After a discussion with Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan, Chinese Leader Deng lays out points to improve China.
November 10, 1986
Cable No. 3026, Foreign Minister to Ambassador Nakae, 'The Prime Minister’s Visit to China (The Meeting with Chairman Deng - on World Affairs)'
[…]
総理より、米ソ首脳会談やソ連の外交政策についてどう見ているかただしたのに対し、鄧主任は次の通り述べた。
自分はいつも対話には賛成する。対抗には賛成しない。米ソ首脳会談自体は良いことであり、現在は米ソのいずれの側も、同会談の意義を低くは見ていない。彼らが引き続き対話を行うのに賛成だ。緊張より緩和が良い。
ソ連の対外政策については、米テレビインタビューに応えて言ったように、ソ連の歩みは大きくない。中国とソ連の関係に関する限りでは、ソ連の言うことには中身がないものが多い。三大障害を取り除くことに原則的に同意していながら、実際には何も出てこない。アフガニスタンでもせいぜい5%の軍隊を撤退するだけで、それも防空部隊だ。モンゴル駐留軍の撤退についても中身はない。だから自分はソ連がカンプチアの障害を取り除くならば、ゴルバチョフに会いに行っても良いといったのだ。「力」問題がもっとも実質的問題である。三大障害を真に取り除くというのであれば、最も中身のあるのは「力」問題であり、ソ連もこれを知っている。中ソ間のホットポイントは「力」にあり、ソ連に誠意があるか否かは「力」を見ることによってわかる。「力」が解決すれば、中ソは正常化する。
（総理より、それでは三大障害は実は一大障害になったのか、と質したのに対し）そうとも言える。しかし依然として三大障害と言い続ける。中ソ国境には、在「モ」軍が撤退しても５０数個師団が残り、ソ連の３分の１のミサイルが置かれている。これは日中双方にとって共通の関心のある問題であり、米国にとっても関心のある問題である。
（総理より更に、米軍艦の青島寄港が行われたが、米中軍事提携はどこまで行くのか、と質したところ）米国はあまり遠くまでゆくことはないし、中国も同じだ。中国の外交政策は独立自主であり、他人の事に自分を張り付けるようなことはしない。
米、ソ、タイ、上海、広州、香港に転電した。
Received at 12:46:44, November 10, 1986
Drafted on November 8, 1986
Primary: Director General of Asian Bureau approved
[illegible]
Director of China Division approved
From: Foreign Minister
To: Ambassador to China
Title: The Prime Minister’s Visit to China: Meeting with Chairman Deng: on World Affairs
Cable No. 3026
Secret, Urgent
[…]
The Prime Minister [Nakasone] asked the Chairman what he thought of the U.S.-Soviet Summit and the Soviet Union's foreign policy, and Mr. Deng said:
I'm always in favor of dialogue. I do not agree with the confrontation. The U.S.-Soviet summit is a good thing in itself, and neither side now views the significance of the meeting in a lesser light. I'm in favor of them continuing to engage in dialogue. Relaxation is better than tension.
As for Soviet foreign policy, as I said in response to a U.S. television interview, the Soviet Union has not made great strides. As far as the relationship between China and the Soviet Union is concerned, there is much that the Soviet Union says that has no substance. They agree in principle to remove the three major obstacles, but nothing comes out of it in practice. Even in Afghanistan, at best, only five-percent of the troops are being withdrawn, and that's an air defense force. There is also nothing about the withdrawal of troops stationed in Mongolia. So I said that I could go and see Gorbachev if the Soviets would remove the Kampuchea obstacle. The "power" issue is the most substantive issue. If we are to truly remove the three major obstacles, the most contentious one is the "power" problem, and the Soviet Union knows this. The hot point between China and the Soviet Union is "power," and you can tell whether the Soviet Union is sincere or not by looking at "power." Once the "power" is resolved, China and the Soviet Union will be normalized.
(The Prime Minister asked if the three major obstacles had actually become one major obstacle.) That could be said. But I [Deng] still keep saying the three major obstacles. Some 50 divisions remain on the Sino-Soviet border even if the forces in Mongolia are withdrawn, and one-third of the Soviet Union's missiles are located there. This is an issue of common interest to both Japan and China, and it is of interest to the United States as well.
(When the Prime Minister further asked about how far would the military cooperation between US and China go in the light of in the wake of the U.S. warship's port call to Qingdao) The US won't go very far, and neither will China. China's foreign policy is independent and self-reliant, and it doesn't try to stake itself on other people's affairs.
[Cable] relayed to the [Japanese diplomatic missions in] the U.S., Soviet Union, Thailand, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong.
The Japanese Prime Minister and Chairman Deng discuss U.S.-Soviet relations, specifically the recent U.S.-Soviet Summit.
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2017-0638, Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs, published online by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, January 12, 2017. Transcribed and translated by Yamaguchi Shinji.
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