Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) Clear All

Related Resources

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Presidential Office Building of Taiwan

East Asia

Taiwan

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

-

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence

-

Portrait of Chiang Ching-kuo

Chiang, Ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo)

1910- 1988

Handshake between Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon

Sino-American Cooperation, 1972-1989

Chiang Kai-shek

Chiang, Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi)

1887- 1975

Representatives from Taiwan at the United Nations, September 1971

Taiwan's International Status

Deng Xiaoping, 1979.

Deng, Xiaoping

1904- 1997

Photograph of President Ronald Reagan

Reagan, Ronald

1911- 2004

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

South Asia

Pakistan

Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Pakistani Nuclear History

Taiwan Strait Crises

Placeholder image for when a Topics image is not available

North Korean Smuggling

Indian Nuclear History

Results:

1 - 10 of 67

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

March 27, 1952	National Intelligence Estimate Number 27/1, 'Chinese Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Taiwan through 1952' The CIA predicts that, as long as US support to Taiwan remains constant, the PRC cannot stage a successful attack on the island.
March 16, 1955	National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4-55, 'Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan' The CIA on whether the PRC has the ability to seize Taiwan and/or the offshore islands.
February 4, 1957	Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Planning for Possible Acceptance by Chiang Kai-shek of Chinese Communist Offers to be Vice Premier' Analysts at the CIA assess whether Chiang Kai-shek would agree to become a Vice Premier for the People's Republic of China, following Zhou Enlai's offer to that effect.
August 27, 1957	Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-2-57, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China' Analysts at the CIA write that "the National Government remains politically stable and the economy of Taiwan continues gradually to improve. The military establishment is growing stronger, but Nationalist forces alone could not defend their territories against a full-scale Chinese Communist attack."
April 9, 1957	Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-57, 'Likelihood of Military Action by the Government of the Republic of China' Analysts at the CIA conclude that "the Chinese Nationalists are very unlikely to launch an invasion or, in the absence of Chinese Communist provocation, to initiate ether major military action against the mainland in the next year or so."
October 9, 1956	National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-56, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China' This National Intelligence Estimate concludes that "the Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise firm political control on Taiwan. With US assistance, an expanding economy has been maintained and the strength of the armed forces has been increased. At the same time, however, the international position of the National Government has declined, causing an increased feeling of insecurity and concern for the future."
August 29, 1958	Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Morale on the Major Offshore Islands and on Taiwan' A report on the situation on Quemoy (Jinmen), Matsu (Mazu), and Taiwan and US support for the Republic of China (Taiwan).
July 7, 1977	Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Intelligence Estimate on Reaction to Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China' Brzezinski outlines the conditions under which the Carter administration would move to recognize the PRC. They include both that the US would cease to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan, but that the people of Taiwan would still be able to live in peace and maintain a prosperous economy.
December 13, 1982	Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Bush and Pakistani President Zia, December 8, 1982, 3:45 p.m. Bush and Zia discuss the Soviet war in Afghanistan, China's relations with Pakistan and the US, the status of Taiwan, and the Pakistani nuclear program.
January 1985	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Political Succession on Taiwan: An Intelligence Assessment' The CIA's Office of East Asian Analysis concludes that "Chiang Ching-kuo is likely to be succeeded by a collegial, technocratic leadership governing in a somewhat less authoritarian style. The immediate succession will be dominated by a collegium of older mainlanders and is expected to go smoothly. Differences within this group over internal or foreign policy issues are unlikely to trigger a major power struggle." This document has been review and declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency on at least two separate occasions. The above version was approved for release on January 20, 2010. An alternative version, with different material withheld, was approved for release on May 12, 2011.