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Documents

August 8, 1985

Cable No. 1373, Charge d’Affaires Tanabe to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani)'

A telegram from Japanese diplomat Ryuichi Tanabe to the Foreign Minister summarizing a meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani about the American hostages in Lebanon. Special Envoy Nakayama is delivering a letter from Prime Minister Nakasone.

August 6, 1985

Cable No. 1368, Charge d’Affaires Tanabe to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Meeting of Special Envoy Nakayama and Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili)'

A telegram from Charge d'Affaires Tanabe to the Foreign Minister summarizing a meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili at the Iranian Foreign Ministry to discuss the relationship between Japan and Iran, and the release of the American hostages in Lebanon.

1946

Letter, Ya. Malik to Cde. V.M. Molotov

In this undated memo, written sometime after July 1946, Malik informs Molotov that he has completed a new draft directive for the Soviet delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission cconcerning Korea.

May 31, 1946

Report on the Work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission to Implement the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers concerning Korea

The Soviet delegation proposed procedures for the work of the Joint Commission on Korea and the terms for consultation with parties and public organization; specifically, it called for the Commission to consult and only listen to parties and organizations of Korea that agreed with the Moscow Decision. The American delegation refused this demand, causing lengthy disputes. A list of parties and public organizations from both South Korea and North Korea for the consultation were drawn, but the right-wing parties in the Democratic Chamber, the administrative body of South Korea, opposed the Moscow decision and Joint Commission decision, and the discussion associated with the formation of a Provisional Korean Government was halted.

December 6, 1946

Report from General-Colonel T. Shtykov to Cde. I.V. Stalin and Cde. V.M. Molotov

Shytkov concludes that the Soviet delegation cannot back down from its demands for the parties in Korea to support the Moscow decision. A reversal of this position, Shtykov writes, would lead to the domination of US-backed, right-wing parties to take control over the Provisional Government of Korea.

June 17, 1980

Confidential Note from M.G. Roberts (Joint Nuclear Unit) to Sir A. Acland, 'Panorama Documentary on Pakistan Nuclear Programme'

The FCO’s Joint Nuclear Unit (JNU) assessed the Panorama documentary as correct in broad terms, but speculative and inaccurate in most details. Analysts contended that the most significant allegation was that of the Libyan/‘Islamic’ bomb, but that there was still no substantive evidence that Libya had provided finance or that Pakistan had agreed to proliferate. Anonymous allegations in the documentary were said to be ‘sensational’ but carried ‘little conviction’.

June 18, 1980

Confidential Note from R.D. Lavers (South Asia Department) to Mr. Roberts (Joint Nuclear Unit), 'Pakistan Nuclear: Panorama Programme, 16 June

June 16, 1980

Transcript of BBC Panorama Television Program, 'Project 706: the Islamic Bomb'

From early 1979 onwards, media coverage of the "Islamic bomb" became ever more prominent. In Mid-June 1980, the BBC's prestigious Panorama investigative strand aired "Project 706: The Islamic Bomb," that seemingly underscored alleged Pakistani-Libyan connections, uranium supplied by Niger, the complicity of British, German, Italian, and Swiss industry, and the threat of pan-Islamic nuclear proliferation. Reporter Philip Tibenham opened by alarmingly informing viewers that: "This convoy grinding across the empty Sahara is carrying what could be the raw material for the world’s first nuclear war …. It’s been mined in the Islamic state of Niger. It’ll be flown on to Islamic Libya; then on to Islamic Pakistan. Tonight, Panorama reports exclusively on payments of millions of pounds by Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi to finance Pakistan’s efforts to build the ‘Islamic bomb’."

December 7, 1984

Chief of the Pasvalys Regional Branch of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR Lt. Colonel S. Saveikis, 'A Plan for the Individual Training of a Young Officer of the State Security Service'

This document provides a set of instructions concerning the matters that a newly-recruited state security officer who has not gone through the Chekist educational system needs to know in order to perform his Chekist duties in the successful manner.

March 23, 1979

Cabinet Ministerial Group on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: Pressures and Inducements'

This report, created in March 1979 by the Ministerial Group on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, explores the state of Pakistan’s nuclear program. The document also explores topics like Pakistan’s political status among its neighbors in the Arab world, as well as possible ways Pakistan could be induced to terminate its nuclear activities.

In the face of alarmists such as Arthur Hummel in the US and Anthony Parsons in the UK, the influential British analysts on the Ministerial Group on Nuclear Non-proliferation thought it unlikely that Arab countries would knowingly fund Pakistan's nuclear programme, even though it was suggested many Muslim states might welcome a co-religionist achieving the ‘ultimate technological feat’. For nations such as Saudi Arabia, relations with the West were situated as far more significant than connections with Islamabad, despite Pakistan's position as a bulwark between the Muslim world and the USSR. The group suggested enlisting Arab governments in order to put pan-Islamic pressure on Pakistan, arguing that security concerns related to India – and not a desire to equip the Muslim world with a ‘nuclear sword’ – were the nuclear programme's main drivers. Addressing Islamabad’s security issues – a constant in British and American discussions about Pakistan – represented the surest way of achieving positive results. Where the pan-Islamic issue might come into play – analysts suggested – was after any Pakistani nuclear test, where Islamabad might enlist Muslim countries to help resist Western pressure to give up ‘the first nuclear weapon to be developed in a Moslem country.'

Pagination