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Zhou, Enlai

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Documents

January 10, 1955	Cable from Feng Xuan, 'Reaction of Britain, United States, France towards the Kuala Lumpur Five Countries inviting China to attend the Afro-Asian Conference' The UK responded the decision of inviting China to attend the Asian-African Conference with anger, stating that countries in the Bogor Conference had wrong expectations toward China. The US feared that China would have great influence on the Asian-African Conference and thus weaken US influence in the region. The US and UK also worried that China’s participation would improve China-Japan relations. French press expressed this decision as the evidence of the failure of the US power in Southeast Asia.
January 16, 1955	Report from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Draft of the Tentative Working Plan for Participating in the Asian-African Conference' The note stated that the Asian-African Conference could be a great contribution in establishing international peace. Among the participants, there were Chinese allies, neutral countries, and American allies. China had to isolate American power in the Conference and befriend the neutral countries. The Chinese Foreign Ministry therefore drafted the plan accordingly.
January 22, 1955	Record of Conversation from Premier Zhou's Reception of the Indonesian Ambassador Arnold Mononutu The Indonesian ambassador tells Zhou that the Indonesian government has sent out the letter of invitation inviting China to attend the Asia-African Conference. Indonesia hopes that PRC will send delegation to this conference and that the Chinese premier will visit Indonesia. Zhou Enlai expresses that after the Chinese government receives the official letter of invitation, the government will give official reply.
January 31, 1955	Cable from Huang Zhen, 'The Soviet Ambassador Came to Visit and Told Me the Following Issues' The Soviet ambassador to Indonesia reported that when delegations discussed before the Bogor Conference whether to invite China to the Asian-African Conference, the Indian ambassador opposed because inviting China would cause the Western countries to consider that Indonesia had aligned with one of the two blocs in the world.
June 1961	Record of proceedings between the Soviet KGB and the Interior Ministry of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on the expansion of intelligence cooperation This document chronicles what was discussed between the KGB and Czechoslovak Interior Ministry concerning the coordination of intelligence and counter-intelligence acquisition and joint implementation of some of these measures. Global foreign policy and intelligence measures are discussed in places as diverse as the USA, NATO countries, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, the Vatican, Guatemala, Cuba, the Congo, Angola, Indonesia, India, England and France. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union pledge to fight perceived imperialist threats from the USA in Latin America, Africa, the Near and Middle East and Southeast Asia. The document lists companies of interest to the two parties, primarily scientific, armament and machine factories and companies.
July 27, 1973	Memorandum of Conversation with Robert Galley, July 27, 1973 Transcript of a conversation between French Minister of Armed Forces Galley and U.S. officials, including Kissinger and Schlesinger. Galley says that the French are making progress and have benefited from their talks with Foster. Kissinger notes that the U.S. has a “cooperative spirit” with regards to French foreign policy. Galley notes the advances that have been made by the French and asks for aid with modernization of their forces to bring the French to the same level as the U.S., specifically in regards to missile hardening, underground testing, and submarines, among others. Kissinger notes that now that the French have missile technology, it is in the best interest of the U.S. that it be effective and not become irrelevant, but there is strong opposition not only from abroad but at home, as well. Kissinger wants to know how long the French can keep their advances a secret, and Galley notes that many things have already been kept secret and can continue to be kept as such. They end the discussion with talks about meeting again sometime in August.
August 9, 1973	Memorandum of Conversation, 'French Nuclear Discussion' Transcript of conversation between Kissinger and Schlesinger. Kissinger wants to make Galley "drool" by keeping him interested without actually giving anything up. Kissinger worries about what the British want in terms of Polaris and notes that putting the French on the same footing as the U.S. would scare the British enough to get their point across.
August 17, 1973	Memorandum of Conversation, 'Visit of French Defense Minister Galley; Strategic Programs' Kissinger wants to help the French without giving them too much. Foster thinks that the French have the worst missile program in the world, while the Chinese have the best. He thinks the best thing we can do is to look at their designs and offer suggestions, especially in regards to forming their objectives and planning how to meet them. Foster notes that any help we give to the French is perceived as a full commitment, so Kissinger warns that we must remain “cold-blooded.”
August 24, 1973	Memorandum, from Holsey G. Handyside, Director of Politico-Military Affairs, Office of Atomic Energy and Aerospace, to Seymour Weiss, 'Speculation: Possibility of High Level Contact Between US and French Governments' This speculates on the French/U.S. missile connection and notes that Blancard is probably a key player, having most likely met with officials in Washington. Blancard would have reported any such talks to Galley, and so Schlesinger will need to be properly informed about the situation before meeting with Galley.
August 30, 1973	Scowcroft to Kissinger on the Meeting with Galley Scowcroft briefs Kissinger for his meeting with Galley. This lengthy document includes information on what the French are specifically asking for, the outline for the meeting (as proposed by Kissinger, himself), Foster’s notes for the meeting expanded, and a reminder to discuss underground testing.