ball informed Ambassador Reinhardt of the developing plans to deploy three Polaris boats in the Mediterranean with the missiles on station by April 1. Polaris would supersede the less effective Jupiters. The Ambassador should seek agreement with the Italian Government to take the “necessary steps” to dismantle the two Jupiter squadrons. The Italians “may be quite willing” to move in this direction, Rusk suggested, having already shown they recognized the value of replacing Jupiters with Polaris. Reinhard should advise the Italians that the U.S. government was treating the matter with “great secrecy” and was making a parallel approach to Ankara.
 
The Italians would not be surprised by this initiative in light of Andreotti-McNamara discussions at the recent NATO meeting, which also covered U.S. interest in modernizing tactical nuclear delivery systems (Sergeant for Corporal missiles). U.S. views would also be repeated to Fanfani when he visited Washington, D.C.

The day before, and probably as a related move, President Kennedy invited Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani for talks in Washington. During mid-December, Fanfani had expressed interest in speaking with Kennedy about the world situation, and a meeting would provide an opportunity for the President to secure a commitment on the Jupiter issue.

Members of the Nassau Decisions Steering Group worked up the texts of letters from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to the Italian and Turkish Defense Ministers, which President Kennedy approved when he met with Dean Rusk and Thomas Finletter in Palm Beach on January 5, 1963. The State Department sent the letters later to Ankara and Rome later that day.

McNamara’s letters expand on the points about the need to replace Jupiters with Polaris missiles that he made to Andreotti and Sancar when he met them in Paris. To both, McNamara wrote that the Polaris force would be “on station” by April 1 as the replacement for the Jupiters. Writing to Andreotti, he also mentioned substituting “obsolete” Corporal with Sergeant missiles. In his message to Sancar, McNamara informed him that he is exploring the possibility of accelerated delivery of the F-104s and that “emergency actions” could make it possible to deliver the first squadron during April 1963.