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Nuclear nonproliferation--Government policy--United States Clear All

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January 24, 1977	Memorandum, Louis Nozenzo, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, to Joseph Nye et al., enclosing paper on 'US Policy on Foreign Reprocessing' A paper describing US Policy on Foreign Reprocessing and questioning economic, environmental and political arguments for reprocessing
December 10, 1964	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Switzerland, 'China's Nuclear Test has caused the American Imperialists to Panic' Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Switzerland describing the efforts of the United States, the West and the Soviet Union to downplay China's nuclear test.
April 12, 1967	Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the Acting Secretary, 'Soviets Continue to Denounce American Interpretation of Nonproliferation Treaty' The Soviets were insisting that article III on safeguards mention only the IAEA but not the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM], even though West Germany and other EURATOM members resisted the idea of IAEA inspections in Western Europe. It would take quite a few months before the Article III wording was to everyone’s satisfaction, but the Soviets also objected to US interpretations of the proposed Article II which would permit a nuclear-armed, united Western Europe.
September 4, 1962	Research Memorandum RSB-152 from Roger Hilsman to the Secretary, 'Soviet Tactics in Talks on the Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons' Before the words “nuclear nonproliferation” entered official discourse, the term “non-diffusion” (or “non-dissemination”) of nuclear weapons was used routinely. In part stemming from the negotiations over Berlin, during 1962-1963 the Kennedy administration held talks with allies and adversaries on the possibility of a non-diffusion agreement which included Germany. In light of a recent Soviet proposal, INR veteran Soviet expert Sonnenfeldt explained why Moscow had moved away from earlier proposals singling out West Germany and was focusing on the general applicability of a non-diffusion agreement.
June 4, 1957	Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and Consequences' This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret
November 18, 1976	Memorandum from Ambassador Figuerero to Castro Madero This memo, produced by the Argentine Ambassador in charge of the Scientific and Technical Affairs Division of the Argentine Foreign Ministry, alerts the Director of the Argentine Nuclear Commission Carlos Castro Madero that the new Carter administration will attempt to exert pressure on Brazil’s nuclear program and hinder its nuclear deal with West Germany. It notes that regardless of Carter’s nuclear policy, Brazil would “try by all means confirm its right to nuclear development.”
February 28, 1996	Cable from Brazilian Foreign Ministry to Embassy in Washington, 'Brazil-United States. Visit of the Secretary of State. Non-proliferation.' This cable reports the visit of the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Brazil. Issues related to non-proliferation dominated the meeting. Christopher emphasized the importance of Brazil strengthening its commitments to non-proliferation norms by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Brazilian officials expected to improve the dialogue with the US administration after Brazil’s adherence to the MTCR.
September 3, 1992	Cable from Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Foreign Ministry, 'Brazil-USA. Access to advanced technology. MTCR. Interview at the Department of State.' This cable reports the meeting between Brazilian diplomat Sergio Amaral, Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant for Politico-Military Affairs, and Vahn H. Van Diepen, Director of the Office of Weapons Proliferation. Eihorn made clear during the meeting that space programs such as Brazil’s are a source of concern for the US administration because it could use the same technology developed for the SLV to build ballistic missiles.
March 7, 1992	Cable from Brazilian Foreign Ministry to Embassy in Washington Barbara Tobias, scientific attaché to the US embassy in Brasília, visited the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to discuss Brazil’s inclusion in the list of countries subjected to a rigorous system of exports control (“validated license”). Tobias explained that the decision was not made by consensus and that it was largely a demand of the American Congress.
June 11, 1992	Cable from Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Foreign Ministry, 'Brazil-USA. Access to advanced technology. MTCR. Supplementary regulation on missile technology exports.' This cable, sent from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Brasília, reports Brazil’s inclusion in the list of countries that might manufacture rockets. The inclusion was in the supplement number 6 section 778 of the “Export Administration Regulations.” The US administration’s report on the list also notes the importance of the Brazilian government’s recent steps towards non-proliferation and that its inclusion in the list is due to its rocket programs and the development of its SLV.