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Rhee, Syngman

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April 26, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger In this conversation, Johnson and Kiesinger discussed the state of U.S.-German relations, Johnson’s irritation with German critical press coverage and public opinion, Kiesinger’s worries about the NPT and the withdrawal of U.S. forces, Johnson’s concern about the high costs of keeping troops in Western Europe, and U.S. interest in a “different relationship with the Soviet Union.”
April 26, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Foreign Minister Willie Brandt, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty' During this meeting, Brandt and Rusk discussed the French attitude toward a West German signature on the NPT, thew problem of "duration", and suggestions for mitigating the West German concerns. Brandt said that De Gaulle “expected” Bonn to sign but if that de Gaulle was asked for advice, he would recommend that Germany not sign.
April 21, 1967	'The President’s Trip to Germany (Chancellor Adenauer's Funeral), April 1967, Background Paper, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Germany' This document detailed West German suggestions which Washington incorporated into the NPT draft.The cover memorandum reviewed the sources of West German discontent with the NPT.
April 20, 1967	US Embassy Bonn Telegram 12582 to State Department, 'NPT—Duration,' partly garbled transmission A message from the Bonn embassy highlighted an issue that had been raised by West German diplomats and which Ambassador McGhee correctly believed represented thinking at the top: Chancellor Kiesinger’s objection to an NPT “of unlimited duration.”
April 12, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between Norwegian Ambassador Arne Gunneng and ACDA Director Foster, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty' In this conversation, Director Foster and Norwegian Ambassador Gunneng discussed the state of the NPT negotiations and the U.S. consultations with West Germany. Foster made comments about Italy and West Germany being inflexible, and Gunneng stated that it would cost the country "a great deal internationally" if they continued to block progress.
April 7, 1967	US Embassy Paris Telegram 15735 to State Department, 'Vice President’s Visit: Meeting with General de Gaulle on April 7 – Nonproliferation Treaty' During his meeting with French president de Gaulle, Vice President Humphrey said that Washington knew the “French position” of opposition to the NPT, but wanted to know what de Gaulle thought the “German attitude” should be.
April 6, 1967	US Embassy Bonn Telegram 11806 to State Department, 'Vice President’s Visit III: Non-Proliferation Treaty' During this discussion with Vice President Humphrey, Kiesinger declared that the NPT was a “serious problem,” but said that he disagreed with some West German conservatives that it was “was not politically acceptable.” For Kiesinger, the problem was the Soviet Union, “which for years, and without any reason had attacked, slandered and threatened” West Germany.
March 27, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Hubert Humphrey and ACDA Director Foster, 'Ambassador Foster’s Briefing of Vice President on NPT,' with enclosure, 'Questions Most Likely to be Asked on NPT' During this conversation, Director Foster briefed Vice President Humphrey about the progress of the NPT. Foster said that he was willing to meet Germany’s concerns about such issues as protecting its civil nuclear industry and a future European federation. Moreover, noting that Washington had to discuss the NPT with other countries that could “otherwise go nuclear,” Foster worried that a long delay caused by consultations could “jeopardize the chance of the rest of the world getting signed up.”
March 21, 1967	US Department of State Airgram CA-6579 to US Embassy Moscow, 'Kosygin's Remarks on Non-Proliferation in London' In this Airgram, the U.S. embassy in Bonn sent a translation of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin's tough statement on the NPT at a press conference in London. Kosygin stated (of West Germany) "whether she wants this or not, such a document should be signed, because we will not allow the Federal Republic of Germany to possess nuclear weapons."
March 10, 1967	US Embassy Bonn Telegram 10500 to State Department, 'Ambassador Foster’s Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger' To try to strengthen West German confidence, ACDA director William C. Foster met with Chancellor Kiesinger, who expressed concern about the danger of “erosion” and “uncertainty” in U.S.-West German relations and the need for more time for consultations. Kiesinger’s “own idea was that it would have been better …to have discussed all aspects of non-proliferation ‘behind locked doors’ before any intention of signing the treaty had become public.”