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Documents

February 6, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the American Jewish Committee on 4 February 1992

Kohl and the American Jewish Committee discuss the challenge of potential nuclear proliferation after the Soviet Union's disintegration. They scrutinize the problem of increasing xenophobia in Germany after unification.

April 26, 1991

The Chancellor’s [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with French President Mitterrand on Wednesday, 24 April 1991, in Paris

Kohl and Mitterrand comment on the situation in the Middle East, the Palestinian question and the idea of convening an international conference on the region.

March 18, 1991

The Chancellor’s [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Israel‘s Foreign Minister Levy on Thursday, 14 March 1991, 13.15 until 14.15 hours

Kohl and Levy discuss the situation in Iraq, the Palestine question and Israel's request for financial assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany.

May 9, 1949

Untitled report on Soviet policy towards Zionist Jews

Fragment describing repression of Zionist Jews in the Soviet Union.

November 13, 1969

Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Officials, 13 November 1969

Meeting between KGB First Deputy S. K. Zvigun (Tsvigun) and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. They discuss anti-Soviet "ideological subversion" on the part of the United States and other enemies, as well as Soviet dissidents such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov.

June 4, 1981

Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting (excerpt), 4 June 1981

The Politburo discusses the internal economic situation within the Soviet Union, the situation in Afghanistan (in particular the group "Parcham" and Karmal), relations with the US, and the treatment of Jews in the USSR.

June 2007

The Operational Situation as Reported in 1971, 1975, and 1981. Folder 35. The Chekist Anthology.

In folder 35 Mitrokhin discusses the KGB’s assertion of an increase in domestic dissent and unrest in the 1970s and early 1980s as well as the methods the KGB utilized to combat this threat. Soviet intelligence believed that this increase in domestic unrest was due primarily to an increased effort by the United States and its allies to promote internal instability within the USSR. In response, the KGB continued to screen foreigners, increased the harshness of penalties for distribution of anti-Soviet literature, and monitored the activities and temperament of nationalists, immigrants, church officials, and authors of unsigned literature within the Soviet Union. Mitrokhin’s note recounts the KGB’s assertion that foreign intelligence agencies were expanding their attempts to create domestic unrest within the USSR. These activities included the support and creation of dissidents within the Soviet Union, the facilitation of the theft Soviet property such as aircrafts, and the public espousal of a position against Soviet persecution of dissidents and Jews. Responding to public exposure of these activities, the KGB proclaimed its legality and trustworthiness while also beginning to assign some agents verbal assignments without written record.