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November 28, 1962

Letter, Chief of the Operations Group in the Port of Baltiysk Vice Admiral Mel'nikov to Comrade S.P. Ivanov, attaching a trip report of the motorship 'Volgoles'

A detailed report following the motorship Volgoles from 4 October to 24 November 1962. The report includes information about US overflights and inspections of the motorship. Various shortcomings of the Soviet effort in Cuba are also mentioned.

November 16, 1962

Letter, P.V. Akindinov to the Chief of General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the USSR

A cover letter from the Chief of Headquarters in Cuba indicating that he is submitting photos of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the destruction of Soviet launchpads in Cuba.

October 28, 1962

Note, R. Malinovsky to Comrade N.S. Khruschev [about a US U-2 Aircraft]

A letter to Khrushchev detailing the shooting down of a US U-2 aircraft that attempted to take photographs of Soviet troops on the island of Cuba.

August 1962

Instructions from Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Grechko to the Commanding General of the Soviet Troops on the Island of Cuba

Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Grechko provides strict guidance on the personal and professional conduct of Soviet troops stationed in Cuba.

March 18, 1968

Note for the Directorate of Political Affairs, Disarmament, 'Non-proliferation treaty: Draft resolution on non-nuclear countries guarantees'

The finalization of a completed draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which the ENDC transmitted to by the United Nations without endorsement on March 18, 1968, launched a French review of the NPT’s implications for international law. The draft NPT was accompanied by a proposed United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC), whose soft guarantees against nuclear-weapon use or threats had been a compromise workd out between Washington and Moscow. An initial study by Foreign Ministry lawyers identified numerous “juridical reasons… to fight against a project that, in its letter if not its spirit, constitutes a revision of the [UN] Charter." The report elaborated on how the hierarchization of “forms of aggression” would “downgrade” non-nuclear (i.e. conventional) violence. Non-nuclear-weapon states treaty signatories would receive non-binding security guarantees. The “Anglo-Saxons and Soviets” would maintain “freedom of action as far as what measures they choose to adopt.” Although the French government’s foremost legal experts opted not to advise vetoing the UNSC resolution, they warned the NPT package could serve as a warrant for nuclear-armed permanent members of the UN Security Council to wage “preventive war” in the name of worldwide nonproliferation.

July 10, 1968

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of Political Affairs, Disarmament, 'Note: The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons'

This report recounts developments at the UN First Committee from the beginning of the special session, April 24, to the plenary vote on June 12, 1968. Among the interesting observations was how the “most important resistance cell had … surprisingly developed among the Black African states,” who had sought concessions from the United States on apartheid South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa (modern-day Namibia). The report notes the various changes forced on the superpowers by Italy and Mexico on behalf of the non-nuclear-weapon delegations. The aide-memoire concluded that “[a]lthough these concessions [were] more apparent than real, they served as a pretext for a number of delegations, under intense Soviet and American pressure, to go along with the draft resolution thus revised.” The French delegate to the United Nations, Armand Berard, explained to the General Assembly on June 12 the reasons for France’s abstention. In accordance with Francis Perrin’s recommendations, Berard elaborated that although France would not sign the NPT when “the real issue was effective nuclear disarmament,” it would nonetheless pledged to behave “[e]xactly in such a way as those States which opt to adhere to it.”

March 28, 1968

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of Political Affairs, Disarmament, 'Note: Guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, Draft resolution of the Security Council'

 This short research note briefly explores the case for and against vetoing the UNSC resolution. As the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union were serving as co-sponsors, and the Republic of China on Taiwan would welcome any international measure the People’s Republic of China opposed, France was the only state in a position to veto the UNSC resolution and perhaps torpedo the NPT when the UNGA special session met in late April. If France were to abstain, it would be henceforth bound by the resolution. Even so, the report cautioned whether “a negative attitude” should outweigh “the downside of defeating a project whose intention, if not whose content, fulfills the wishes of the vast majority of non-nuclear delegations.”

April 3, 1968

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of Political Affairs, Disarmament, 'Note: The Question of the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

This 18-page memorandum was circulated to French embassies on the eve of the special UNGA session. The report recaps the series of events leading up to the international meeting, including the early history of the treaty, through an article-by-article analysis of the treaty text’s negotiating history. After reviewing the contexts in which the treaty was negotiated, the report concluded by citing three major elements as informing the French attitude. The first was the German question and, specifically, how the NPT would internationalize West Germany’s non-nuclear status, deepening its dependence on France. The second was the positive attitude of most nations—the vast majority of which lacked the wherewithal to build nuclear deterrents—to institutionalize their neighbors’ non-nuclear-weapon status. The third and “most remarkable element” was the U.S.-Soviet joint effort, undeterred by the Vietnam War, “to consolidate the current world balance under their dual control.” French “reservations” therefore boiled down to two critiques of the emerging regime: that it would “consolidate nuclear monopolies,” namely the U.S. and Soviet power blocs, “and legalize discrimination between States.”

June 2, 1992

One-on-one talks between Minister of State Schmidbauer and Minister of Security Fallahian

Schmidbauer and Fallahian review possibilities for increasing bilateral cooperation in the intelligence field. Schmidtbauer does not see any chances to asssist Iran in the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He  requests Iran's assistance in the release of German hostages in Lebanon.

May 29, 1992

Meeting between Head of Department 2 Hartmann and President Aylwin’s Special Envoy, Ambassador Holger, on 27 May 1992

Hartman and Holger discuss plans for Honecker's release from the Chilean embassy in Moscow and Honecker's refusal to return to Germany. 

Pagination