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Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Presidential Office Building of Taiwan

East Asia

Taiwan

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

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United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence

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Portrait of Chiang Ching-kuo

Chiang, Ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo)

1910- 1988

Handshake between Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon

Sino-American Cooperation, 1972-1989

Chiang Kai-shek

Chiang, Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi)

1887- 1975

Representatives from Taiwan at the United Nations, September 1971

Taiwan's International Status

Deng Xiaoping, 1979.

Deng, Xiaoping

1904- 1997

Photograph of President Ronald Reagan

Reagan, Ronald

1911- 2004

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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South Asia

Pakistan

Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Pakistani Nuclear History

Taiwan Strait Crises

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North Korean Smuggling

Indian Nuclear History

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August 17, 1949	Information Report, 'Opinions in Manila regarding the Visit of CHIANG Kai-shek' A CIA summary of views in the Philippines regarding the meeting between Chiang Kai-shek and Elpidio Quirino.
June 10, 1955	Central Intelligence Agency Information Report, 'The Development of an Ultra-Centrifuge at the Nuclear Institute of Manfred von Ardenne in Sinop' CIA report describing the construction process of ultra-centrifuges in the Soviet nuclear institute of Sinop and the personnel working there.
November 26, 1982	Secretary of State George Schultz to President Reagan, 'How Do We Make Use of the Zia Visit to Protect Our Strategic Interests in the Face of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Activities' Secretary of State George Shultz’s letter to President Reagan covering the history of US responses to Pakistan’s nuclear program and future courses of action by the United States. While each option will rescind United States’ aid money, the Secretary details three different ways to go about it, with varying political implications for each.
November 19, 1982	Henry S. Rowen, National Intelligence Council, to DDCI [Deputy Director of Central Intelligence McMahon], 19 November 1982, with attached memorandum from National Intelligence Council staffer [name excised], 'Pakistan' Despite the concerns about sharing the ALR-69 radar warning receiver with Pakistan for fear of it falling into Chinese hands, CIA officials argue that failure to meet Pakistani demands would lead to a “serious blow to U.S. worldwide nonproliferation efforts.”
November 8, 1982	'Pakistan-US: Demarche on F-16 Equipment,' 11/8/82, with Memo from McMahon to Carlucci, 'Risk Assessment of the Sale of AN/ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver to Pakistan,'1 1/8/82, and Excerpt from Natl Intel Est on Pakistan With delivery of U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers imminent, Pakistan threatens to refuse delivery unless the U.S. agrees to include the ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft. CIA analysts have concerns that including this sensitive radar technology in the delivery of the F-16s would enable China, a close military ally of Pakistan, to obtain and study the device.
June 4, 1982	Note for [name excised] from [name excised], 'State/INR Request for Update of Pak SNIE, and Assessment of Argentine Nuclear Program' A planned update of the Special National Intelligence Estimate 31-32/81 concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear program was continuing and new evidence suggested a “significant” Chinese role in the design of the weapons. Despite this new evidence, CIA estimates suggest that the required amount of fissile material for weapons production would not be available as early as had been predicted, and that a Pakistani nuclear test was not imminent.
October 12, 1976	Intelligence Community Staff, Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement, to Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, 'Nuclear Proliferation and the Intelligence Community' As this report indicates, the recommendations made in the 1974 post-mortem of the Indian nuclear test failure had little impact. The authors identified a basic disconnect between “national level users”—-the top policymakers-—and those who “set analytical and collection priorities in the intelligence community.” The latter were not sure how high a priority that the policymakers had given to nuclear proliferation intelligence. Moreover, a study for the Defense Department produced by MIT chemistry professor (and future DCI) John Deutch questioned whether the intelligence community “is adequately focused and tasked on proliferation matters.” This would be a recurring problem for the CIA and other intelligence agencies.