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United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986

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American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (AMCOMLIB)

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United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence

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Yeltsin, Boris

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Nuclear Proliferation

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Sino-American Cooperation, 1972-1989

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Taiwan's International Status

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September 6, 1963	Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency Report from the CIA station in Saigon on Ngo Dinh Nhu, stating that he is opposed to neutralism in South Vietnam. He also discusses the difficulties of negotiating or even communicating with Hanoi.
1989	Defense Intelligence Agency Briefing, 'The 1987-88 Combat in Southern Angola: Lessons Learned' Analysis of the military campaign waged in Southern Angola in 1987-88 as well as the lessons learned from this exchange. Document indicates that FAPLA failed to learn from its mistakes, while UNITA adapted much more effectively to the combat environment it faced in Angola. Although FAPLA managed to hold on to Cuito Cuanavale, its large losses led to a Cuban build-up in Southern Angola, which challenged the existing military balance in the region. This provided new impetus to peace negotiations and resulted in the December 1988 Accords among South Africa, Angola and Cuba.
1998	Interview with Robert W. Hultslander, Last CIA Station Chief in Luanda, Angola CIA station chief in Luanda, Hultslander gives his perspective on the US involvement in Angola. In his interview he explains what the US knew about liberation movements prior to the outbreak of Civil War, his opinion on the CIA covert action program IAFEATURE, the Cuban presence in Angola and his assessment of the leading factions in Angola; MPLA, UNITA and FNLA.
1993	Interview with Walt Rostow by Avner Cohen Transcript of interview by Avner Cohen with Walt Rostow. Rostow served as national security advisor to US president Johnson. In this interview, Rostow discusses the US perspective on Israeli nuclear capability through the 1960s and 70s.
July 1991	Memorandum, 'An Analysis of the “Islamic factor” in the Afghan Situation' by A. Belousov, Deputy Chairman of the Tajik SSR KGB Analysis of US support to opposition mujaheddin forces in Afghanistan and related attempts to use Islamic ideology to destabilize the Soviet Central Asian republics.
July 1991	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 5-91C, 'Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control' With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.
February 1985	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Libyan Nuclear Program: A Technical Perspective' For years, U.S. intelligence agencies did not take seriously Muammar Gaddafi’s efforts to develop a Libyan nuclear capability and this report provides early evidence of the perspective that the Libyan program “did not know what it was doing.” According to the CIA, the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.” The Libyan effort was in such a “rudimentary stage” that they were trying to acquire any technology that would be relevant to producing plutonium or enriched uranium.
August 1977	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Scientific Intelligence, 'South African Uranium Enrichment Program' With South Africa’s status as a pariah state, its nuclear program was a thorny problem for a series of U.S. presidents. In August 1977, the Carter administration, working with the Soviet Union, lodged protests against South Africa’s apparent preparations for a nuclear test, forcing a shut-down of the Kalahari test site if not the entire nuclear program itself. Indeed the CIA’s analysis of South Africa’s innovative “aerodynamic” uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba brought it to the conclusion that South Africa would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium “to make several nuclear devices per year.”
November 1985	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Research Paper, 'Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Personnel and Organizations' This heavily excised report on the “well-educated committed cadre” that managed the Pakistani nuclear program demonstrates how the CIA protects its intelligence on Pakistani nuclear activities. This is the same version of the report that can be found on the Agency’s FOIA Web page; the recent version includes no new information. Details on Khan Research Laboratories and the gas centrifuge program are entirely withheld, but some information is made available on the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission and the Directorate of Nuclear Fuels and Materials. The latter includes details on the status and purpose of major projects, for example, the Kundian Nuclear Complex, also known as the Chasma Reprocessing Plant, which was not completed until 1990. For the purposes of producing plutonium for weapons, the Pakistanis were interested in a heavy water moderated reactor of the NRX (National Research Experimental) type that Canada built at Chalk River. In 1985, the Pakistanis started that project in earnest, with construction beginning in 1987 of what became known as Khushab Chemical Plant II.
December 1982	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States' This CIA report on India, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” has comparatively few excisions. It discusses in some detail Indian efforts to support its nuclear power and nuclear weapons development program by circumventing international controls through purchases of sensitive technology on “gray markets.” The report depicts a “growing crisis in the Indian civil nuclear program,” which combined with meeting nuclear weapons development goals, was forcing India to expand imports of nuclear-related supplies. The purchasing activities posed a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls.”