Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

Related Resources

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Emir Farid Chehab

Emir Farid Chehab Collection

Gyeongbokgung

East Asia

South Korea

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Sino-Soviet Relations

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898- 1976

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893- 1976

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879- 1953

Kim Il Sung, 1978

Kim, Il Sung

1912- 1994

Press Briefing by Permanent Observer of Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the UN, 7 July 1976.

Inter-Korean Relations

Dr. Syngman Rhee, 1939

Syngman Rhee Era

Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

-

Dr. Syngman Rhee, 1939

Rhee, Syngman

1875- 1965

Results:

2881 - 2890 of 15969

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

December 10, 1964	Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson During this conversation Wilson, McNamara, Rusk, and Ball continued the discussion of the British proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force, including possible command arrangements. Other topics included the impact of the Chinese nuclear test and a nonproliferation agreement.
December 7, 1964	Untitled Read-Out for State Department of Johnson-Wilson Conversation Account of the first day of the Johnson-Wilson discussions prepared by State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin Read probably on the basis of an account by Secretary of State Rusk.
December 7, 1964	Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson In this conversation, President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson discuss the MLF and the proposed ANF--the "Atlantic Nuclear Force," a British proposal as an alternative to the MLF. The two leaders weighed the pros and cons of both proposals, with President Johnson ultimately deciding to give a positive response to the ANF, leaving it up to the British to see if Bonn could be enlisted.
August 2, 1963	US Embassy Bonn Airgram A-250 to State Department, 'Secretary McNamara’s Conversation with Chancellor Adenauer' In this conversation, Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary McNamara discussed the West Germans signing the U.S. proposed Limited Test Ban Treaty, which Adenauer felt would be a "success" for the Soviets. Adenauer worried that signing the same documents as the Soviets would recognize the Soviet Occupied Zone.
May 22, 1964	State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin H. Read to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, 'NSAM 241 on Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Plant' Noting that the situation that gave rise to NSAM 41 had improved, Read informed Bundy that intelligence reporting would continue but he wanted permission to stop work responsive to the NSAM. There had been “no indication of any attempts by the French to enlist German or Italian cooperation in the Pierrrelatte project.”
May 12, 1964	Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk, UK Foreign Secretary Butler, and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, 'Tripartite Discussion of Non-Dissemination' In this discussion between Rusk and the British and French Foreign Ministers, the three discuss a proposed British nonproliferation declaration. Rusk had no objection but Couve de Murville found the declaration “patronizing” because it said “in effect that we [nuclear weapons states] are sinners and don’t want others to join us in sin.”
October 10, 1963	Memorandum of Conversation between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Gromyko, 'Non-Dissemination and the MLF' In this conversation, President Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko discussed the Soviet attitude toward the MLF. Gromyko argued that it would be a barrier to a nonproliferation agreement. Kennedy made the standard argument that “one of the reasons for an MLF was to make it less possible for the Germans to press for nuclear weapons of their own.”
July 5, 1963	Secretary of State Rusk to the President, 'Interim Reply to Your Memorandum of May 30, 1963, for Holders of NSAM 241' In this memorandum, Secretary of State Rusk noted Minister Lenz’s denials of any German connection with Pierrelatte or any interest in supporting the French weapons program. He declared that the agencies would continue “reviewing allied attitudes toward the Pierrelatte project and possible measures for inhibiting bilateral cooperation.”
June 11, 1963	A.A. Wells, Director of Office of International Affairs, AEC, to Dr. Ragnar Rollefson, Director, Office of International Scientific Affairs, 'Reported Franco-German Cooperation in Development of the French Gaseous Diffusion Efforts' In this memorandum, Wells reported on comments that West German Minister for Scientific Research Hans Lenz made during a meeting at the Atomic Energy Convention. Noting that West Germany had been holding talks with the French and EURATOM about building a reprocessing plant at Karlsruhe, Lenz “implied that this proposal quite likely had resulted in reports that Germany might be undertaking a cooperative program with France in the development of their gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte.” Lenz then reaffirmed West Germany's commitment to the 1955 Brussels Treaty pledge, declaring that West Germany would not initiate action to develop military applications of atomic energy.
June 6, 1963	Thomas L. Hughes, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Secretary of State, Research Memorandum, 'Franco-German Military Nuclear Cooperation,' REU-43 In this report, INR noted that the French had walked back statements by Charles de Gaulle in January 1963 that he would not object to the development of a West German nuclear capability. This report also includes notes on why the French opposed an MLF, claiming Washington might be "whetting the German appetite" for a national nuclear capability.