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December 15, 1966

Record of a Conversation between CPSU CC General Secretary Cde. L. I. Brezhnev and Cde. Le Duc Tho, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the VWP CC

Brezhnev and Le Duc Tho discuss the Vietnamese War.

November 26, 1969

US Embassy Bonn Telegram 15293, 'NPT – Text of FRG Note on NPT Signature'

This telegram detailed the conditions under which the West German's would ratify the NPT, which depended on the results of EURATOM-IAEA safeguards negotiations.

November 28, 1969

State Department Telegram 199360 to US Embassy Bonn, 'FRG and Swiss NPT Signatures'

On 28 November 1969, West German Ambassador to the United States Rolf Pauls signed the NPT at the State Department and delivered a statement and a detailed note. At the signing Secretary Rogers spoke about the treaty’s value, the “historic” importance of the West German signature, the U.S. understanding that the UN Charter “confers no right to intervene by force unilaterally in the Federal Republic of Germany,” and a reaffirmation of U.S. security guarantees to NATO and the Federal Republic.

November 5, 1969

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Ambassador Helmut Roth, 'US-FRG Consultations on NPT,' with memorandum attached

During these consultations on the NPT, the chief West German official, Helmut Roth, Chief of the Foreign Office’s Disarmament Section, reviewed the progress of the talks with Secretary of State Rogers. Roth emphasized the importance of the “reaffirmation” of US security commitments “at a time when [the Federal Republic] was signing a renunciation of nuclear weapons for its own defense.”

April 30, 1969

Thomas Hughes, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary of State, 'FRG - Further Delay on NPT Signature,' Intelligence Note-327

Noting that the same objections to the NPT remained, INR opined that some West German politicians were using them “to rationalize an opposition that is really based on nationalistic emotions and on the political advantages to be derived from playing upon these emotions.”

November 27, 1968

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Prospects for the Nonproliferation Treaty'

According to this CIA evaluation, the West German governing coalition was so divided and so antagonistic to the Soviet Union in light of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20 August that action was “unlikely for the time being.”

July 26, 1968

US Embassy Bonn Telegram 14922 to State Department, 'Eppler on NPT'

Erhard Eppler, a Social Democratic member of the Bundestag, gave embassy staffers his perspective on the political status of the NPT. Highly critical of Kiesinger for his “hold-back tactics” on signing and ratification, Eppler believed that the longer the delay the more likely that the treaty “would become entangled in election campaign politics.”

January 23, 1968

US Embassy Bonn Telegram 7557 to State Department, 'FRG Defense Council Meeting on NPT'

This telegram detailed an FRG Defense Council Meeting on the NPT. While recognizing that the agreement on Article III was “progress,” Kiesinger continued to criticize the treaty’s “inflexibility,” which he saw as a danger to West Germany’s “longer term” security interests. Kiesinger, however, professed willingness to consider signing the Treaty, even to be an early signer, if Washington could comply with a few basic “requests,” such as “safeguards against Soviet pressure” and some improvements in Article III.

October 6, 1967

State Department Telegram 50379 to US Embassy Bonn, 'NPT'

In this meeting with Deputy Under Secretary Eugene Rostow, West German Embassy official Georg Lilienfeld listed desiderata, including a limited y duration, assurances against Soviet blackmail, acceptable language for the safeguards article, “more balanced rights and obligations,” and non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic.

May 10, 1967

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and State Secretary Baron Guttenberg, 'German Views on NPT and NATO'

This conversation between Rusk and Baron Guttenberg, a top official on Kiesinger’s staff and the CDU foreign policy spokesperson, demonstrated that accepting Bonn’s suggestions for the NPT draft had not made it more acceptable to the West Germans. Guttenberg emphasized the importance of a limited duration clause and the need for the Soviet Union to make a “counter-concession” in exchange for a West German signature on an NPT.

Pagination