The first meeting of negotiations consisted of press photos and statements made about goals of the Treaty.
August 10, 1978
Cable No. 1606, Ambassador Sato to the Foreign Minister, 'Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China Negotiations (1st Ministerial Meeting) (Part 2 of 2)'
極秘
総番号 （ＴＡ） Ｒ０５７２６２ ５６４２ 主管
７８年 月１０日０２時３０分 中国発
７８年０８月１０日０４時１８分 本省着 ア局長
外務大臣殿 佐藤大使
日中平和友好条約交渉（第一回大臣会談）
第１６０６号（２の２） 極秘 大至急
（限定配布）
５．休けい後冒頭コウ華部長より、次の発言があつた。
（１）大臣の発言の中でそつ直に何の留保もなく会議を行うという点に心から称さんの意を表する。中国外交の基本も、おざなりでなく、そつ直、短とう直入に見解を表明することであり、このことは国際的に広く知れわたつており、中日平和条約交渉において一かんしてこうした方針で臨んできた。このような精しんに基づき反は権条項についての考えを述べたい。
（２）中日共同声明は、中日関係史上非常に重要な文書であり、国交正常化以降の実せんは、中日両国の共通の願望に合致し、かつ、アジア各国の共通の利益にも合致していることを示している。同声明の原則は、両国関係を発展させる準則であり、根拠であり、基礎である。中日平和友好条約は、共同声明を前進させるものであり、後退させてはならず、共同声明の原則を弱めるものであつてはならない。両政府の指導者により規定された反は権条項は、現実の世界情勢を反えいしたものである。現在の世界におけるは権主義のきよういに対してどういう態度で臨むべきかは、両国人民の支持によつて示されている。両国人民、世界の人民が現実に存在しているは権主義に対して闘争しなければならないということは、広く知れわたり、深く人の心に根を下した思想である。共同声明の中に反は権を書いたのは、仮定から出発したのではなく現実のきよういから出発している。共同声明後の国際情勢は、中日友好条約の中に反は権条項をそのまま入れねばならないことを生々と立証している。は権主義は中国をおびやかし、日本をおびやかし、世界各国をおびやかしている。
（３）とりわけソ連社会帝国主義は、数年来は権主義の段どりにはく車をかけ、増々侵略のために戦略的配置をおしすすめ、自こに有利な体制をつくりつつある。
当面の国際情勢は共同声明当時と比し一層緊張している。その根源は、超大国の争だつにあり、とりわけソ連帝国主義が一層きよう気じみたは権主義を推進していることにある。われわれは国際情勢の現実を真険そつ直に直視すべきである。は権条項を含めた中日友好条約の早期締結は、両国人民の及び世界各国人民の願望を反えいしている。ソ連がこの条約の締結をよろこばない原因は、ソ連がは権主義を実行しているからである。ソ連は、日本に対して圧力をかけ、種々ろこつな干渉を行つている。われわれはソ連のきよういをおそれず、影響をうけず、共同声明の精しんを守り、両国人民の利益を守り、早期に条約を締結する必要がある。
（４）私はこのような精しんに基づいて共同声明の重要な部分を占めるは権条項についての貴大臣の考えをききたい。
６．これに対し、大臣より、次のように述べた。
（１）貴大臣の話しはよくうけたまわつた。日中共同声明の原則を弱めず、後退させてはならないこと、平和友好条約を早期に締結する必要があることなついて｛前４文字ママ｝異存はない。
（２）私が正月にソ連を訪問し何を話したかはほぼ御理解を得ていると思う。私はソ連の言い分に一つもくつしていない。中ソの問題については、自ら求めて次のように発言した。「中ソはある時期きようだいの国であり、中国はソ連に学ぶといつていたこともあつたが、現在は激しく対立している。日本はりん国に中ソが対立していることはいかんだと考えている。しかも中ソは、お互に争うばかりではなく、その争いのとばつちりを日本が受けている。日本は中ソの緊張のかん和を願うものであり、ある時期がくれば両国の間に立つてその緊張をかん和したいと思つている。日本はソ連と携｛前1文字ママ｝けいし、中国にきよういを与えることは断じてしない。同時に中国と協力してソ連に敵対行為をしようとも考えていない。あなたの方では好まないようであるが、日中友好条約は必ず近いうちに締結する。その際ソ連が中ソ同盟条約をどうするかは私の干渉せざるところである。干渉はしないが同条約の中で日本を両国の敵国と書いてあることは断じて見のがすわけにはいかない。」この点についてはソ連は回答せず、中国の方からは何もいつてきていないと責任を回避した。
（３）アジアの問題について申し上げたい。この前の戦争で日本はめいわくをかけいかんだと考えている。日本はいろいろ間違いを犯したが、その一つは「アジアを一つ」と考えたことである。アジアは、かおいろ、目のいろ、物の考え方等東洋人として共通のものをもつている。しかし、アジアは一つではなく、国の大小、強弱、歴史、伝統、習かん、しゆう教、政治形態それぞれ違つている。その違いをお互に理解し、そん重し、相手の立場に立つて行動するこれが道理と考える。
（４）は権の問題も、先程申し上げたとおり、お互に中国の考えはこう、日本の考えはこうという議論をやつても解決はしない。は権問題に対する理解、これに対する闘争が同じ方向であり、お互にその真意を理解するならば、中国側は日本の立場でものを考え、どういう条約を締結すれば日本国民は納得し、しゆくふくするか、日本側は中国の立場に立ち、中国が今後第３、第２世界に対処する方針の中でどういう条約を締結すれば支障を与えないか、そのように考えれば私は双方が好むようにこの問題は妥結すると思う。
（５）早期妥結は、日本にとつても中国にとつても極めて重要であり、しかも大事なチャンスである。中国が、おれの方はいつでもよい、２ヶ月、３ヶ月、１年待つてもよい、と言い日本も同じことをいうなら、私も貴大臣も世界の人々のわらいものとなろう。日本の実状についてもお解りとは思うがまだ足りない。私が短い期間に決定をして訪中したのには、それなりのく労がある。この機をいつすれば相当先までのびる。そこで双方とも早期妥結の決意の下にサトウ・韓念リュウ会談を続行せしめ、問題点をつめさせてゆきたい。
７．これに対しコウ部長は次のように述べた。
（１）貴大臣が、日本側は共同声明の反は権を弱めたり後退せしめる意思がなく、条約を早期に締結したいとの希望を表明されたことを評価する。貴大臣は、中国側が条約締結を２ヶ月、３ヶ月とのばしてもよいと考え、日本側もそのように考えるなら条約の締結はおくれるといわれたが、中国側は一かんして条約の早期締結を望んでおり、いずれも条約の締結をおくらせることを考えていない。
（２）中ソ同盟条約についての中国側の態度は、サトウ・韓念リュウ会談で申し上げたとおりであり、私からくり返して申し上げなくてもよいと思う。貴大臣が中国政府の指導者と会談される際に、前々から有名無実になつているこの条約についての見解を明確に示すこととなろう。
（３）次に会談のしよう点となつている反は権条項にしよう点を移したい。貴大臣は条約について交渉を行うという重大な責任をもつて中国に来られた。そこで平和友好条約についての最もかん心な問題についての日本政府の考えを証明されるよう求める。
８．これに対し大臣より次のように述べた。
（１）私はサトウ・韓念リュウ会談が速やかに進ちよくするようにすること、及びその上で条約に調印すること、この二つの目的のために訪中した。
（２）は権についてはこれまでも述べたとおり、は権行為があればこれに反対するのは当然であり、今までもそのようにやつてきた。日本国民の正直な気持をいえば、は権行為があればどうどうとこれに反対する、しかし、中ソの対立には絶対にまきこまれない、これにはかい入しかない、これが日本国民の大多数の気持である。私は貴大臣、韓閣下のいわれることは十分解つている。口にださなくても、心の中で何を考えているかも十分に理解しているつもりである。しかし、は権に反対するし方の違い、日本の基本的外交方針の違いを十分に理解しあい、お互の立場に立つて反は権闘争を行つていくことがアジア及び世界の平和にこうけんするゆえんと考える。今後とも日本はは権をおそれず、日本の立場からこれに反対してゆくのは当然である。私は、この会談を通じて閣下各位を説得しようというつもりはない。私がここで発言するのは、この会談において交された話しを両国国民、アジアの人民に聞かせ、更にはこの交渉を中しようしている人々に、双方の真意を正確に理解させることを望むからである。
（３）反は権について最も重要なことは、日中両国がそれぞれ侵かさないという反は権の出発点である。先般のＡＳＥＡＮ外相会議でＡＳＥＡＮの外相は、アジアのは権はソ連一つということに全員が同意した。ソ連のきよういはみなが認めている。しかし、中国の未来に対しても不安をもつていることも事実である。アジアの国々にとつて貴国は大国であり、しかも貴国の努力によつてはん栄している。ＡＳＥＡＮの国境紛争問題、各国における反体制運動、ゲリラ運動等の中で、中国は未来えいごうには権行為を行わず各国となか良くやつていけるかどうかについて各国は不安をもつている。従つてビルマを含むＡＳＥＡＮの国々は日中条約の締結をかん迎している。しかし、どのような形で条約が締結されるか、特には権条項がどういう形で結ばれるかについては非常な関心を有している。それは、中国が相手の立場をどのようにそん重し、この条約を締結することになるかという意味である。
（４）次に日本国民について申し上げる。日本で同じ時期に中ソ各々の展示会が開かれ、中国展の方は３０何万人の入場人員があり、ソ連のほうはその１０分の１であつた。日本人の中ソに対する感情は異つている。しかし貴国を訪問した政治家や、財界人が言うようには、日本人全部が貴国を安心して信頼しているわけではない。中国はわが国にとり大事な国であり、日中両国がなか良くすることはアジアの将来のためである。これまで日中友好協会が好成績を上げ、日本の対中感情は良くなつてもいる。しかしそつ直にいつてこれまで問題がなかつたわけではない。仮に日本で華国ホウ、トウ小平はけしからんということを言えば中国人民は日本を信頼するだろうか。中国の方からは、おりおり日本の総理はけしからんという批判がでている。その度に日本国民は、中国は本当に内政不干渉なのか不安をもつている。ナリタ空港反対闘争は、反体制闘争に変わり、自民党から共産党に至るまで支持していない。この闘争の委員長を招待し、かん迎し、激れいする。このようなことでは、公正な日本国民は本当に中国は内政に干渉しないのか、また、中国が強くなつたらきよういをうけないのか不安を感じているのは事実である。
（５）そこで私は貴大臣、韓閣下にお願いしたい。は権条項に対するＡＳＥＡＮ、日本国民の不安を一そうし、なる程中国は未来えいごうの日本の友人としてなか良くできるようなものをまとめることとしたい。両国をめぐる情勢は極めて厳しい。しかし非同盟外相会議では権という言ばがでてきたこと、ＡＳＥＡＮの国が一部に不安はあつてもこの条約を結ぶことをかん迎していること、更にはこの条約の締結を注視している米国の考え方を合わせると、ぜ非、日本は日本の国民を納得させ、よろこばせる条約を結びたいし、中国も、日本、ＡＳＥＡＮ、米国、世界各国がよろこび納得する条約を結ぶようにしてほしい。
９．これに対しコウ部長より休けいを提案、大臣は、サトウ、韓会談の継続を再提案されるも、コウ部長は、午後その点を討議したい旨発言、３時３０分再会として、会談を了した。
（了）
Number: (TA) R057262 5642
Primary: Asian Affairs Bureau Director-General
Sent: China, August 10, 1978, 02:30
Received: MOFA, August 10, 1978, 04:18
To: The Foreign Minister
From: Ambassador Sato
Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China Negotiations (1st Ministerial Meeting)
No. 1606 (2 of 2) Secret Top Urgent
(Limited Distribution)
5. Following the break, Minister Huang Hua started with the following statement:
(1) I sincerely commend the point in the Minister’s statement on holding the talks frankly and without reservation. The basis of Chinese diplomacy, too, is the expression of views not perfunctorily but frankly and to the point. This is well known internationally. With such a principle from the start, we have faced the China-Japan treaty negotiations. On the basis of such a spirit, I would like to state our thoughts on the anti-hegemony clause.
(2) The Sino-Japanese Joint Statement is a very important document in the history of relations between China and Japan. The actions since the normalization of relations have been in agreement with the common desires of China and Japan, as well as with the common interests of every Asian country. The principles of the Joint Statement are a preparation for the development of relations between our two countries. They are its nature and its basis. The China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship advances the Joint Statement. We must not retreat from it. We must not weaken the principles of the Joint Statement. The anti-hegemony clause, stipulated by the leaders of our two governments, is a reflection of the actual world situation. With what kind of attitude should we face the threat of hegemonism in the world today is expressed with the support of our two peoples. The peoples of our two countries and the peoples of the world must struggle against the hegemonism that now exists. This is an idea that is widely known and deeply rooted in the hearts of people. The writing of opposition to hegemony in the Joint Statement does not come from hypothesis but from an actual threat. The international situation since the Joint Statement vividly demonstrates that we must incorporate the anti-hegemony clause as it is into the friendship treaty between China and Japan. Hegemonism threatens China, threatens, Japan, and threatens every country in the world.
(3) In particular, Soviet socialist imperialism these past few years has spurred on its hegemonic plan, more and more advancing its strategic deployments for invasion and building a system to its own benefit. The international situation at present is even more tense than at the time of the Joint Statement. Its origin lies in the struggle between the superpowers, and particularly in Soviet imperialism’s driving an even more frantic hegemonism. We should seriously and frankly face the reality of the international situation. The early conclusion of the friendship treaty between China and Japan, including the anti-hegemony clause, reflects the aspirations of the peoples of our two countries and the peoples of all countries in the world. The Soviet Union is unhappy over this treaty because the Soviet Union has been practicing hegemonism. The Soviet Union has been pressuring and conducting varied and blatant interference against Japan. We are not afraid of Soviet threats and are not affected by them. It is necessary to observe the spirit of the Joint Statement, protect the interests of the peoples of our two countries, and quickly conclude the treaty.
(4) On the basis of such a spirit, I would like to hear the Minister’s thoughts on the hegemony clause, which occupies an important part of the Joint Statement.
6. In reply, Minister Sonoda spoke as follows:
(1) I heard what you said, Minister. I have no objection to your saying that we must not weaken the principles of the Japan-China Joint Communique, or retreat from them, and that it is necessary to quickly conclude the treaty.
(2) I imagine that you largely understand what I discussed on my New Year’s trip to the Soviet Union. I have not bowed before a single Soviet complaint. By my own choice, I made the following statement concerning the Sino-Soviet issue: “China and the Soviet Union were fraternal countries at one time. China even said that it would learn from the Soviet Union. But now the two countries are fiercely opposed to one another. Japan thinks that it will not do for neighboring China and the Soviet Union to be in conflict. Moreover, not only are China and the Soviet Union in conflict with one another, but that conflict is spilling over to Japan. Japan hopes for a relaxation of tensions between China and the Soviet Union and would like, if the time should come, to stand between the two counties and ease those tensions. Japan will absolutely not join with the Soviet Union and threaten China. At the same time, we are not thinking to cooperate with China to engage in hostile acts against the Soviet Union. Your side seems unfavorable to it, but the friendship treaty between Japan and China will be concluded in the near future. It is not my place to interfere in the matter of what the Soviet Union does about the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance. I will not interfere, but I cannot overlook Japan’s description in the treaty as the enemy of both countries.” The Soviet Union did not respond concerning this point, escaping responsibility in saying that China had said nothing about it.
(3) I would like to raise the issue of Asia. Japan regrets having caused trouble in the previous war. Japan committed various errors. One of them was to think of “Asia as one,” to think that in the color of their faces, the color of their eyes, and in their thinking Orientals were alike. However, Asia is not one. Its countries differ from one another in size, strength, history, tradition, custom, religion, and form of government. Understanding and respecting one another’s differences and acting with an understanding of the other person’s position is, I think, reasonable.
(4) With the issue of hegemony, too, as I said a little while ago, arguing with one another that this is what China thinks and this is what Japan thinks will not settle anything. Understanding the issue of hegemony and struggling against it are in the same direction. I think that if we both understand the other’s real intention – if the Chinese side would think of Japan’s position, what kind of treaty we would conclude that would gain the understanding of the Japanese people and their blessing, and the Japanese side would stand in China’s position, considering what kind of treaty we would conclude that would not be an obstacle to China’s future dealing with the Third and Second worlds – if we both thought that way, we would settle the issue in a way favorable to both sides.
(5) An early settlement is extremely important for both Japan and for China. Moreover, it is a major opportunity. If China were to say that any time is fine with me, that waiting for two months, three months or a year is fine, and if Japan were to say the same, then, Minister, you and I would probably become the laughingstock of the peoples of the world. I think that you have an understanding about Japan’s situation, but it is still insufficient. It took some effort for me to make a decision in a short period of time and visit China. If I had missed this chance, the next one would have been considerably in the future. Then, with both sides resolved for an early settlement, I would like to have the Sato – Han Nianlong meetings continue and work out the points at issue.
7. In reply, Minister Han spoke as follows:
(1) I value the Minister’s declaring that the Japanese side does not intend to weaken or retreat from the Joint Statement’s opposition to hegemony and wishes an early conclusion to the treaty. Minister, you said that if the Chinese side were to think it fine to put off concluding the treaty for two or three months and the Japanese side were also to think so, then the treaty’s conclusion would be delayed, but the Chinese side has from the start hoped for the treaty’s early conclusion and has not thought of either side slowing the treaty’s conclusion.
(2) The Chinese side’s attitude concerning the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance is as we mentioned in the Sato – Han Nianlong meetings, and I think it fine if I do not raise it again. Minister, when you have met with leaders of the Chinese Government, I believe they clearly expressed their view on the treaty, which long ago became one in name only.
(3) Next, I would like to shift the focus to the anti-hegemony clause, the focus of the talks. Minister, you came to China with the important task of conducting negotiations on the treaty. I therefore request that you explain the thinking of the Government of Japan on the most important issue concerning the treaty of peace and friendship.
8. In reply, Minister Sonoda spoke as follows:
(1) I have come to China with two objectives: to have the Sato – Han Nianlong meetings progress rapidly and then to sign the treaty.
(2) As I have said before about hegemony, it is natural, if there is hegemonic behavior, to oppose it, and we have done so until now. Speaking of the honest feeling of the Japanese people, if there is hegemonic behavior they will openly oppose it. However, they will absolutely not become caught up in the conflict between China and the Soviet Union, nor will they intervene in it. This is the feeling of the majority of the Japanese people. I fully understand what you, Minister, and His Excellency Han are saying. I believe I understand what you are thinking in your heart, even if you do not say it. However, I think that contributing to peace in Asia and the world is the reason for fully understanding the different ways of opposing hegemony and the difference of Japan’s basic diplomatic policy, each side carrying out the struggle against hegemony on the basis of its own position. Now and in the future, it is natural for Japan, without fear of hegemony, to oppose it from Japan’s position. It is not my intent to try to persuade His Excellency through these meetings. What I am stating here is because I desire to have the peoples of our two countries and of Asia hear the words exchanged in these meetings and, further, to have those people who speak maliciously of these negotiations to correctly understand the true intentions of our two sides.
(3) The most important thing concerning opposition to hegemony is the starting point of opposition to hegemony: that neither Japan nor China will invade the other. All the ASEAN foreign ministers at the recent ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting agreed that hegemony in Asia was about the Soviet Union alone. Everyone recognizes the Soviet threat. However, it is also a fact that they are also uneasy about China in the future. For the countries of Asia, yours is a great country and, moreover, they prosper with the cooperation of your country. Each of the ASEAN countries, in the midst of disputes over national boundaries, as well as such problems as dissident movements and guerrilla movements in every country, worries whether or not China will forever more not engage in hegemonic behavior and get along well with each country. Accordingly, the ASEAN countries, including Burma, welcome the concluding of the Japan-China treaty. However, they have an extraordinary interest in the form in which the treaty will be concluded, particularly in the form in which the anti-hegemony clause will be concluded. That means how China will respect the position of the other party and conclude this treaty.
(4) I will next talk about the Japanese people. In Japan, Chinese and Soviet exhibitions opened at the time. The Chinese exhibition had 300,000 visitors. The Soviet side had a tenth of that. Japanese feel differently about China and the Soviet Union. However, as the politicians and business leaders who have visited your country have said, it is not the case that all Japanese feel at ease about your country or trust it. China is an important country for our country. Japan and China’s getting along well with one another is for the sake of Asia’s future. The Japan-China Friendship Association has achieved good results to date, with Japanese sentiment regarding China improving. Frankly speaking, however, it is not the case that there have been no issues to date. If in Japan we said insulting things about Hua Guofeng or Deng Xiaoping, would the Chinese people trust Japan? From the Chinese side there comes from time to time insulting criticism of Japan’s Prime Minister. At those times, the Japanese people are uneasy about whether China will really not interfere in Japan’s internal affairs. The struggle against Narita Airport has turned into a dissident struggle. From the Liberal Democratic Party to the Japan Communist Party, they have no support. China has invited the chairman of this struggle, welcomed him, and encouraged him. It is a fact that, due to such things, fair-minded Japanese people are worried about China interfering in Japan’s internal affairs and, once it has grown strong, threatening them.
(5) Now, then, Minister, I wish to make a request of you and His Excellency Han. I would like to put together something capable of sweeping away the unease of the peoples of ASEAN and Japan about the anti-hegemony clause and convince them that China forever more will behave well as a friend of Japan. The situation for our two countries is challenging. However, the word “hegemony” appeared at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. Despite the unease among some ASEAN countries, they welcome this treaty’s conclusion. Also, in bringing it in line with the thinking of the United States, which is closely observing this treaty, Japan wishes by all means to conclude a treaty capable of convincing and pleasing the Japanese people. Japan wishes that China, too, conclude a treaty to please and convince Japan, ASEAN, the United States, and every country in the world.
9. In reply, Minister Huang proposed a break. Minister Sonoda again proposed the continuing of the meeting between Sato and Han, but Minister Han said that he would wanted to discuss that point in the afternoon. With the statement that they would meet again at 3:30, he ended the meeting.
(End)
Discussion of hegemony and its effect on Japan, China, and the rest of Asia. Specifically using the Soviet Union as an example of the use of this power.
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2010-367, Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs. Also available at the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Contributed by Yutaka Kanda and translated by Steven Mercado.
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